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CHAPTER I
SOME RECENT ARGUMENTS FOR
THE WILLINGNESS REQUIREMENT
1.

The problem of civil disobedience and its justification has re-

ceived a great deal of attention in the past decade, and it seems safe
to say that a consensus of sorts has been reached with respect to the
basic questions of (i) whether such dissent can be morally justified in
a legitimate constitutional democracy; and, if it can be justified, (11)
roughly what the conditions are under which this is the case.

The re-

ceived view among liberal political theorists, as I understand it, is
that civil disobedience can be morally justified, under certain conditions, even in a more or less just democratic society.

What's more,

there is a remarkable degree of agreement among contemporary thinkers
as to roughly what the conditions are under which civil disobedience
2
is justified.
3
There are dissenters to what I call the received view, of course,
but the degree of agreement among most contemporary writers is quite impressive.

My principal aim in the following chapters is to show that

the received view with respect to the justification of civil disobedience
is radically defective in at least one respect, defective in a way that
is of considerable intellectual and practical consequence.

For according

to virtually every theory of civil disobedience in the recent literature,
an essential part of being morally justified in an act of civil disobedience is a willingness to accept the full legal consequences of that
4
act.
This "willingness requirement", as I shall call it, is incorporated in different ways into different theories, but for the most part
recent theorists agree that civil disobedience is morally justifiable
only, inter alia, if the dissenter is willing to pay the penalty for his
disobedience.

I shall show that this contention is mistaken and that a

willingness to accept the consequences is not required, morally speaking,
1

2

for the justification of civil disobedience, even in a more or less just
constitutional democracy.
As I have said, and as I shall show in considerable detail in section 3 below, the willingness requirement can be incorporated into theories
of civil disobedience in importantly different ways.

Thus, some writers

claim that an illegal act is, by definition, not "civil disobedience" unless the dissenter is willing to accept the consequences of his conduct.
Other theorists, while avoiding this definitional maneuver, have been
anxious to show that, tactically speaking, civil disobedience is not likely
to be effective unless the disobedients exhibit a willingness to pay the
penalty for their disobedience and hence that they ought to do so.

I

shall have much more to say about these matters below (see section 3 ) , but
I want to emphasize from the start that I am not interested in arguments
for the willingness requirement that proceed primarily on either definitional or tactical grounds. My concern is with arguments that make a
willingness to pay the penalty a matter of moral and political principle.
I need to say something about this last point before going on.
When a thinker claims that civil disobedience can be "justified",
even in a reasonably just democratic society, for example, he is usually
claiming not that disobedience to the law can be legally justified but
that despite its obvious (and intentional) illegality such conduct can
be morally justified.

And one point which nearly all of these thinkers

emphasize is the point I've made my quarry:

the claim that to be morally

justified in his illegal action the civil disobedient must be willing to
accept the legal penalties for an act that is itself morally right and
perhaps even morally obligatory.
That in general one should expect to have to suffer for one's moral
righteousness, as a sad matter of fact, is perhaps not surprising; but
that one should be required, as a matter of moral principle, to expect
and accept punishment for doing what is otherwise morally right and perhaps even morally obligatory, is, it seems to me, somewhat paradoxical.
And in any case, even if this apparent paradox can be dissipated, if
someone wishes to argue that I have an obligation to accept that punish-
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ment willingly, when I have rightly refused to obey an unjust law, it
seems that the proponent of this view ought to bear the burden of proof.
We should expect him to give us, first, a general account of what it is
for an action to be morally right (even if plainly illegal) and, second,
a very detailed account of why it is that, morally speaking, it is right
to punish right conduct (when the latter is illegal).
Curiously, no more than a handful of recent theorists have made any
effort to discharge this burden of proof.

It is worth noticing why this

is so and how it is that the burden of proof is assumed to lie where it
is taken to lie in recent discussions of the justification of civil disobedience, and I shall get into these matters below (see Chapters III
and IV).

It will be my contention that almost all recent discussions of

civil disobedience, while anxious to vindicate the right of the Individual
to disobey unjust laws as a last resort, have taken place in a framework
that makes it quite natural to put the entire (moral) burden of proof on
the individual in establishing his right to disobey, rather than on
society in making good its right to enforce legislation that is at best
controversial, from the point of view of justice and morality, and is in
some cases clearly unjust and immoral.
But before doing this I wish to glance, in this chapter, at some
of the more articulate defenses of the willingness requirement in the recent literature, and suggest roughly where they go wrong.

In Chapter II

I want to study the best explicit defense I know of for the willingness
requirement: Professor John Rawls's arguments in Chapter VI of his recent
book, A THEORY OF JUSTICE.

I shall show that Rawls's (explicit) argu-

ments are really no better than the arguments of his predecessors.
In Chapters III, IV, and V I shall elaborate what seems to me a far
more impressive defense of the willingness requirement, a defense that is
suggested by some recent work of Rawls on a related topic.

This defense

fails too, however, and in Chapter VI I shall show why this is so.
My aim in Chapter VI is to show how the willingness requirement
gains whatever plausibility it has from our tendency to think that it
would be impossible —

or disastrous —

to allow legal defenses for civil
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disobedience, defenses that would be based on the claim that the illegal
act was morally justified.

In this last chapter I shall attempt some

crude legal draftsmanship and suggest roughly how defenses based on the
moral propriety of disobedience to the law might be worked into our
judicial system.

A great deal of work obviously remains to be done in

this last area.

My principal aim is to show why we must face the task

of doing it and to suggest that this is not an impossible task.

2. I indicated above that what I call the "willingness requirement" is
built into different theories of civil disobedience in different ways.
It would be nice if this were not so.

For then I could simply say

"Here's the view I'm after," point to it in a number of recent theories,
and show how none of the arguments in its favor does the job required
of it. My task is complicated, however, by the fact just mentioned:
not every theory I wish to discuss straightforwardly contends that civil
disobedience is simply not justified unless the disobedient is ready and
willing to accept all the legal consequences of his illegal act.

In

some cases we shall indeed find contentions as straightforward as this
one.

But in the most interesting cases, we shall not find that the

willingness requirement is made an explicit necessary condition of justified civil disobedience.

Part of our task, then, will be to determine

just what role paying the penalty plays in a given theory of civil disobedience.
The following distinctions will enable me to isolate the precise
component of recent liberal political theory that I am interested in.
There are, to begin with, at least three very different sorts of reasons
that are frequently given for saying that anyone contemplating civil disobedience ought to be willing to pay the penalty for his illegal act.
The first is simply that he will not be perpetrating "civil disobedience"
if he does not express such a willingness.

The second is that he is not

likely to be successful in his undertaking if he fails to accept the legal
consequences willingly.

The third is that he cannot be justified in what

he is doing unless he is willing to pay the penalty for what he does.
The first move is what I call a "definitional" one.

The second is
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obviously a "tactical" one. And I shall say that arguments involving
considerations of the third sort above are arguments that make paying the
penalty a matter of principle: the act is not morally justified if the
relevant willingness is not present.
Unfortunately, none of the theories we shall be studying arranges
things quite so tidily as this.
up without distorting them.

However, I think that we can tidy them

That is, I think we can separate those

thinkers who defend the willingness requirement on definitional or tactical grounds from those who make it a matter of moral and political principle, even though these distinctions are foreign to the works we shall
be studying.

Some thinkers will t u m out to be using just the first and/

or the second sorts of arguments distinguished here.

I am not interested

in these thinkers, for reasons I shall give in a moment. Most thinkers,
however, not having made the distinction in question, will themselves be
unclear as to just what they're defending, with respect to paying the
penalty, much less why they are defending it.
I*m interested in.

These are the thinkers

For after we have separated out the definitional and

tactical components of their theories, we shall find in some cases that
a willingness to pay the penalty remains an essential feature in the
justification of civil disobedience according to these thinkers.

3. Perhaps Professor Hugo Bedau is the best example of the first sort
of defense of the willingness requirement distinguished above.

Bedau

says at the outset of a justly famous article on the subject that he has
been *'unable to find a suitably detailed analysis of what civil disobedience is," and that consequently he has decided to devote most of
his energy to trying to provide an "analysis" of the concept of civil disobedience.

It is in that part of his article devoted to his analysis or

definition of civil disobedience that Bedau remarks that "normally, com:mitting civil disobedience does not involve acting with...intent to resist, even non-violently, the legal consequences of the act"

and calls

the views of Irving Kristol and Robert Penn Warren "quite remarkable in
o

implying the opposite".
If by making acceptance of the legal consequences part of his
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analysis or characterization of civil disobedience Bedau means to define
a special sort of disobedience to the law, a kind of disobedience the
very definition of which includes a willingness to pay the legal penalty,
then obviously I have no quarrel with him.

Professor Bedau, like every-

one else, is perfectly free to define special categories of acts whose
very definition includes this or that.
saying something like the following.

Thus, we might think of Bedau as

There are many different ways of

disobeying the law and many different reasons for doing so.

One form of

disobedience is of special interest to political theorists.

This is a

form of disobedience that is conscientious, nonviolent, and publicly
9
performed, among other things.
Let us call disobedience of this sort
"civil disobedience". It's not that other sorts of disobedience cannot
be justified —

they can.

Thus, revolution is sometimes justified, and

it may be quite violent. Alternatively, a clandestine, illegal abortion
might be justified under certain circumstances.

The point is not one

about justification; it is simply one about what we are going to call the
illegal act. And violent revolutionary acts, as well as clandestine
abortions (where abortions are illegal), are not acts of civil disobedience
as we are speaking of them, even when they're justified.
I think the preceding is pretty much what Bedau has in mind in his
analysis of civil disobedience.
ness requirement.

The difficulty arises with the willing-

It is not part of his explicit definition of civil

disobedience, but I think Bedau more or less wants it to be.

That is,

he pretty clearly wants to say that whether or not one is ever justified
in refusing to accept the legal consequences of illegal conduct, one is
not performing "civil disobedience" if one so refuses.

Thus, the will-

ingness requirement becomes as much a part of the characterization or
definition of civil disobedience as the requirement that it be public,
say, or nonviolent.
In short, Bedau seems to be saying that when you break the law,
even if you do so conscientiously, nonviolently, publicly, and so on, you
are not performing "civil disobedience" unless you are also ready and
willing to accept the legal consequences for what you're doing.

This is

all very fine, and Bedau is entitled to define civil disobedience in this
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way.

But there is one thing Bedau cannot do.

He cannot, without

further argument, say that an act of disobedience to the law, exactly
like an act that he would regard as an instance of justified civil disobedience and performed under exactly the same circumstances with exactly the same aims, is not justified if the disobedient is unwilling to
suffer the full legal consequences of his action.
an act of "civil" disobedience, on Bedau*s view.

To be sure, it is not
And if the matter

ended here, there would be little more to be said, unless one wished to
quarrel about exactly how we ought to define or characterize civil disobedience, which I do not wish to do.

But many thinkers do say, or

imply, not only that an act exactly like an act of justified civil disobedience would not be civil disobedience in the absence of a willingness
to pay the penalty, but also that such an act would not be justified.
This view, it seems to me, is mistaken.

Before proving this, however,

I must dispose of another preliminary matter.

4. Many recent theorists (as well as practitioners) of civil disobedience have pointed out that if the disobedient is honestly seeking
to effect substantive social change by his actions, then he should be
prepared to suffer the consequences of those actions —
sequences in particular.

the legal con-

But this "should" is a prudential "should":

the disobedient should (or ought to) express a willingness to accept the
consequences because in many cases he is likelier to move others and
achieve his aims by doing so.
This is certainly not an unimportant point.

Civil disobedience

is not moral posturing; it is, in the sense we are concerned with, an
attempt to affect social policy, usually by affecting the majority's
"sense of justice", as John Rawls has put it. And doing this will often
involve important tactical considerations:

How will the majority react

to this particular act at this time in such and such a place?
take us seriously?

Will they

Will they appreciate our sincerity and depth of

feeling about this issue?
As many recent writers have pointed out, a willingness to accept
the legal consequences of one's action is particularly helpful with
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respect to the last question above.

Thus, Professor Marshall Cohen has

written that:
After openly breaking the law, the traditional
disobedient willingly pays the penalty. This
is one of the characteristics that serves to
distinguish him from the typical criminal...
and it helps to establish the seriousness of
his views and the depth of his commitment as
well.12
Cohen is quite emphatic in denying that accepting the penalty has anything to do with the justification of the illegal act and in emphasizing what is (for him) its strictly tactical relevance. Thus, speaking
of the suffering that accepting the penalty often entails, he says:
"This suffering does not justify the act of civil disobedience, but it
helps to establish the disobedient's seriousness and his fidelity to law
13
in the eyes of the majority...".
In the same vein, Cohen suggests
still another tactical reason for being willing to suffer the legal consequences of an illegal act:
The disobedient's willingness to suffer punishment has another purpose as well. It is meant
to weaken the will of the transgressors and to
discourage them from a course of action that
the dissenters consider immoral. For, if the
transgressors do not draw back, they may be
forced to punish some of the most scrupulous
and dedicated members of the community. The
fact that this is so will often persuade those
who heedlessly supported the original measures,
not to mention those who supported them with a
dim sense of their injustice, to withdraw their
support or even to join the opposition. Forcing
others to suffer for their moral beliefs is a
high price for pursuing a questionable course
of conduct and many will prefer not to pay it.-'-^
In what follows it is not part of my intention to take issue with
these and similar tactical considerations. Indeed, as I hope I have made
clear, I agree with Professor Cohen that a willingness to accept the legal

consequences of one's (illegal) acts may often be a very important tactical
consideration in perpetrating effective civil disobedience. Hence, if an
author emphasizes the importance of accepting the legal consequences of
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an illegal act because of the strategic or tactical effect such an
acceptance might have —

in convincing the general public of the sin-

cerity of the disobedients, for example, or of the purity of their motives —

then I have no quarrel with him, for he is not making a moral

issue out of the willingness requirement in the sense that interests
me.
But we must not confuse tactics with principles (Professor Cohen
certainly does not, as we have seen), and the position I shall be concerned with is one that insists on a willingness to accept punishment
(or any other legal consequences) not for tactical reasons but for
reasons of principle —

namely, because the illegal act is not morally

justified unless the agent is willing to accept its legal consequences.
I think it is fair to say that the latter view is the position of the
thinkers whose views we shall now consider, and where it is not, I am
not concerned with attacking them.

5. The clearest kind of case in which we would have an example of
a thinker for whom the willingness requirement is a matter of moral and
political principle in the justification of civil disobedience is that
of a thinker who explicitly claims that a willingness to pay the penalty
is one of the necessary conditions for the justification of an act of
civil disobedience.
such an example.

Professor Stuart M. Brown provides us with just

He writes:

In order to be justified, acts of civil disobedience must meet each of at least three conditions:
(1) persons may not be harmed, and property may
not be destroyed; (2) there must be unconditional
submission to arrest and to the legal penalties
for the breaches; and (3) the protests, in the
course of which the breaches occur, must be
directed at constitutional defects exposing either
all the people or some class of the people to
-^
legally avoidable forms of harm and exploitation.
It is, of course, the second of these three conditions for the
justification of civil disobedience that interests us here. Unfortunately, Brown does not provide an independent defense of this second
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condition; instead, for reasons he does not explain, he first defends his
third condition at great length and then returns to the first two conditions and argues for them together.

After explaining and defending the

third condition, then. Brown writes:
The remaining two conditions for justifying civil
disobedience are the protection of persons and
property and the passive submission to arrest and
punishment. The first restricts the kind of law
that may be broken; the second restricts the extent to which the defiance of a given law may be
carried.17
Brown then gives three arguments for these two conditions, without explicitly indicating to what extent each argument specifically applies
to one, the other, or both of these conditions.

He begins with the fol-

lowing argument:
There are three reasons for making these restrictions. The first is that the use of force and
violence, being evil in itself and being no less
evil for being used in a good cause, can be
morally justified only in circumstances where the
alternative is an even greater evil and cannot,
therefore, be justified in cases of civil disobedience. 1^
As it stands this argument involves a patent non sequitur: it
simply does not follow from the fact that force and violence are great
evils, which can only be justifiably used in special circumstances,
that force and violence cannot be justified in cases of civil disobedience.

Indeed, some recent writers have been inclined to think

that property is less than universally sacred, and while they have been
anxious to retain the prohibition against violence toward persons, violence toward

property is sometimes thought to be justifiable in at
19
least some cases of civil disobedience.
We need not go into this here,
however, for although Brown has led us to believe that his argiiment is
directed at both the first and the second conditions, this first reason
for the restrictions those conditions imply bears only on condition (1),
which protects "persons and property" and forbids "the use of force and
. T
„20
violence.
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Brown comes to the point when he gives his second and third reasons
for conditions (1) and (2). He says:
The second reason for imposing these restrictions is the need to maintain a clear, sharp
distinction between justified acts of civil
disobedience and justified acts of civil
rebellion.21
This argument is certainly obscure —

at best enthymematic —

but I think

Brown's point is this: violence and an unwillingness to accept the
legal consequences of one*s (illegal) acts may be justified in all-out
rebellion, but we must be careful to distinguish such civil rebellion
from "civil disobedience", which is a much milder form of protest and
where violence and this unwillingness cannot be permitted.
Now if this were merely what I have called a "definitional"
move on Brown*s part, I would have no quarrel with it. However, as I
shall show shortly, there is conclusive evidence (indeed, an explicit
statement) in Brown* s paper that his reasons for (1) and (2) are not
intended to be merely definitional.

But if this is so, then this sec-

ond reason simply rests on a confusion.

For the idea is that, while

violence and an unwillingness to accept punishment may be justified in
an all-out rebellion, we must still preserve an alternative form of
civil protest that is nonviolent and where the dissident is willing to
accept the legal consequences of his acts.

But this is to assume that

there is only one alternative to all-out civil rebellion, which is obviously false.

The possibilities for protest and dissent range from

something like a mild voicing of polite disagreement with the law or
policy in question, through "traditional" civil disobedience, so-called
"direct action" and so forth, all the way up to full-scale revolution.
Now at any stage short of all-out revolution, for both tactical and
theoretical (I mean "principled") reasons, violence and a willingness to
accept the legal consequences of one's actions may or may not be justified.

And even if at some point violence may not be justified (until

conditions get worse), it does not follow that an unwillingness to pay
the penalty is justifiable only when violence is justifiable.

As we
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shall see in Chapter II, such a claim assumes that one can display such
an unwillingness only in some manner that involves force or violence,
an assumption which is plainly false.

In any case. Brown certainly

cannot justify conditions (1) and (2) simply by calling for a clear and
sharp distinction between "justified acts of civil disobedience and
justified acts of civil rebellion."

This is indeed an important dis-

tinction to observe and to preserve; it does not ensure conditions (1)
and (2), as Brown would like it to (and needs it to), however, unless
22
these are the only two courses open to a dissident.
Finally, Brown gives his third reason for cond.itions (1) and (2)
and the *'restrictions" they imply:
The third reason for maintaining these restrictions is to preserve civil disobedience as a
tolerable, ritualized form of public protest in
which law-breaking is minimal and for the most
part formal.23
Now when Brown argues for conditions (1) and (2) by saying that they
will "preserve civil disobedience as a...ritualized form of public protest", and so forth, it almost seems inevitable that we conclude that
he is now simply defining what he considers an important form of political protest that is well worth preserving.

But such an inference flies

in the face of Brown*s explicit assertion that "a public protest in
which the participants injure others, destroy property, and resist arrest
is no less an act of civil disobedience; it is merely an unjustified
24
one."
I think this assertion makes it clear that Brown does not intend his remarks in what I have been calling the "definitional" sense.
But if this is not his intent, then what is it, since this third "reason"
is certainly a difficult one to interpret?
I think the answer is that this last (third) reason is what I
called earlier a "tactical" one —

but with a difference.

Some authors

insist on non-violence and a willingness to accept legal consequences
as an important tactical consideration in certain particular instances
of civil disobedience; but I think Brown's argument is slightly more
subtle, or at least somewhat different.

For he is arguing that it is
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tactically important not just for any particular act of disobedience to
be characterized by conditions like (1) and (2) but that, from the point
of view of the disobedients, it is important for there to be an institution or institutionalized form of disobedience to the law characterized
by such conditions.
The argument, as I understand it, rests on the claim that it is
strategically important that there be some form of dissent which the
general public can recognize as a form that will be both nonviolent and
submissive (with respect to legal consequences), despite its illegality.
The reasons for this latter claim are somewhat obscure.

Is the point

simply that if there is such a ritualized form of dissent, with nonviolence and the willingness requirement built into it, then the public
will be more likely to appreciate the sincerity of the dissenters and to
distinguish them from run-of-the-mill criminals?
faces a number of difficulties.

If so, the argument

First, it seems to take a rather cynical

view of the general intelligence in a democratic society.
this point in Chapter II.

Secondly, it is a tactical point, even if a

generalized one, and hence does not prove —
prove —

I return to

what Brown had set out to

that in order to be justified civil disobedience must, in

principle, be characterized by a willingness to accept the consequences,
much less that such a willingness is a necessary condition of justified
civil disobedience.
But suppose we concede Brown's cynicism about the public's ability
to assess different forms of Illegal conduct differently, and suppose we
further concede that, in light of this, "it is important," as he says,
to preserve a form of disobedience to the law like that characterized by
Brown.

There is still a third difficulty in Brown's argument.

For it

now seems that Brown is making both a definitional and a tactical point:
we ought to include nonviolence and the willingness requirement in our
very conception of justified civil disobedience because it seems strategically important (from the point of view of the disobedients themselves)
to do so.
It is difficult to evaluate such a claim in the absence of more

14

explicit arguments, and I shall not be able to do so in any detail until
Chapter II, where I consider a related claim made more recently, and defended more cogently, by both John Rawls and Marshall Cohen.

But it is

important to notice here that by failing to separate the nonviolence requirement and the willingness requirement. Brown has left himself in an
awkward position.
against violence —

There are many reasons for cautioning dissenters
indeed. Brown has mentioned some above —

and tactical

considerations are not even foremost among them.
But when Brown insists that in order to be justified civil disobedients must express a willingness to pay the penalty, he must give us
more than definitional or tactical rationalia for this claim (if he
wishes to make more than definitional or tactical points, at any rate,
25
as he obviously does).
For now he is no longer advising dissenters
to respect the persons and property of others; he is insisting that they
welcome damage (in the form of punishment and fines) to themselves.
This they may be willing to do, for the sake of their long-range goals
and if the circumstances seem to require it. But in the absence of arguments to the contrary, it would seem that this decision, being a tactical
one, should be left to the dissenters.
What such "arguments to the contrary" would have to show, of course,
is why, as a matter of moral principle and not simply as a matter of political cunning, a dissenter has to pay the legal penalty for resisting
unjust legislation.

Brown does not provide us with such arguments.

But

this third argument is a suggestive one, and I return to it at the beginning of Chapter II when I consider the view of John Rawls and Marshall
Cohen.

6. Brown's paper appeared when the decade of discussion on civil disobedience was just beginning, and it would be unfair to expect him to
see and effectively deal with problems that arose precisely because of
the work of thinkers like himself.

Before we proceed to the arguments

of more recent thinkers, however, it will be instructive to look at the
position of one other early theorist of civil disobedience. Professor Milton Konvitz of the Cornell University Law School.

The principal merit of
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Professor Brown*s position is that he says quite straightforwardly that
the willingness requirement is a necessary condition of justified civil
disobedience on his view.

Unfortunately, Brown*s arguments for this

claim are rather sketchy, as we have seen.

Professor Konvitz, on the

other hand, provides arguments of some length and subtlety in defense
of the willingness requirement.

But Konvitz is like many more recent

thinkers in an unfortunate respect: he does not say explicitly that
the willingness requirement is a necessary condition in the justification of civil disobedience.
There is no question that Konvitz is defending this requirement
for reasons other than the tactical and definitional ones distinguished
above, as we shall see. And he defends the moral basis of the willingness requirement at some length.

But what we gain in depth of argument,

we lose in clarity with respect to just what role the willingness requirement is playing in Konvitz*s theory of civil disobedience.

This

is a problem we shall have to face again and again in looking for arguments for and defenses of the willingness requirement.

It is not until

we get to the theory of Professor John Rawls in the next chapter that I
shall be able to clear up these difficulties completely.
Konvitz has written that "voluntary —

and even willing —

assump-

tion of the legal punishment for violation of the law is an essential
26
characteristic of civil disobedience."
This could easily amount to no
more than the claim that disobedience to the law is not "civil disobedience" unless the disobedient willingly accepts the legal consequences
of his action.

But in the context of Konvitz's article it becomes clear

that he wants to say more than this, although it is less clear just how
much more he wants to say.

Thus, he claims that civil disobedience "en-

tails the penalty of the law" and that "the penalty must be imposed",
adding cryptically that "in this way [i.e., by straightforward imposition
and willing acceptance of the penalty], civil disobedience may render
27
unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's".
As if to underline his position with a final thrust, Konvitz concludes his article
by remarking that:
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by looking only at the act of disobedience, one
sees only half of the event. The punishment is
the other half, which is just as essential to
the person as the act of disobedience.28
Why is all this so, according to Konvitz?
I think we can distinguish three different reasons for this view
in Konvitz's paper.

These lines of argument are at least hinted at in

a great deal of other writing on this subject, and it will be useful
to deal with them once and for all here.

Only the first of these three

lines of thought has much plausibility, but the other two are worth
sketching and refuting. Konvitz does not himself distinguish these
three different reasons for his view, and in order to sort them out I
shall have to quote three different passages from his article.
It will be easier to see the point of Konvitz's first argument
for the willingness requirement if we bear in mind that in his paper
Konvitz is replying to Rawls's early paper "Legal Obligation and the
29
Duty of Fair Play".
Rawls had not yet articulated his subsequent
theory of the justification of civil disobedience, much less his defense of the willingness requirement, but Konvitz was quick to anticipate at least part of it.

In the passage below Konvitz speaks of the

intention, as he sees it, of the civil disobedient and describes it in
terms of Rawls's concept of "fair play".

I. The intention of his [the disobedient's] act is
not to override the principles of fair play but
to achieve their vindication in the wills and
institutions of men; and I believe that fair
play requires that we do justice to this intention in our attempt to formulate the moral principles that are the underpinnings of obedience
and disobedience. Such men cannot be in any way
charged with trying to be "free riders". They
try, through civil disobedience and paradoxically,
to affirm, rather than to breach, the agreement
between themselves and the Laws of which Socrates
spoke.30
Now in the suggestion (above) that the conscientious law-breaker is trying
to affirm rather than to breach the "agreement" between himself and the
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Laws in disobeying the law in question, I think we have the seed of the
only of Konvitz's three reasons for his view that is at all possible.
And it is significant, I think, that this particular reason is couched
in "contractual" terms —

i.e., in terms of the hirpothetical (or ficti-

tious) "agreement" between the law-breaker and the Laws.

However, Kon-

vitz does not develop the line of argument that is implicit in this
passage until the last paragraph of his article, where he only adumbrates it quite sketchily, and instead proceeds to an entirely different
and rather curious line of thought and then to an even more curious one.
The first of these two is contained in the following passage, a small
part of which I have already quoted:
II.

What Thoreau said, and what Professor Rawls is
saying, is that the moral judgment must be given
priority over the political or any other judgment.
When pressed far enough, this means that the
individual conscience must have the last word.
If that last word means civil disobedience, which
entails the penalty, then the penalty must be imposed, and in this way both conscience and law are
vindicated. Socrates could not and would not accept
as binding on his conscience the majority vote of
the jury that tried him, but he willingly submitted
to the penalty. So, too, a citizen may not accept
as binding on his conscience the majority vote of
the legislature, though he will willingly submit
to the penalty for his civil disobedience of that
law. In this way civil disobedience may render
unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is
God's.31
Now it simply seems to me absurd to suppose that conscience is in

any sense "vindicated" simply by allowing disobedience that is summarily
punished.

The "Caesar-God" metaphor, moreover, only serves to make

matters worse. Konvitz says that "in this way," i.e., by both calling
the disobedience "justified" (and in that sense "allowing" it and supposedly giving conscience "its due") and then promptly punishing it, we
can see to it that civil disobedience renders "unto Caesar what is
Caesar's and unto God what is God's".

Now Caesar may well be getting his

due in such an exchange, to continue Konvitz's figure, but it hardly
seems that God (or conscience) is.

For how could He?

A man has acted.

18

ex hypothesi, as God wants him to act.

Quite clearly, neither God nor

the man can be expected to feel that he's "gotten his due" when the latter
is subsequently punished for doing exactly what the former wanted him to
do.

At any rate, I doubt that God, if consulted about the matter, would

take Konvitz*s sanguine view about whether He*s getting His due.
In any case, however, I think that this whole way of conceiving
the matter (as expressed in II) is a muddle that Konvitz has fallen into,
and that at least in Passage I, where he speaks about the intention he
thinks the disobedient is acting out of, Konvitz is on to a somewhat
more plausible line of argumentation.

He returns to this line of thought

in Passage III below, but not, unfortunately, without mixing in another
and even less convincing "reason" for the willingness requirement.
III. By looking exclusively at the act of disobedience,
one sees only half of the event. The punishment
is the other half, which is just as essential to
the person as the act of disobedience; for even
as he breaks the law, he intends to restore its
wholeness. He may be mistaken in what he does,
but he ought not to be blamed for wrongs that are
entirely beyond his intention. "What will thou
have? quoth God; pay for it and take it." This
Emersonian rule is the measure by which he who
breaks the law in civil disobedience acts. He
takes and pays, and thus affirms, rather than
overrides, the duty of fair play.32
If we remember that the key-note of Passage I was the disobedient*s
affirmation of the agreement between himself and the Laws, we can see
that Konvitz is returning to this line of thought in Passage III. At
best, however. III contains two kinds of reasons for the willingness
requirement —

one very bad one and another not so bad (though ulti-

mately unsuccessful) one. At worst, it contains only one reason: the
"not so bad one" supported by (cf. the 'thus' in the last sentence of
III) the really bad one.

Let me explain.

On one interpretation Passage III contains two different lines
of thought in support of the willingness requirement.

The first is a

development of that which was adumbrated in Passage I: in breaking
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what he considers an unjust (or immoral) law, and accepting the legal
consequences, not only is he affirming the agreement between himself
and the Laws, but the conscientious law-breaker is also seeking to
restore the "wholeness" of the law in breaking it,

I shall have more

to say about this line of thought below.
The second line of thought in III, on this interpretation, and
Konvitz*s third reason in support of his view, is embodied in the "takeand-pay" metaphor.

The idea, presumably, is that paying the penalty is

part of the cost of breaking the law; and the disobedience is justified
only if the disobedient is willing to pay that penalty.

Professor

Marshall Cohen has expressed the absolute unacceptability of this view
far better than I can hope to do:
It is in interpreting the role of punishment in
the theory of civil disobedience that many errors
are made. For the theory of civil disobedience
does not suggest...that the disobedient*s actions
are justified by his willingness to pay the penalty
that the law prescribes.... This suffering does
not justify the act of civil disobedience, but it
helps to establish the disobedient*s seriousness
and his fidelity to law in the eyes of the majority
whose actions have, in his opinion, justified it.32
Now what are we to make of Konvitz*s other view that "punishment
is just as essential to the person as the act of disobedience" Itself,
because "even as he breaks the law, he intends to restore its wholeness", or because such men are trying "through civil disobedience and
paradoxically, to affirm rather than to breach, the agreement between
themselves and the Laws of which Socrates spoke?"

Certainly, it is

admirable that it should be part of a conscientious law-breaker's intention to affirm his agreement with the Laws and to try to restore the
'*wholeness" of a law that is, to him, for moral reasons or for reasons
of justice, somehow "out of joint".

But while agreeing that such in-

tentions are indeed admirable, we must be careful to ask (1) how it is
that his having these intentions requires him to invite (or at any rate
willingly accept) punishment, or any other legal consequences of his
act; and (ii) whether, indeed, such intentions are in any sense necessar-
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ily connected with justified disobedience to the law.
I think it is clear from Konvitz*s article that the answer to (i)
is a tactical one and not a matter of any moral principle attaching to
the theoretical justification of the act in question; that is, a willingness to accept the legal consequences of his act may be good tactics
just because it may help the disobedient to distinguish himself from
the run-of-the-mill criminal, to establish his sincerity in the eyes of
the rest of the community, indeed, perhaps help "win them over", and so
forth.

As I hope I have made sufficiently clear earlier, however, such

tactical considerations in favor of a willingness to accept punishment
and other legal consequences in no way constitutes an argument for
making such a willingness a necessary condition of justified disobedience
to the law.
Hence, Konvitz*s claims that "voluntary —

and even willing

—

assumption of the legal punishment for violation of the law is an essential characteristic of civil disobedience" and that *'...civil disobedience. . .entails the penalty of the law" simply stand unproven

—

unless, of course, he is simply stipulating that this is a necessary
feature of a certain species of disobedience to the law called *civil
disobedience*.

It is abundantly clear from Professor Konvitz*s article,

however, that he is not merely making such a definitional move. But
since (or if) he is not, then he needs arguments for the willingness requirement and he simply does not offer them; or rather, he offers two
unsuccessful arguments for his position and one sound argument to the
effect that conscientious law-breakers should be sensitive to tactical
considerations.
One final word about this third argument of Konvitz*s, that a
willingness to accept punishment is required as a sign of the disobedient* s affirmation of the "agreement" between himself and the Laws or
as an attempt at restoring the "wholeness" or integrity of a bad law.
It may be that in certain cases of the kind we are considering we will
need "signs" or even explicit assurances that the disobedient is not
trying to rupture the fabric of the law entirely or to break the "agreement** in question.

But it seems slightly paradoxical to insist so

21

stringently on signs and assurances of this sort when we remember the
kind of case we*re dealing with —

namely, cases in which it is precisely

the disobedient*s claim that this "agreement" has been broken by others
(society, say, or some part of it, or some one of its laws or policies).
This man certainly doesn* t need to be reminded of the "agreement" or the
principles of "fair play", since it is exactly his claim that the former
has been broken or that the latter have been violated.
It is in the context of the preceding remarks, I think, that we
can answer question (ii) above quite simply.

There is, of course, a

"necessary" connection of some sort between intentions (on the part of
the law-breaker) of the kind Konvitz describes and justified disobedience
of the kind we are considering.

For it is precisely the spirit of civil

disobedience as we are construing it that the "agreement" between the individual citizen and the Laws (as Konvitz puts it, following Socrates in
the Crito) must not be broken.

It follows analytically from the fact that

a man chooses to defend disobedience to the law with an argument like
Socrates' "contractarian" argument in the Crito that he has intentions in
some sense like those Konvitz wants him to have.

Hence, it is all the

more paradoxical to suppose that we need to "make sure" he has such intentions by insisting that he accept the legal consequences of his action.
Indeed, if his case can be made good, along the lines suggested by Socrates and elaborated recently by John Rawls (see Chapters III and IV below), then it would in fact be wrong (from the point of view of "morality",
"justice", "utility", and so forth) to punish him, much less to expect
him to invite punishment.

Before I can show this, however, and thus give

Konvitz's "fair play" argument its due, I shall have to sketch Rawls's
theory of civil disobedience as well as his argimients for the willingness
requirement.

Before doing that there is an entirely different kind of

defense for the willingness requirement that I want to consider.
7. According to the willingness requirement it is morally right for
society to punish an individual who is, ex hypothesi, doing the morally
right thing in disobeying the law, and it is morally incumbent upon that
individual to accept that punishment and to do so willingly.

This is
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paradoxical, but I must insist that it is part of the received view on
the justification of civil disobedience.

After all, a theory of civil

disobedience is supposed to tell us when civil disobedience is morally
justified.

And according to many recent thinkers civil disobedience

can be justified, even in more or less "just" democratic societies, but
only if the disobedient is willing to pay the penalty for his disobedience.

It is this conjuction of (1) attempting to show that under cer-

tain circumstances it can, on balance, be morally right (and perhaps
obligatory) to perpetrate civil disobedience, while (11) insisting that
it is nonetheless morally right (and perhaps obligatory) for society to
punish such disobedience, that generates the paradox that worries me.
Perhaps it is not inappropriate to point out that resolving this
(apparent) paradox involves us in much more than an academic dispute.
For if what I call the received view is correct, then civil disobedients
who, perhaps understandably, do not want to pay the penalty cannot justly
accuse society of compounding injustice with injustice when they are
punished for violating an admittedly unjust law.

But if I am correct,

and the received view is unsound, then in inflicting punishment on individuals who have justifiably broken the law society is treating them
unjustly and is itself perpetrating a serious moral wrong.

And to the

extent that the received view rationalizes this injustice it is not merely
guilty of intellectual error but of encouraging moral error and injustice
as well.
So much might be said for the importance of our inquiry.

But these

remarks have another bearing on our problem as well, for they suggest
what one would have thought would be the most natural and straightforward
way of determining whether it is morally right to punish people who are
themselves morally right in what they've done.

Curiously, tmtil quite

recently, no one I know of had taken this approach.

In fact, I had

attempted (and failed) to work out a possible defense for the willingness
requirement on my own, in the way considered below, when yet another book
on civil disobedience was published which, if it has no other merit, has
the distinction of being one of the few works in the recent literature
that takes the question of justifying the willingness requirement (and the

23

punishment that comes with it) at all seriously.
in a rather natural way:

What's more, it does this

by asking whether the principles that allegedly

justify inflicting punishment for ordinary criminal acts also justify
punishing those whom we agree are not only conscientious in their disobedience but morally right in perpetrating it as well.
The traditional defense of the institution of punishment, as well
as of its application to particular cases, proceeds along well-known
lines.

There is certainly not much agreement as to just what justifies

us in administering punishment to law-breakers, if we're justified at all,
but there is fairly widespread agreement on the possibilities.

Most at-

tempts to defend punishment rely on the rationale of "deterrence", as it
is called, some rely on that of reform or rehabilitation, a few on the
notion of "retribution** or some more sophisticated variation on retribution; and of course, many rely on some combination of two or even all
three of these traditional rationalia.

It seems natural to ask, then,

whether any of the standard arguments for the general institution of
punishment, either by itself or in conjunction with one or both of the
other arguments, can be used to defend the willingness requirement.
And even if we are skeptical about these traditional moves in defense
of punishment generally, we might ask whether the case for punishing those
who have justifiably disobeyed the law is any worse than the case for punishing law-breakers generally.

Professor Carl Cohen has recently tried to

show that it is not and that the rationalia of retribution, reform and deterrence apply just as much to justified civil disobedience as to unjustified, run-of-the-mill law-breaking.33
Perhaps the most widely-received argument for saying that punishment is at least sometimes morally tolerable is based on the theory of deterrence.

On this view punishment is seen as a way of discouraging the

disobedient from further illegal action as well as discouraging others
from following the disobedient *s example.

I wish to disregard for now the

critically important claim that in fact punishment is far less effective
as a deterrent than is commonly thought.

Suppose we grant that for cer-

tain crimes and certain types of criminals (and potential criminals) deterrence is to some degree effective and hence not an altogether unlikely
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candidate for justifying punishment in at least a wide range of cases.
Nonetheless, even if we accept deterrence as a reasonable rationale for
punishment in some general sense, it is not obvious how the argument is
to proceed when we are talking about punishing people for crimes that we
are willing to concede were themselves morally right.
tion one is tempted to raise is simply this:

The obvious ques-

why should we want to deter

people from acting in a way that we agree is morally right despite the
fact that it is clearly illegal?

If we assume, as Carl Cohen himself

does, that an act of civil disobedience is morally justified when it produces more good for society, in the long run, than evil, it seems odd to
say that such conduct should be discouraged.34
But of course an obvious reply is available to Cohen, and he attempts
to make use of it.

Ideally, it might be true that we should not punish

those who have done more good for society by disobeying the law than they
would have done by obeying it, or when they have disobeyed the law in order
to avoid the injustice of obeying it. Presumably we actually want to encourage such conduct.

But if the individual who (justifiably) engaged in

civil disobedience is not punished, will this not encourage others, who
not so correctly judge the long-range "good" or the immediate "justice"
of a statute, to act in a similar manner?
are courting chaos and disaster.

And surely in allowing this we

For the example set by the disobedient

Jiay be misconstrued, and when he is not punished, many people who would
otherwise be deterred from unjustifiable disobedience may feel justified
in acting illegally and may actually do so, when in fact their disobedience
is not justifiable •— i.e., does not in fact contribute more good than evil
to society in the long run, or is not necessary in order to avoid

perpe-

trating injustice by virtue of complying with an unjust law.^
This is a curious argument.
tant empirical claim:

For one thing, it rests upon an impor-

I call it the "domino theory of civil disobedience."

In this regard one would simply like to know the facts.

For example, is

it true, as a matter of empirical fact, that ordinary people are unlikely
to perceive the difference between conscientious resistance to segregation
laws, say, and other sorts of criminal conduct?

I know of no recent re-

search that would shed any light on questions like this one, and Cohen
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does not allude to any.

This is significant, since his argument depends

on the truth of something like the "domino theory" of civil disobedience.
But this argument faces an even more serious difficulty.

For even

if it could be shown that exempting justified civil disobedience from
the ordinary routine of punishment would have a certain amount of "negative utility", to put it crudely, surely we would want to balance this
against the apparent injustice of punishing the man who has done the
right thing, from either a "teleological" or a "deontological" point of
view, or both, in disobeying the law.

Such a person's claims to consid-

eration in the calculus of good and evil is surely not insignificant.
Moreover, on this view of things, we should have to take seriously the
possibility of a reverse "domino" effect.

That is, we should have to ask

how much socially beneficial disobedience we would be discouraging by
punishing offenders whom we are willing to concede were right in what they
did.

A society that punishes such people might lose more in the long run

than it gains, not simply by discouraging further socially useful disobedience but also by slowly undermining its own moral standing in the
eyes of many of its members.36
The most that can be said, then, for the "deterrent" argument in
favor of punishing even disobedience that is admittedly justified, is that
it rests on a dubious empirical claim and an even more dubious assessment
of moral priorities.

The whole notion of "justified'* civil disobedience

rests, among other things, upon the fact that some acts of disobedience
are better for society than not, and that some are a consequence of our
moral commitment to "justice" and "right conduct" generally.

If it is con-

ceded that in fact we do not want to deter such conduct, but only the unfortunate consequences of ignorant misconceptions of what justified civil
disobedience is all about, then deterrence theory will not provide much
succour to proponents of the willingness requirement until they come up
with the appropriate empirical data and, even more importantly, until they
show us that the evil of punishing a man who has acted rightly in breaking
the law is outweighed by the evil allegedly engendered by the example he
sets in acting as he does.

At present, it seems extraordinary to me that

thinkers like Carl Cohen are so confident that civil disobedience sets a
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"bad" example, even when it is justified, and that they are willJLng to
defend punishment of the righteous man before any of the facts are in
and before the calculus of social good has shown that he must, unfortunately, be punished for the common good.

It is perhaps an understatement,

then, to say that the burden of proof is on Cohen (and his allies) here,
and that this burden has not been sufficiently discharged as yet to warrant Cohen's claim that deterrence theory justifies punishment of justified civil disobedience just as well as it justifies punishment in general.

This is not to say that Cohen's unsubstantiated empirical claim is

absurd or altogether implausible on its face.

It simply stands unproven

as things are.
Another traditional rationale for the institution of punishment is
rehabilitation or reform.

On this view society "punishes" the disobedient

in order to reform him, or change his perspective on anti-social behavior,
so that his conception of social behavior will be more in accord with that
of the society at large. At least up to the point, at any rate, where he
will no longer be inclined to engage in outright anti-social behavior.
Here there is even less reason to believe that our present penal system
is achieving this goal, with any degree of effectiveness, than there is
to believe that it is achieving the goals of deterrence.

But suppose we

avoid this difficulty for now and pretend that we can in fact "reform"
criminals and make them law-abiding citizens. We still face a question
similar to the one raised above: why should we want to "reform" an individual whom we agree acted rightly in disobeying the law?

What rehabil-

itation is in order for the man or woman who rightly protested racial inequality, for example, or any other form of legalized injustice?
Carl Cohen does not have even the hint of an answer to this question,
which is not surprising.

There was at least a superficially attractive way

of explaining why we might want to deter people from attempting to perpetrate justified civil disobedience.

But no similar move is available here,

for the argument would have to contend that for some reason we actually
want (and need) to reform people whom we also want to encourage and applaud.
It is hard even to imagine what such an argument would be like, unless it
took the form of saying that we wanted (and needed) to eliminate civil dis-
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obedience from society altogether.

But neither Cohen nor any other pro-

ponent of the received view can say this, since it is precisely their contention that civil disobedience can, in theory, be morally justified, and
is, in fact, a form of dissent that we both need and want in our society.
Hence, the rationale of reform or rehabilitation lends no support to the
willingness requirement whatever, even if we grant it a fragile plausibility as a rationale for the punishment of ordinary criminal behavior
and even conscientious but unjustified civil disobedience.
There is, finally, the so-called "retributive" rationale for the
institution of punishment.

It is perhaps oddest of all to suppose that

this objective would justify punishing justified civil disobedience, even
if it can justify avenging cold-blooded murder, say, with cold-blooded
capital punishment. Again, the question one would want to press here is
obvious:

just what are we exacting retribution for when we punish a law-

breaker who was morally justified in what he did?
Surely not for "doing wrong"; for, ex hypothesi, he "did right".
And it is certainly not open to the retributivist to say that, despite
the moral rightness of what he did, the civil disobedient must be punished because, after all, he broke the law, although Carl Cohen tenders
this reply and makes much of it.3' Such an argximent contradicts what is
perhaps the single component of retributivist theory that carries even
the slightest plausibility:

that the moral propriety of punishment is

somehow related to the moral impropriety of what was done and that somehow it is appropriate, morally speaking, to do evil to evil-doers (to extract an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth).

It is not the bare

illegality of an action that moves the retributivist to his wrath but the
immorality or downright "evil" of that action.

Since the case we are con-

cerned with is that of an individual who acted rightly in what he did, it
is impossible to tender an argument whereby punishment would be justified
on the grounds that somehow we were "righting" a moral wrong.

In the

cases we are dealing with there is simple no moral wrong to set right, in
38
the retributivist sense.
This is as much as I want to say for now about the sort of approach
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Carl Cohen takes with respect to the justification of the willingness requirement and the punishment of justified civil disobedience.

I do not

pretend that I have said the last word on these matters, and I shall return to them in Chapter V below.

I do think, however, that enough has

been said to show how difficult it would be to defend the willingness requirement on the same grounds that we defend punishment in general.

Carl

Cohen has certainly not shown how this can be done, and in Chapter V I
shall try to show that this is not merely due to his particular limitations.

It is due to the fact that any attempt to vindicate the willing-

ness requirement, while granting that civil disobedience can be morally
justified, is in principle misconceived; for the received view is incoherent in as much as it makes the willingness requirement a part of the
justification of civil disobedience.

CHAPTER II
RAWLS'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE
WILLINGNESS REQUIREMENT
1.

I wish to t u m now to some very recent work on the role that

paying the penalty should play in the theory of civil disobedience.

It

will be helpful to begin by recalling a difficulty we got into with respect to Professor Brown's views in this regard.

This will involve a

certain amount of "backtracking", but it will enable me to connect this
chapter with the previous one and, more importantly, will put the present discussion in the proper perspective.
In one of his arguments for the restrictions that make nonviolence
and a willingness to pay the penalty part of the justification —

and

not simply part of the definition or tactics -— of civil disobedience.
Brown wrote:
The third reason for maintaining these restrictions is to preserve civil disobedience as a
tolerable, ritualized form of public protest in
which law-breaking is minimal and for the most
part formal.
I think Brown* s third argument can be instructively compared with some
of Professor Marshall Cohen*s arguments in a recent article on "Liberalism and Disobedience".

Getting clear on Cohen's view, as compared to

Brown's, will enable me to identify the exact position with respect to
paying the penalty to which I am opposed and against which I shall argue.
I'm fairly certain that Cohen himself does not hold the view I wish to
rebut. However, I think I can show that John Rawls does.

Unfortunately,

it is not perfectly clear that even Rawls holds exactly the view I am
opposed to, but it seems to me that he holds some view close to it.

In

any case, I am only interested in criticizing Rawls's (or anyone else's)
position with respect to paying the penalty to the extent that he makes a
willingness to accept the consequences of civil disobedience a matter of
29
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moral and political principle in the justification of such conduct.
It will be recalled that in trying to get clear on the arguments
involved in Brown*s third reason (above) for the nonviolence and willingness requirements, I noted that Brown was in danger of defending these
requirements on what I call merely definitional or tactical grounds and
not on grounds of moral and political principle.

That is, he seemed

almost to be saying that it was important to have a ritualized form of
dissent whose very definition included the notions of nonviolence and
a willingness to pay the penalty, such that acts which did not have
these characteristics, even if justifiable, would not be "civil disobedience".

What*s more, he seemed to favor this definition (or charac-

terization) of civil disobedience for some sort of general tactical
reasons (see section 5, Chapter I).

But this Interpretation seemed un-

fortunate for Brown*s argument because he says explicitly that "a public
protest in which the participants Injure others, destroy property, and
resist arrest is no less an act of civil disobedience;

it is merely an

unjustified one." There seems to be some inconsistency here.

On the

other hand, it might be argued that my division of the arguments for the
willingness requirement into "definitional", "tactical", and "moral-andpolitical-principle" arguments is an artificial one and, what*s worse,
is a division that obscures the merits of some of the best arguments on
behalf of the willingness requirement as well.

I want to explore this

possibility before addressing myself to Rawls*s defense of the willingness requirement.
I noted earlier that Professor Marshall Cohen is extremely sensitive to the tactical relevance of paying the penalty.

Thus, in a recent

article he has written:
After openly breaking the law, the traditional disobedient willingly pays the penalty. This is one
of the characteristics that serve to distinguish
him from the typical criminal (his appeal to conscience is another), and it helps to establish the
seriousness of his views and the depth of his commitment as well.l
Cohen expands upon these remarks somewhat and finally concludes:

"The
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disobedient*s willingness to face suffering and punishment may be seen,
then, as a useful way of reinforcing the effects of his protest and
2
appeal."
It would be a mistake to conclude from these remarks, however, that Cohen*s sole (or even principal) reason for urging disobedients to pay the penalty is a tactical one. He considers at least
two other reasons as well.

One of these, which we shall consider below

when we discuss Rawls's views on the willingness requirement, has to do
with the notion of "fidelity to law" and its place in a theory of civil
3
disobedience designed to fit a reasonably just constitutional democracy.
As I shall show, there is some reason to believe that Rawls himself believes that under certain conditions not only is illegal dissent without
a willingness to pay the penalty not "civil disobedience" but that, under those conditions, it is not justified either.
seem to want to say this.

But Cohen does not

In remarks addressed to a criticism made by

Professor Kai Nielsen, Cohen says that "Nielsen is essentially correct
...in thinking that I am putting forward a definite conception of civil
4
disobedience," and later continues:
In defining civil disobedience in such a way that
the civil disobedient necessarily accepts the
punishment, I have in no way committed myself on
the question of [moral] legitimacy. It certainly
remains open to me to say that there are justifiable acts of illegal dissent that do not require
the acceptance of punishment. The definition
offered simply has the consequence that where the
disobedient does not accept punishment (and conduct himself in a number of other specified ways),
his actions will not count as civil disobedience
in the sense sketched here, and they will not be
subject to the observations made about that form
of politics.^
This is about as clear a case of what I call the **def initional**
defense of the willingness requirement as I can imagine.

Thus, Cohen

illustrates very nicely the position of both the thinker who urges a
willingness to pay the penalty for tactical reasons and the thinker
who defends the willingness requirement as part of the very definition
of civil disobedience. What's important about the latter point is
that defining civil disobedience in one way rather than another is not
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a matter of mere caprice, as Cohen makes quite clear.

Rather, there is a

certain form of illegal activity that not only has a tradition of its own
in recent democratic politics but that is also particularly appropriate
as a form of dissent in more or less "just" democratic societies.
When I dismiss a defense of the willingness requirement as "merely"
definitional or tactical, then, I do not mean to overlook both the tactical reasons for accepting punishment in a particular case and, perhaps
more importantly, the more general tactical reasons for having a generally
recognized form of disobedience to the law such that when dissenters say
(and show) that they are employing this form of dissent, the general public will know more or less what to expect.

Brown expresses this by ar-

guing that it is important "to preserve civil disobedience as a tolerable,
ritualized form of public protest in which law-breaking is minimal and for
the most part formal."

Cohen elaborates this idea with considerable sub-

tlety in his article, but it is summarized rather well in the following
short passage:
Going to jail does not "end" one's civil disobedience; on the contrary, it is a crucial
part of that disobedience. It is crucial in
characterizing the disobedience as being of a
certain historically intelligible sort, and
this, it is hoped, will have a special effect.
For the fact that the disobedient displays his
fidelity to law and strictly minimizes his
deviation from it, as well as the fact that he
is willing to suffer for his views, is meant
to reassure and to move the majority.6
I hope it is clear enough now why it is important, from one perspective, to preserve what Brown calls "a ritualized form of public protest" and what Cohen sees as a form of protest especially appropriate for
limited dissent to unjust laws or policies in an otherwise just constitutional democracy.

I hope it is also clear that I have no objections to

this view.
But now suppose that I say to Brown and Cohen:

"Imagine two cases

of disobedience in a more or less 'just' democratic society where all
the circumstances and relevant factors are the same except that in-
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dividual A is willing to accept the consequences but B is not. Are you
saying that, because of that fact, A is justified in his disobedience
(given that all the other conditions are met) while B is not?"
To this we must suppose that Cohen would answer:

"He (B) may be

justified, but he is not performing an act of justified civil disobedience."

And I have no quarrel with this view.

But Brown, as I have

already suggested, maintains explicitly that an act of dissent in which
the protestors do not willingly accept the (legal) consequences "is no
less an act of civil disobedience, it is simply an unjustified one."
It is this latter view that I object to, but Brown's arguments
support only Cohen's view and not his own much stronger view.
any better arguments for the latter view?

Are there

I think that Professor Rawls

attempts to defend some form of this view, though not successfully.
Since Rawls's position is, superficially, much more like Cohen's than
Brown's, I want first to determine to what extent Rawls wishes to defend
some version of the latter view.

I shall then try to see what sorts of

arguments Rawls provides for the stronger, less tolerant position —
if he does not explicitly endorse it —

even

and ask just how plausible they

are.
2. Rawls's position with respect to paying the penalty is a curious one.
It is clear from his remarks in section 55 of his book that a willingness
to accept the legal consequences of one's conduct is an essential feature
of Rawls's conception of justified civil disobedience (cf. especially pp.
Q

366-67).

Thus, he writes that although a particular law has been delib-

erately broken in cases of justified civil disobedience, "fidelity to law
is expressed...by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of
one's conduct" (p. 366). However, if we examine Rawls's list of the necessary conditions for justified civil disobedience (cf. section 57, pp.
371-374), we do not find the willingness requirement among them.

Indeed,

it is actually in the section of his book devoted to "The Definition of
Civil Disobedience" (section 55) that Rawls discusses the question of
"paying the penalty" or accepting the consequences.
This might mean that, like Professor Bedau in the article mentioned
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in the preceding chapter, Rawls is merely defining a certain kind of disobedience to the law and saying that if the disobedient isn't willing to
accept the consequences, then that's not "civil disobedience" in his
sense.

There is some evidence in the text that this is in fact what Rawls

is doing.

Thus, in one footnote he says explicitly that he is following

"Bedau's definition of civil disobedience" (footnote 19, p. 364), and in
another he says, apropos the question of accepting the consequences, that
"there comes a point beyond which dissent ceases to be civil disobedience
as defined here" (footnote 22, p. 366).
If Rawls, like Bedau, is making a willingness to accept the consequences part of his definition of civil disobedience, then I have no
quarrel with him,

Rawls, like Bedau, is perfectly free to define a cer-

tain form of dissent and say that when the appropriate features are absent dissent is not "civil disobedience" in his sense. But there is
evidence in the text that Rawls wishes to make another, stronger claim,
that he wishes to say that some acts of disobedience to the law which
would otherwise be justified are not justified in the absence of a willingness to accept the legal consequences.
This is obviously quite different from saying that some acts of
disobedience to the law which would otherwise be civil disobedience are
not civil disobedience, in his sense, in the absence of a willingness
to accept the consequences.

Rawls obviously cannot make the former claim

good simply "by definition."

That is, the freedom to define civil dis-

obedience in a particular fashion does not imply a similar freedom to
stipulate when such conduct is and is not "justified."

Arguments are

required for claims about when civil disobedience, however defined, is
or is not justified.

What evidence is there for saying that, according

to Rawls, the willingness requirement is relevant to the justification
of civil disobedience as well as its characterization?
To begin with, it is worth noting that nothing like the "willingness requirement" is included in the actual definition of civil disobedience that Rawls gives in section 55; he writes:
I shall begin by defining civil disobedience
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as a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet
political act contrary to law usually done
with the aim of bringing about a change in
the law or policies of the government, (p. 364)
It may be objected that the willingness requirement is entailed by some
feature(s) of this definition and in that sense is part of Rawls's definition of civil disobedience.

I shall consider this claim in detail

below when I discuss the relationship between nonviolence and a willingness to accept the legal consequences of one's actions. Nonetheless,
it is significant that a willingness to pay the penalty is not mentioned
explicitly in Rawls's definition of civil disobedience.

What*s more im-

portant, however, is that a whole class of illegal actions that would
otherwise be justified are not justified, on Rawls*s view, in the absence of a willingness to accept the legal consequences.

It is this fea-

ture of Rawls's theory which makes it so controversial, and before proceeding I must show that this is indeed his view.
Rawls conceives of civil disobedience as occupying its own special position on a spectrum of possible reactions to legal authority,
any of which can be appropriate

depending on the circumstances of the
9
actual society in which it occurs.
At one end of this spectrum is
straightforward obedience to the state's laws and at the other end is
all-out rebellion.

Between these extremes we find disobedience for the

sake of testing a law's constitutionality, civil disobedience and conscientious refusal as Rawls conceives them, so-called "direct action",
and what Rawls calls "militant resistance".

The idea, very roughly,

is that more radical means of protest are justified as violations of
the principles of justice get progressively more serious and irremediable.

Since this notion, which appears to me a very reasonable one in

nearly every respect, occupies such an important place in my interpretation (below) of Rawls's views on the willingness requirement, I want
to say a bit more about it here.
I wish to stay as close as possible to Rawls's actual way of
putting things, but in the interests of clarity I shall have to sim:plify things a bit.

Suppose we call the range of possible reactions to

legal authority that Rawls alludes to the "reaction spectrum" in our
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model of his theory.

These possibilities range, as we have seen, from

more or less complete obedience, to all-out rebellion.

Let us say, quite

arbitrarily and simply for the sake of clarity, that this spectrum ranges
from "A" to "Z", where A represents more or less absolute compliance,
where Z represents full-scale rebellion, and where the intermediate lettervariables represent the possible forms of dissent between these extremes
(the forms mentioned in the preceding paragraphs:

disobedience for the

sake of testing a law's constitutionality, for example, direct action,
militant resistance, and so forth).
Now beneath this spectrum we may imagine a correlative continuum describing the various circumstances in which a given form of dissent on the
reaction spectrum is appropriate —
of view.

i.e., justifiable, from Rawls's point

We can call this the "circumstances continuum".

Let us say

that the conceivable circimistances range from A', which would be a situation of perfect justice, to Z', which would be a situation of not only
intolerable but monstrous injustice.
The circumstances of interest to the political theorist concerned
with the possibility of justifiable forms of dissent short of all-out
rebellion fall between these extremes, of course.

Rawls is such a theo-

rist and —• in terms of this very crude, simplistic model —

what he

tries to show is that in a given social setting the appropriateness of
a given form of dissent on the reaction spectrum is a function of the
position that the society in question occupies on the circumstances continuum.

As we proceed in the direction of Z' on the latter, more and

more radical forms of dissent may be.justifiable.
ceed toward

That is, as we pro-

Z* on the circumstances continuum, we proceed toward

the reaction spectrum.

Z on

Needless to say, circumstances that would justify

forms of dissent verging toward

Z (all-out rebellion) also justify, a

fortiori, any forms of dissent short of, or less radical than, those
forms.

But, and this is crucial to Rawls's theory as I understand it,

until circumstances justify it (by changing in the direction of Z* on the
circumstances continuum), a given form of dissent on the reaction spectrum
cannot, justifiably, take a form of dissent closer to Z.
In short, and very simplistically, if circumstances in a given
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society are described by G*, say, on the circumstances continuum, then no
form of dissent more radical than G, on the reaction spectrum, will be
justified, although the possibilities short of G will still be available
to the dissenters.
This view, especially as Rawls states it in section 55 of his book,
is a very appealing one, and its simplicity does not detract from its
12
theoretical power.
However, one feature of Rawls's view is quite controversial, it seems to me, and bears directly on the problem of the
justification of civil disobedience and the willingness requirement.

For

suppose, as Rawls himself frequently does, that at times there will be
circumstances such that while civil disobedience (of the sort described
by Rawls) will be justifiable, no more radical means of dissent will as
yet be justifiable.

That is, suppose C represents "civil disobedience",

in Rawls*s sense, on the reaction spectrum, and D represents what Rawls
calls "direct action".

The latter form of dissent will not be justifi-

able, according to Rawls, until the "political sociology" of the situa13
tion, as he puts it, evolves from C* to D*, for example.
What disturbs me about Rawls's view can be illustrated by imagining a case similar to the one proposed to Cohen and Brown in section
1 above.

Consider two individuals, A and B, who perform acts of disobe-

dience of exactly the same sort, in the same circumstances, and for the
same reasons.

Suppose in addition that at the same time no further (or

more "radical") steps would be justified.

In other words, A and B are

at the same point on the circumstances continuum and remain there for
the purposes of our tale.

Finally, suppose that both A and B meet all

of Rawls*s requirements for justified civil disobedience except for one:
A is ready and willing to accept the legal consequences of his act but
^1^
B xs not.
It may be that on Rawls*s view B is not committing "civil disobedience"; this does not concern me at present.
this:

What does concern me is

given the parameters of the situation we're imagining, and given

Rawls's discussion of what is and is not justified in such situations
(cf. especially p, 367), it seems clear that Rawls would say that A was
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justified in what he did, under the circumstances, and B was not. And
the reason would be that A met the willingness requirement while B did
not (again, see p, 367). This is because for Rawls an unwillingness to
accept the consequences is one step closer to Z, on the reaction spectrum, than an identical act of disobedience which exhibits a willingness
to accept them.
What I wish to ask is simply this:

what reasons does Rawls have,

not for saying that A is, and B is not, performing an act of "civil disobedience", but for saying that A would be justified in what he did while
B would not?

I shall show that one answer to this question hinges on

Rawls's conception of the notions of nonviolence and "fidelity to law."
I shall also show that Rawls's reasoning in this connection is unsound.
3. On Rawls's view both nonviolence and what he calls "fidelity to
law" are essential to civil disobedience qua civil disobedience; that is,
if these elements are not present, then we are not talking about civil
16
disobedience but about some more radical alternative.
I shall accept
Rawls's characterization of civil disobedience as being by its nature nonviolent and at the extreme limits of fidelity to law, although I shall
subject the latter to a great deal of scrutiny below.

What I want to de-

termine is whether either or both of these conditions entails (or in some
weaker sense "requires") that the disobedient must be willing to accept
the legal consequences of his act.
Rawls has three arguments for saying that this is the case.

He

argues first that the nonviolence (as well as the "publicity") requirement entails the willingness requirement. He argues next that the willingness requirement is an indirect consequence of "fidelity to law,"
since fidelity to law entails nonviolence, which in t u m entails the
willingness requirement.

He argues finally that the willingness require-

ment is an immediate consequence of fidelity to law; that is, that the
latter entails the willingness requirement independently of the nonviolence requirement.

This third argument is the most substantial since it

can be rather easily shown that the nonviolence requirement does not entail the willingness requirement.
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Rawls*s definition of civil disobedience stipulates that to qualify
as "civil" disobedience the illegal act must, among other things, be both
public and nonviolent (p. 364). I shall subsequently refer to these as
the requirements of "publicity" and "non-violence", and I shall accept
them as noncontroversial elements of a reasonable conception (or definition) of civil disobedience.

Does the willingness requirement follow

from these definitional requirements?
At various points Rawls writes as though the public and nonviolent
nature of civil disobedience entails that the disobedient must be willing
to accept the legal consequences of his conduct (see, for example, section
57).

If this is true, then such a willingness would be part of the "na-

ture" (or definition) of civil disobedience and I would have no argument
with Rawls.

But it is not true.

To be sure, there are certain ways of

exhibiting an unwillingness to accept the consequences that would violate
these requirements of publicity and nonviolence, and perhaps this is what
has led Rawls to connect the willingness requirement with the requirements
that the disobedience must be public and nonviolent.

For example, if the

unwillingness in question takes the form of forcibly resisting arrest,
then the act is no longer nonviolent.

Similarly, if this unwillingness is

exhibited by the fact that the illegal act is done in private (in order to
escape detection, say) then the act is obviously not "public" in the required way.
But we have agreed to eschew violence and act publicly when we wish
to say that we are performing "civil" disobedience, and so these are not
cases that Rawls can use to make his point.

The question is:

can an un-

willingness to accept the consequences take any other form than resisting
arrest, say, or attempting to keep one*s criminal conduct secret?
it can.

Surely

I can express my unwillingness to accept the consequences in

writing (in a philosophy paper or a legal brief, for example); I can express it verbally (at the time of arrest, for example, or at my trial);
or, most dramatically, I can express such an unwillingness simply by
failing to show up for trial or by refusing to cooperate if I am forcibly
brought to trial. None of these ways of repudiating the willingness requirement, if appropriately executed, need involve the disobedient in any
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violation of the publicity and nonviolence requirements.
So the fact that civil disobedience must, by definition, be both
public and nonviolent does not entail that the disobedient must be willing
to accept the full legal consequences of his action.

It is possible to

meet the former requirements while denouncing the latter, and it seems to
be mistaken to suppose otherwise, as Rawls does.

In fairness to Rawls,

however, we must grant that considerations like the preceding force us to
clarify what we have thus far left rather inchoate:

namely, just what it

means to repudiate the willingness requirement. We see now that we cannot express our unwillingness to pay the penalty by means of force or
secrecy; we cannot forcibly resist arrest, for example, or try to escape
detection and arrest by acting secretly.

But the modes available to us

for expressing an unwillingness to accept the consequences are not exhausted by these alternatives, as I tried to point out above.
More significantly, perhaps, we have isolated a far more important
issue:

the crucial issue in the repudiation of the willingness require-

ment is not the practical question of whether or not we can manage to
avoid punishment (without violence or secrecy), but the question of whether
or not we are going to grant, in principle, that the state retains a moral
right to punish us in cases of the sort we*re discussing.

Thus, I shall

henceforth construe "accepting" the willingness requirement as accepting
the claim that the state retains its right to punish (and exact legal
consequences generally) in the cases in question, cases where the illegal
act is, ex hypothesi, "justified".

And I shall construe "rejecting" the

willingness requirement as denying this claim.

I must postpone until

Chapter VI the question of what means the disobedient can legitimately resort to —

other than violence or secrecy —

if he rejects the willingness

requirement in principle.

4« I should like to tum now to the question of whether "fidelity to
law'* entails a willingness to accept the consequences, but first I must
show how Rawls persists in thinking of an unwillingness to accept the consequences as necessarily involving violence, even when he is discussing
*'fidelity to law" as a rationale for the willingness requirement.

Consider
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the following remarks:
Civil disobedience is nonviolent for another
reason. It expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it
is at the outer edge thereof. The law is broken but fidelity to law is expressed by the
public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the
willingness to accept the legal consequences of
one*s conduct (p. 366).
Both the underlying logic as well as the grammar of this quotation are
extremely suggestive.

Logically, the structure of the argument is this:

(1)

Civil disobedience is justified (qua civil
disobedience) only if it is disobedience
"within the limits of fidelity to law".

(2)

Disobedience is within these limits only if
it is public and nonviolent.

(3)

Civil disobedience would not be public and
nonviolent if the disobedient were not
willing to accept the full legal consequences
of his illegal act.

(4)

Therefore, civil disobedience is justified
only if the disobedient is willing to accept
the full legal consequences of his action.

I propose to accept premises (1) and (2) without any argument
for now.

Since along with premise (3) they entail (4), it is this third

premise that concerns me here.

That Rawls is making a claim like that

suggested in (3) is implied both by the structure of his argument as a
whole and by the grammar of the second sentence in the preceding quotation:

Rawls does not say that fidelity to law is expressed by the public

and nonviolent nature of the act as well as by the willingness to accept
the consequences; he writes as though a willingness to accept the consequences is somehow synonymous or conceptually connected with an acceptance of the fact that the act must be public and nonviolent.

The crucial

clauses are connected not by the particle *and* but by a comma.
This is not just a verbal quibble.

The grammar of Rawls*s asser-

tion suggests that for him we shall not be meeting the nonviolence requirement if we are not willing to accept the consequences of our action.
But we have already seen that this is not necessarily true.

That is, we

have seen that the willingness requirement is at least not obviously en-
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tailed by the requirements of publicity and nonviolence.
Rawls's first argument from the notion of fidelity to law fails,
therefore, for the same reason that the argument from publicity and nonviolence fails:
the penalty.

the latter notions do not entail a willingness to pay

Rawls has another argument based on the notion of fidelity

to law, however.

This is an argument which (in effect) concedes that an

unwillingness to pay the penalty can be both public and nonviolent, but
which purports to show that nonetheless such an unwillingness is not consistent with the principles of fidelity to law, even when that unwillingness is expressed both publicly and nonviolently.
The new argument is roughly this.

Civil disobedience is distin-

guished from "militant action" (and other more radical forms of dissent)
by the fact that the former, and not the latter, is within the bounds of
fidelity to law.

This is important because there are times when disobe-

dience to the law is justified but when it must, for reasons to be explained, remain within the limits of fidelity to law in order to be justified.

Let us summarize this by saying that civil disobedience is. justified,

qua civil disobedience, only if it is disobedience within the limits of fidelity to law.

With this claim as its first premiss, the new argument con-

tinues with the following claim as its second premiss:

civil disobedience

is not disobedience within the limits of fidelity to law unless the disobedient is willing to accept all the legal consequences of his conduct.

The

conclusion of course is that civil disobedience is justified only if the disobedient is willing to accept all the legal consequences of his conduct.
I want to show that the second premiss in this new argument is false
and that an unwillingness to pay the penalty is not inconsistent with a
commitment to fidelity to law.

In order to do this I must first explain

briefly what fidelity to law is and describe the role it plays in Rawls*s
theory of civil disobedience.

I am particularly anxious to show why civil

disobedience must be within the bounds of fidelity to law, according to
Rawls.

Then I shall show that an unwillingness to pay the penalty, pro-

vided that it is unconcealed and nonviolent, does not necessarily take
one beyond those bounds.
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Rawls assumes, quite correctly I believe, that societies and the institutions that comprise them are not always absolutely just or unjust but
are frequently only more or less so.

In terms of the figure sketched in

section 2 above, we can imagine that there is a continuum describing (very
roughly) the range of possibilities with respect to the overall justice or
injustice of various human societies.

This would be a continuum ranging

from a more or less perfectly just society at one extreme to a more or less
totally corrupt society at the other extreme.

In the middle will be soci-

eties that vary in one way or another from these extremes.

In a totally

corrupt or unjust society men are presumably justified in all-out rebellion.
18
On the other hand, Rawls argues that in a reasonably just society
men not
only have a moral duty to obey just laws and policies, but sometimes even
have a moral duty to obey unjust legislation as well.
I shall have a great deal to say about the latter claims in Chapter
IV below.

For the present I simply want to point out, what Rawls himself

makes quite clear, that it is a corollary of this view that the extent and
nature of justifiable dissent (within a given society) depends upon roughly
where that society is located on the "circumstances continuum" described
above.

Thus, it is conceivable (indeed, highly probable, according to

Rawls) that a given society xd.ll depart far enough from the ideals of justice to warrant moderate dissent but not so far from these ideals as to
warrant an unqualified repudiation of the society as a whole and the moral
19
authority of its legal system generally.
That is to say, a given society
may be sufficiently corrupt or unjust to forfeit its claims to moral authority with respect to certain unjust laws or policies without at the same
time forfeiting its moral authority generally.

Hence, a reasonably just

society retains its overall moral authority and legitimacy —
command our allegiance and cooperation —
20
policies have lost their moral force.

its right to

even when certain of its laws and

The point of Rawls *s theory of civil disobedience is to show how this
particular form of dissent can be justified in a reasonably just society
consistent with a recognition of the prima facie moral duty that one has to
abide by duly enacted laws and policies in such a society, even when they
are unjust.

It is extremely important, therefore, to bear in mind that the
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theory of civil disobedience is designed to speak to problems that arise
only at a very special point on the so-called "circumstances continuum".
We are imagining a situation in which laws of substantial injustice have
been passed, so that civil disobedience is justifiable, but in which injustice is not so pervasive as to justify any steps beyond civil disobedience.

In particular, we would not be justified, in this situation, in

taking any steps that would be destructive of the society*s overall stability, as Rawls sometimes puts it.
In light of these rather sketchy remarks, it is fairly easy to say
roughly what fidelity to law is and why it occupies so prominent a place
in Rawls*s theory of civil disobedience.

We are expressing fidelity to

law in our dissent when we are careful not to do anything that will undermine the society*s long-range social and political stability, stability
xdiich Rawls believes can be attained and preserved only through "the rule
21
of law".
Conversely, we are not expressing this fidelity when we act
in ways likely to jeopardize that stability and the effects of the rule
of law generally.

"Fidelity to the task of upholding what we recognize as

a reasonably just society and the rule of law that sustains it" would be a
more apt characterization of this notion.

But it would also be more awk22
ward, so I shall stick to "fidelity to law".
The importance of staying within the limits of fidelity to law, in
cases of the sort we are imagining, should also be obvious if we accept
Rawls *s general view.

For we have both a natural duty (and sometimes an

obligation) on that view "to support and to further just institutions"
23
(p. 334).
We are, to be sure, dealing with a situation in which we are
confronted with substantial injustice, a situation in \diich civil disobedience is justified.

But we are also dealing, ex hypothesi, with a sit-

uation in which the society and its laws and institutions are, on balance,
still reasonably just.

So we have a natural duty to see to it that our

actions remain within the boundaries of fidelity to law, as defined above.
It is not an abstract fidelity to an abstract conception of "law" that is
at stake here, but a very concrete commitment to the legal and constitutional structure of a given society.
We can now return to the main thread.

It is easy to see, from what
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has just been said, why the notion of fidelity to law occupies such an important place in Rawls*s theory of justified civil disobedience and, in
particular, why he believes that this notion precludes violence and organized militant resistance.

The theory of civil disobedience is relevant

when some valid law or duly enacted policy seems to exceed the bounds of
tolerable injustice.

But as long as we are dealing, by assumption, with a

society that is reasonably just as a whole, despite occasional lapses,
then we must acknowledge that there are serious limits on how far a citizen
may go in protesting the injustice of a particular law or policy.

Very

roughly, these limits are those that define when we are still acting in
accordance with the spirit if not the letter of the law.

Rawls believes

that public, nonviolent dissent aimed at addressing the sense of justice
of the majority is within the spirit of the rule of law, even when it
transgresses the letter of a particular law or policy.

But to engage in

violent actions, for example, in an attempt to right social wrongs by
force rather than persuasion, is clearly outside the limits of fidelity to
law and is a violation of the spirit as well as the letter of law.
This is an unhappily abstract way of putting Rawls*s point, but unfortunately he himself is neither clearer nor more concrete.
point is obvious enough, however.

The main

Under certain circumstances illegal

dissent is justified in a more or less just democratic society, but it
must be limited dissent, limited by our commitment to the system as a
whole and our responsibility not to do anything likely to undermine it.
Suppose that violence is the sort of thing likely to undermine the mutual
trust and social stability that are required to manage a reasonably just
constitutional democracy.

We shall then say that if nothing more radical

than civil disobedience is justified at a given time in a given society,
then that disobedience must be nonviolent.

This is because we've con-

ceded that nonviolence is inconsistent with fidelity to law.

However,

Rawls also claims that an unwillingness to pay the penalty for civil disobedience is inconsistent with fidelity to law, and hence that if nothing
more radical than civil disobedience is justified under certain circumstances, then one is not justified in seeking to escape the consequences
of one*s illegal act, even if the act itself is justified.

Why is this
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so, according to Rawls?
The short answer is to say that in the absence of a willingness to
pay the penalty the disobedient *s conduct would be subversive of the
stability of the society in question and of the rule of law generally;
but of course this is exactly what needs to be argued, since this claim
is at best controversial.

Moreover, I do not think that Rawls wants

(at least explicitly) to urge a simple "subversion" claim, like that
advanced by Socrates and the Laws in the Crito for example (but see
Chapter III below).
ticated claim.

Rather, I think Rawls is making a much more sophis-

Roughly, his claim is that an unwillingness to pay the

penalty is subversive of the aims and principles of democratic constitutionalism.

This notion must now be explained.

Consider the following quotation from Chapter VI of Rawls*s book:
...to the legal forms of constitutionalism one
may adjoin certain modes of illegal protest
that do not violate the aims of a democratic
constitution in view of the principles by
which such dissent is regulated (p. 386).
This is somewhat opaque, but it contains the kernel of Rawls*s most important (explicit) argument for the willingness requirement.

Dissent

is acceptable, in a reasonably just constitutional democracy, provided
that it does not violate the aims of the just constitution.

We ensure

that it will not do so by regulating such dissent by certain principles.
One of these principles is the willingness requirement.

Now according

to Rawls the aims of a constitutional democracy are, very roughly, the
creation of just and efficient social institutions.

If we interpret the

willingness requirement as one of the principles by which dissent is
regulated consistent with these aims, then obviously the argument for
the willingness requirement must involve the claim(s) that to eliminate
it would lead to less just and/or less efficient institutions.

In the

remarks that follow I shall explicate the arguments for these claims and
show that they are not sound.

That is, I shall show that a "principled"

(i.e., public and nonviolent) repudiation of the willingness requirement
is consistent with fidelity to law as Rawls conceives it.

To do this I

shall have to show what tempts Rawls to say that this is not the case.
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At first blush it would seem that we ought to separate the question
of whether refusing to pay the penalty would simply be unjust from the
question of whether such a refusal would be detrimental to the efficiency
of the society*s institutions.

That is, it seems that we ought to separate

the question of whether there is a more or less "deontological" rationale
for the willingness requirement from the question of whether there is a
more or less "teleological" rationale for that requirement.

It would be

convenient to be able to do this, and I shall attempt to do so below.
But first a caveat:

Rawls and Professor Charles Fried, the principal

authors we shall be considering, do not always keep these considerations
separate.

Hence, it is not always clear whether they are claiming that

refusing to accept the consequences is unacceptable because it is in inself "unfair" or because it leads to social instability or both.
Consider the claim that one is violating the principle of fair play
if one disobeys a valid law and then refuses to pay the penalty.

Rawls

has argued in another context that we have an obligation, based on the
principle of fair play, to obey unjust laws as long as the constitution
itself is reasonably just and the laws in question do not exceed certain
24
limits of injustice.
One might be tempted to argue that we have a similar obligation to pay the penalty after breaking a law that exceeded the
tolerable limits of injustice. But it's difficult to see the analogy
25
between these two cases.
We are dealing, ex hypothesi, with situations
of grave injustices. Rawls himself concedes in a footnote that "certainly
one does not accept the punishment as right, that is, as deserved for an
unjustified act" (p. 366). But he continues:

*'Rather, one is xd.lling to

undergo the legal consequences for the sake of fidelity to law, which is
a different matter" (ibid.).

Rawls*s reasoning here is remarkably obscure.

If the punishment is neither "right" nor "deserved for an unjustified act",
how can punishing and requiring acceptance of punishment be right?

Rawls

makes a valiant effort to answer this question, but his answer is clearly
not in terms of the deontological notion of "fair play" but in terms of
the likely social consequences of not accepting (and requiring acceptance
of) the legal consequences of illegal action.
Rawls has argued earlier that the danger in allowing indiscriminate
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disobedience to the law, even on conscientious grounds, is a greater evil
than the evil of requiring people to obey at least some unjust laws.
Similarly, it might be argued, the instability of a system where we "let
people off" if their reasons were convincing would be a greater evil than
the evil of punishing people who were ex hypothesi justified in disobeying
the law.

Thus, Rawls writes:
No doubt it is possible to imagine a legal system
in which conscientious belief that the law is
unjust is accepted as a defense for noncompliance.
Men of great honesty with full confidence in one
another might make such a system work. But as
things are, such a scheme would presumably be unstable even in a state of near justice (p. 367).

This passage involves a serious confusion on Rawls*s part, I think.

He

says that, as things are, "...a legal system in which conscientious belief that the law is unjust is accepted as a defense for noncompliance...
would presumably be unstable...." (p. 367) Let us suppose that this is
so.

What bearing does this fact have on the theoretical question of

whether it is reasonable to expect individuals to accept the ordinary
legal consequences for disobedience, when they are justified, ex hypothesi,
in that disobedience?

Rawls*s remarks are relevant to the issue of

whether a sincere belief that the law is unjust is a sufficient condition
for noncompliance.

I agree with him that it is not.

Such a belief does

not even ensure that the act itself is justified (independent of its
illegality), much less that noncompliance (in the form of civil disobedience) is justified.

But Rawls also believes that noncompliance can be

justified; surely this is his central point in the latter half of Chapter
VI of his book.
The question I am raising, then, is simply this: when civil disobedience is justified on the grounds suggested by Rawls, what reason is
there to suppose that we ought nonetheless to punish the disobedients?
It is no answer to this question to say that sincere belief does not by
itself justify noncompliance.

Of course it doesn*t.

clear about what does justify noncompliance —
what section 57 in Rawls* s book is all about —

But when we get

and I take it that this is
then presumably we have

said what more is needed to justify civil disobedience.

As long as we
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have no clear conception of what justified civil disobedience is, then
perhaps considerations of "stability" make it necessary to allow civil
disobedience only if the disobedient is willing to accept the legal consequences of his action.

But if Rawls has achieved anything in Chapter

VI, he has managed to help us get clear about just when civil disobedience is justified.

What he doesn*t appear to recognize is that this

raises a whole new series of questions —

the most important of which is

just the one I have been belaboring: if a man is ex hypothesi justified
in disobeying the law, then how can society be justified in punishing
him?
5. None of Rawls*s arguments in Chapter VI provides an adequate answer
to this question, as I hope I have shown.

This, of course, does not show

that there is no good reason for making the willingness requirement a
part of the theory of justified civil disobedience; it shows only that
Rawls has not provided such reasons.

In Chapter V

I shall elaborate a

general argument that in fact any theory of civil disobedience that justifies that disobedience on the basis of a "contractarian" theory of
political obligation is incoherent if it also includes a requirement that
the disobedient must accept all the legal consequences of his conduct.
Before turning to this enterprise, however, I should like to look at Professor Charles Fried's recent attempt to support the willingness require26
ment with principles borrowed from Rawls.
Fried*s argument is based on an interpretation of Rawls's principle
of fair play.

He has shown in an earlier argument that it is this prin-

ciple that makes it wrong for some individual to violate a just incometax law on the grounds that his delinquency will obviously help him and
in no way hinder the general welfare.

Even if the latter claims are true.

Fried argues, the tax-evader is acting unjustly because he is taking advantage of benefits that can be secured only by general observance by
others of the very law he is violating.

Fried argues that the same charge

can be pressed against the civil disobedient, albeit "at another level of
generality":
...he [the civil disobedient] seeks to benefit from
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an institution which depends on the sacrifices of
others without contributing a like sacrifice.
Only here the institution and the sacrifice are
respectively, the legal system as a whole and the
readiness of individuals within that system to
abide by the principle of "institutional settlement", that is, the readiness of each to forego
pressing his claim — even when he considers his
claims justified — when by some fair procedure
the issue has been determined against him.27
Fried makes two distinct points about the violation of "the principle
of institutional settlement", although he writes as though he is unaware of just how distinct they are.

The first is this:

The demonstrators in violating this principle
run the risk that if they are successful in
procuring a change in the law those persons
who believe that the old situation was justified and that the new unjustifiably prejudices their interests will feel entitled to
resist the "remedial" legislation.2°
While this observation may be sound as a comment on the psychological
dynamics of dissent, surely Fried would be the first to admit that
feeling entitled to act in a certain way must be firmly distinguished
from being entitled to act that way. Hence, whatever conclusions the
demonstrators draw from Fried* s remarks so far will be what we have
called tactical or strategic ones: they have to take the likely consequences of their actions into account. If the only way to prevent a
vicious cycle of disobedience and counter-disobedience is to accept the
legal consequences of their initial disobedience, then perhaps this is
what they ought to do on balance.
But Fried wants (and needs) to make a much stronger claim than
this.

Apropos the feeling that one is entitled to resist (illegally)

"remedial" legislation that was brought about through civil disobedience.
Fried writes:
...this feeling would not be wholly unwarranted, as
the demonstrators* unwillingness to abide by the
principle of institutional settlement does weaken
their moral claim on the fidelity of others to that
principle.29
Fried offers no argument for the crucial moral claim embedded in this
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remark, but he does offer a "solution" for the practical problem of cyclic
disobedience that he thinks arises in such cases —

viz., a willing ac-

ceptance of the legal consequences of one*s illegal act.

The civil dis-

obedient, "in showing his readiness to suffer the penalty for disobedience," is, according to Fried, thereby "affirming the value of law in
30
general, while at the same time disobeying it."
Perhaps it is true that
in paying the penalty the disobedient is in some sense affirming the value
of law in general, although I should like to have seen some argument for
this claim.

But surely Fried is mistaken in asserting that the civil dis-

obedient has weakened his moral claim on the fidelity of others to the
principle of institutional settlement.

For built into Rawls*s theory of

civil disobedience is the admission that in certain cases one has a moral
right to disobey the law.

How can the exercise of this right deprive him

of his otherwise legitimate expectation that others will abide by the
rule of law?
There is, of course, one last move open to Rawls and Fried here.
They can agree that as long as the disobedience takes place within the
limits of "fidelity to law" the disobedient has not lost his moral claim
on others to stay within those limits.

They can then stipulate that un-

less he is willing to accept the consequences, the disobedient is not
acting within the limits of "fidelity to law".

Unfortunately, this move

guarantees inclusion of the willingness requirement at the expense of
begging the question.

Why does the disobedient have to accept the con-

sequences to stay within these limits?

Far from having forfeited his

moral claim by his disobedience, on Rawls's theory he is reminding others
of the principles underlying the just constitution and pointing out that
they have been violated.

It may be prudent for him to accept the conse-

quences, but as yet we have seen no convincing argument that he must, in
principle, do so.
I said at the beginning of this chapter that I would be considering
only Rawls's "explicit" arguments for the willingness requirement.

If

these arguments do not seem very impressive, I hope this is not because I
have misinterpreted Rawls's remarks with respect to paying the penalty.
have simply gone carefully through the text, explicating several obscure

I

52

remarks and amplifying them with an argument from Fried that Rawls himself
seems to consider conclusive.

However, I do not feel that Rawls himself

actually does justice to the willingness requirement. As implausible as
this requirement is at first glance, and as implausible as it remains
after we have considered Rawls*s explicit arguments in favor of it, I
think there is a far more powerful argument for the willingness requirement than any argument Rawls explicitly advances in behalf of it. It is
an argument that is entirely within the spirit of the Rawlsian enterprise,
however, and it is perhaps fair to say that it is implicit in Rawls's
work.

In the next three chapters I should like to develop this argument,

partly because I believe it suggests why reasonable men of good will might
claim that they were right in punishing even justified disobedience to
the law and also because I am anxious to make such implicit arguments explicit and show that in the long run they too are unconvincing.

CHAPTER III
THE "LEGALIST" TRADITION AND
SOCRATES' ARGUMENTS IN THE CRITO
1.

The whole course of our discussion thus far may seem somewhat dis-

satisfying.

Surely there are better arguments for the willingness re-

quirement than any we have so far considered.

Or perhaps more can be

said in favor of some of the arguments I have sketched above than has yet
been said.

I think that in fact there is another argument for the willing-

ness requirement that is both more powerful and more interesting than any
considered above. But this argument is at best only implicit in some of
Rawls's work on political obligation generally; and perhaps it would be
most apt simply to say that we can construct an impressive argument for
the willingness requirement by analogy to another argument that appears
explicitly in Chapter VI of Rawls's book and in a number of his earlier
publications.
I am alluding to Rawls's argument for the claim that, at least in
a reasonably just constitutional democracy, we have a prima facie moral
duty (and sometimes a moral obligation) to obey the law. What is particularly interesting about this argument is that it purports to show how it
happens that sometimes we have an "actual" or "on balance" moral duty to
obey even unjust laws.

Rawls's argument for the latter claim is of in-

terest in its own right, as I shall show below.

It is also interesting,

however, because in light of it we can construct the "argument by analogy'*
for the willingness requirement: the argument that just as we are sometimes morally required to comply with unjust legislation, so too, under
certain circumstances we are morally required to accept the results of
fair judicial procedures, even when this means accepting the legal consequences for disobedience that was itself morally justified.

Before any

of this will make much sense, something must be said about the tradition
in political theory in which Rawls seems to stand.
53
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The intellectual atmosphere in which most recent thinkers have worked
can be called an atmosphere of qualified (and sometimes quite extreme)
*'legalism", an atmosphere in which it is taken for granted that the moral
claims of civil law are very heavy ones and that the burden of proof is
on those who would disobey even an admittedly unjust (or unfair) law rather
than on those who would enforce such a law.

Professor Hugo Bedau may have

had this contemporary moral and political bias in mind when he complained
recently that one of the most disturbing features of recent writing about
civil disobedience is its uncritical assiimption that the moral burden in
questions of obedience to the law and enforcement of it is on the individ2
ual in his disobedience rather than on society in its enforcement.
That
is, it is taken for granted that we have a presumptive moral obligation to
obey the law even when it is somewhat unjust; the problem is conceived as
that of showing when this presumptive (or prima facie) moral obligation
3
breaks down.
Professor Bedau made his complaint apropos a very recent book on the
4
problem of civil disobedience.
But it should have been obvious in the
early 1960s, when theoretical interest in the justification of civil disobedience was revived (at least in the United States) by the civil rights
movement, that the whole cast of the discussion was to embody the assumption in question.

In one of the most significant articles of that period.

Professor Richard Wasserstrom wrote that the view he was "most concerned
to show to be false" was the view "that one has an absolute obligation
to obey the law."

And yet it would be very odd to find that any respect-

able philosopher or political theorist had ever actually held this view,
sans phrase, since it seems to entail that not even the most oppressed
mass of people imaginable would be justified in resisting the most corrupt
tyrant conceivable as long as the latter's edicts were embodied in valid
7
law.
Why, then, should Wasserstrom be so concerned about this view?
Apparently he is not, after all. He is, despite what he says, actually
concerned about a qualified, but still very extreme, version of legalism.
The view that Wasserstrom is in fact concerned with is the view that
we have an absolute obligation to obey the law whenever we have any moral
obligation to obey the law at all. Wasserstrom interprets western political
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theory as embodying the claim that we are never justified in disobeying
the law in a given society unless all-out rebellion is justified in that
society.

This qualification removes the cases which make the view

Wasserstrom is so concerned about totally untenable, but the view we are
left with is still a very strong one:

if we are not justified in all-

out rebellion, we are not morally justified in any sort of disobedience
Q

or illegal dissent short of rebellion.
Notice that we are still left with Professor Bedau*s question:
how did the cards ever get stacked so heavily against the moral right of
the individual to resist injustice short of the gross injustice that
justifies rebellion?

One looks in vain for arguments in the works of the

philosophers Wasserstrom cites as exponents of this view, since it seems
9
that they did not in fact expound it.
Indeed, it would be odd if they
did. Wasserstrom attributes this view, for example, to Hume. Hume does
indeed argue for a presumptive moral obligation to obey the law, but he
does not argue that this obligation is absolutely binding up to the point
when revolution is justified.

And in order to do so, he would have to

make a very curious empirical assumption, one which to my knowledge he
never makes.

The point is this.

Hume*s argument for the obligation to

obey the law is a teleological or a "utilitarian" one: we are morally
required to obey the law because in general the consequences of doing so
are better than the consequences of not doing so.

Presumably, a situa-

tion where revolution would be justified is a situation where the over-all
negative utility of continued obedience obviously outweighs the over-all
positive utility of doing so, to put it crudely.

But in order for Hume

to be defending the normative claim that no sort of disobedience short of
rebellion can ever be morally justifiable, he would have to be defending
the empirical claim that the over-all positive utility of disobedience to
the law will as a matter of fact be greater than the over-all negative
utility of such disobedience only when conditions are bad enough to justify rebellion.
Perhaps it is sufficient to point out that this is an empirical
claim that Hume never makes, but it is hard to resist pointing out what
an implausible claim it is as well.

Contemporary utilitarian defenses
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explicitly recognize this when they make the conditions under which disobedience to the law is justified a direct function of the long-range
utility of such disobedience and when they point out that positive
utility can outweigh negative utility in all sorts of situations short
of revolutionary ones.
The preceding point can be generalized in the following way.

Sup-

pose a theorist appeals to moral principles like "justice" or "utility"
as the basis for our obligation to obey the law.

Since the author of

this doctrine is appealing (ex hypothesi) to these principles in accounting for our obligation to obey the law, it seems always to be at least a
theoretical possibility that these same moral principles can be invoked
as a justification for disobeying the law.

Now if considerations of

justice or utility can justify all-out rebellion, why can*t these same
moral principles justify something short of revolution?

It seems that

any philosopher who bases the obligation to obey the law on some moral
principle like justice or utility must face this general question; that
is, it seems that his principles will cut both ways (for and against
disobedience to the law) depending on the circumstances. Why should
13
they favor disobedience only in the worst imaginable circumstances?
2. To be fair to Wasserstrom, it should be conceded that at least
one philosopher he mentions, although not in the context of his actual
historical claim, does appear to hold the view that Wasserstrom, along
with Professor Marshall Cohen, regards as characteristic of traditional
democratic theory in western political thought.

I am alluding, of course,

to Socrates and the position he defends in the Crito.

It is interesting

that Wasserstrom says that his own aim is to determine the nature and
extent of our obligation to obey the law and interesting that he goes on
to say that this problem "received at the hands of Socrates...a sustained
14
theoretical analysis and resolution" in the Crito.
For one thing,
Wasserstrom himself never gets around to telling us just what the nature,
much less the extent, of our obligation to obey the law is. At best, he
has managed to refute two extremely implausible views:

(1) the view that

civil disobedience is never justified in a more or less just society;
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and (2) the view that civil disobedience is never justified in a more or
less just democracy.
another reason:

But Wasserstrom*s remarks are interesting for

the one clear case he gives of a philosopher who actually

seems to have held one or the other of these views is that of Socrates
in the Crito; and as we shall see below, Socrates* arguments are extremely unimpressive.
A great many discussions of civil disobedience begin by paying
homage to Socrates* eloquent defense of some form of extreme legalism
in the Crito.

It will be worthwhile, for a number of reasons, to recall

the actual arguments that Socrates uses there.

For one thing, these

arguments are, as I have said, strikingly unimpressive ones, as we can
see simply by departing from what is customary in this context and actually laying out the arguments Socrates relies upon in the dialogue.

But

this enterprise, as surprising as its results may be, would be of little
more than historical (and perhaps iconoclastic) interest, if it were not
for another striking feature of Socrates' arguments.

Despite the fact

that they are, as they stand, rather bad arguments, they anticipate
in an almost uncanny manner, as I shall show —

—

some very powerful argu-

ments that have recently been advanced by Professor Rawls both with
respect to our putative obligation to obey the law generally and our
putative obligation to accept the legal consequences of disobedience
under certain conditions, when the moral obligation to obey a given law
breaks down.
Rawls's arguments are more powerful than those of Socrates not because the former are developed more carefully and explicitly (they're
not), but because they aim to prove a more modest conclusion:

not that

we have an absolute obligation to obey the law in a reasonably just society but that we have a prima facie obligation to obey the law which
generates, sometimes, an "actual" or "on balance" obligation to obey virtually all just laws in such a society and even a great many unjust laws
as well.

I am primarily interested in Socrates' arguments because of the

curious way they anticipate Rawls's arguments and because their failure
is instructive in ways I shall indicate.

I am interested in Rawls's
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arguments, or rather, in reconstructing arguments for his inchoate enthymemes and argument-sketches, for a number of reasons.
To begin with, Rawls provides us with at least a sketch of a
possible answer to Professor Bedau*s demand for arguments that show that
there is even a presumption, morally speaking, in favor of obeying the
law as opposed to acting by one*s private moral lights.

Secondly, Rawls

takes up, to some extent, the burden of telling us what it _is to show
that certain conduct is or is not "morally justified," whatever its
legal status, before arguing that civil disobedience is in fact morally
justifiable.

Thirdly, in attempting the previous task, Rawls puts his

own moral principles on the table as it were and thus enables us to
determine for ourselves just how plausible the moral and political
bias that Bedau discerns in other theorizing actually is, at least insofar as Rawls's principles are anything like those of other less articulate political theorists.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for

the purposes of the following chapters, Rawls's arguments for restricted
or qualified legalism with respect to legislative decisions can be used
to formulate analogous arguments for the view that I am ultimately most
interested in:

the view that in a reasonably just constitutional democ-

racy, even when the prima facie obligation to obey the law breaks down
and we are morally justified in civil disobedience, we are nevertheless
morally required to accept the full legal consequences of our illegal
actions.

I shall eventually show that the latter view is best charac-

terized as extreme legalism with respect to judicial decisions in a
reasonably just society and can be contrasted with Rawls's restricted or
qualified legalism with respect to legislative decisions in such a society.
Both views are part of that "legalistic" tradition in political theory
that goes back at least as far as Socrates and that Professor Bedau has
criticized recent thinkers for accepting too uncritically.
this and the following chapter is twofold.

The point of

For one thing, the arguments

examined will familiarize us with a point of view (concerning the moral
force of civil law) which makes the contemporary emphasis on paying the
penalty quite understandable.

Secondly, and much more importantly, these

arguments will enable us to construct an analogous (and, I think, very
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powerful) argument for the willingness requirement as an essential part
of any theory of justified civil disobedience.

3. It is curious, on the one hand, that so many discussions of the
justifiability of civil disobedience should allude to Socrates' position
in the Crito, since Socrates suggests at several places in the dialogue
that the question he is addressing is not the general one of the justifiability of civil disobedience but the much more specific one of the
moral propriety of accepting the consequences of a fair trial, even
when the verdict is "unjust," as Socrates puts it, or simply mistaken,
1 fi

as we should say.
It is easy, on the other hand, to understand why
so miany readers should interpret the Crito as a tract on political obligation generally, and civil disobedience in particular, since the arguments that Socrates uses to convince Crito that it would be "unjust" or
morally wrong to try to escape from prison seem to imply that it would
be wrong to disobey the law under any circumstances, at least in a more
or less just democratic society.
If we distinguish legislative decisions (which are embodied in
laws enacted by duly constituted legislative bodies) from judicial decisions (which are embodied in the decisions of duly constituted judicial bodies or courts), then it is obvious that Socrates* explicit intent in the Crito is to defend some form of extreme legalism with respect to judicial decisions, at least in more or less just societies.
Socrates indicates as much when he structures the inquiry by telling
Crito that the issue they must face is "whether it is just or not for
1
me to try to escape from prison, without the consent of the Athenians,"
and when he insists that they "have nothing to consider but the question
which I asked just now —

namely —

shall we be acting justly...if we

ourselves take our respective parts in my escape? Or shall we in truth
18
be acting unjustly?"
It is quite clear, then, that the question
Socrates explicitly raises is the narrow question about our obligation
to comply with fair judicial procedures in a just society rather than
the much larger question about our obligation to obey the law generally
in such societies.

Despite the fact that Socrates himself tends to
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conflate these different questions in the course of the dialogue, it is
important to keep them separate in our own minds, for a number of reasons.
To begin with, while extreme legalism with respect to legislative
decisions (in a reasonably just democracy) certainly seems to entail extreme legalism with respect to judicial decisions (in such a society),
the converse is not the case.

That is, it is possible to contend that

we have an absolute obligation to abide by fair judicial procedures in
a reasonably just society without contending that we have an absolute
obligation to abide by all laws or legislative decisions in such a society.
Indeed, in Chapter IV

I shall show that this inverted legalism is some-

thing like the view of Professor Rawls in A Theory of Justice. And as I
shall show in this chapter, Socrates seems to anticipate Rawls*s view in
the Crito.
Another reason for keeping these two views about the nature of legal
obligation separate has to do both with the arguments for the willingness
requirement considered above and especially with the argument evaluated in
Chapters V and VI below.

All the recent thinkers who, in elaborating

theories of the justifiability of civil disobedience, have done so much to
refute extreme legalism with respect to legislative decisions, are at the
same time anxious to insist on extreme legalism with respect to judicial
decisions, at least in reasonably just democratic societies.

The latter

view, of course, is embodied in what I call the willingness requirement
that is an essential part of so many recent theories of civil disobedience.

The explicit arguments for the willingness requirement in the re-

cent literature on civil disobedience are no better than Socrates* arguments in the Crito for the more general form of legal absolutism (extreme
legalism with respect to legislative decisions), to which I now tum.
In the next two chapters I shall show that the best argument for the
willingness requirement (or extreme legalism with respect to judicial
decisions) is one that can be constructed by analogy to Rawls*s arginnent
for restricted legalism with respect to legislative decisions.

I should

like to proceed to the latter argument via a brief discussion of Socrates'
arguments in the Crito.
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4.

There are two preliminary points that it is quite Important to bear

in mind in any discussion of the Crito.

To begin with, the issue of

whether to try to escape from prison is a moral issue for Socrates.

He

says that the question he is about to examine in the Crito is a question
of "...justice and injustice.. .the base and the honorable... the good and
19
evil."
In arguing the urgency of a correct answer to the question
Socrates insists that "...we should set the highest value, not on living,
but on living well," and he goes on to say that "living well and honorably
20
and justly mean the same thing."
I shall explain why this assumption is
so important in Section 5 below.
It is also important, by the way of preliminaries, to note that the
argument against escape (and in favor of accepting the consequences of
his trial) proceeds on the assumption that Socrates was in fact not guilty.
Thus, Socrates places a great deal of emphasis on the moral principle
that it is wrong to repay injustice with injustice.

The clear implica-

tion, throughout the dialogue, is that the first injustice was the injustice of the verdict against Socrates.

Indeed, when Socrates person-

ifies the laws of Athens and has them deliver the argument against attempting to escape, they themselves acknowledge that if he goes to his death
Socrates will have suffered a grave injustice —

the injustice of a mis-

taken verdict; but they emphasize that in this respect he is "a victim
21
of the injustice, not of the laws, but of men."
Finally, Socrates repeatedly finds it necessary to remind Crito that his own innocence is
irrelevant to the question at hand.

It is important that, in Socrates*

view, his innocence is irrelevant; but it is also important that, on
his view, he i£ innocent.
The assumption that he is in fact innocent is of the first importance in understanding both the precise thesis Socrates is defending
as well as the various arguments against escape that appear in the dialogue.

Indeed, the dialogue would not be of much philosophical interest

if the arguments were not based on this assumption.

For these arguments

are designed to show not merely that we must invariably accept the consequences of disobedience to the law, but that we must accept the consequences of a fair trial even when we have been wrongly convicted or when
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we have broken the law but were justified in doing so.

This thesis is

particularly startling when we realize that Socrates is saying that he
has a moral obligation to let the state execute him for crimes he did
not commit. Why, given the fact that the state has "wronged" or "injured" him by unjustly finding him guilty and sentencing him to death,
would it be wrong or unjust for Socrates himself to try to escape?
Despite a great deal of subsequent unclarity, Socrates* answers
to this question are quite straightforward:

(1) because it is unjust

(or wrong) to repay evil with evil (i.e., to repay an injury done to
oneself with another injury or injustice); and (2) because he has agreed
to abide by whatever judgments the state should pronounce in a court of
law.

In light of the first claim we claim we can see the point of what

I shall call the "causal" or "consequential" argument below:

it is

supposed to show that by trying to escape Socrates would indeed be injuring the state.

Thus, if he tries to escape, he is acting unjustly

because of the moral principle against repaying evil with evil.

What I

call the "contractarian" argument is designed to show that Socrates has
indeed agreed to abide by whatever judgments the state should pronounce
in a court of law.

Thus, trying to escape would also be wrong because

of the moral principle requiring us to keep our just agreements.
The "consequential" argument fails not because Socrates would not
be injuring the state by trying to escape but because the principle that
we cannot repay injustice with injustice is fatally ambiguous.

The **con-

tractarian" argument fails, conversely, because while the principle that
we should not break our just agreements is sound, it is unreasonable to
suppose that Socrates has agreed to what the laws say he has agreed to.
Before I can make these claims good, we shall have to look at the text in
some detail.

5. Early in the dialogue Socrates sets the scene for his subsequent
arguments by getting Crito to agree to three presuppositions that seem
harmless enough but which t u m out to be critical to the development of
the subsequent arguments:
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(a) We must never act unjustly.
(b) It is unjust to repay evil with evil, or
injustice with injustice. Therefore, we
must never do so.
22
(c) We must carry out our just agreements.
I want to begin with a remark about the first of these presuppositions.

Early in the dialogue Socrates gets Crito to acknowledge that
23
*'we ought never to act unjustly."
In light of Socrates* virtual identification of the notion of acting unjustly with acting wrongly (from
the moral point of view), it might appear that Crito's concession amounts
to no more than agreeing that it is immoral to act immorally.

Without

digressing into any deep questions concerning Plato*s moral philosophy
here, I want to point out that this first premise represents far more
than an empty tautology.

It expresses what I shall call Socrates'

commitment to justice or right action.

It indicates not merely that

Socrates recognizes the truism just mentioned but also that he intends
to act always as a just and upright man, whatever the consequences for
himself.

This is a rather obvious point, but we should bear in mind

that Socrates* subsequent arguments will not be very convincing to anyone who does not go along with the first presupposition, for whatever
reasons.
My second preliminary point is that there is a critical ambiguity
in the notion of repaying evil with evil (injustice with injustice), and
I'm afraid that Socrates* arguments sometimes get muddled because of it.
Consider the distinction between:
(1) Hurting someone simply because he has hurt
me, where there is no other reason, excuse
or justification for hurting him. (I shall
call this repaying evil for evil in the
**primary'* sense or for its own sake.)
and
(2) Hurting someone because he is hurting me,
where the reason I am hurting him is that
this is the only way I can stop him from
hurting me. (I shall call this returning
evil for evil in the *'secondary" sense
or for the sake of self-defense.)
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I am inclined to grant (though even this, I think, is controversial) that
returning evil for evil in the primary sense is unjust or morally wrong.
If we can show that an action is an instance of returning evil for evil
in this sense, then if we accept presuppositions (a) and (b) above, we
must not perform that action.

Often, however, an action may involve re-

turning evil for evil in what I have called the "secondary" sense.

I am

inclined to think that whether returning evil for evil in this sense is
unjust or immoral depends entirely upon whether or not the person inflicting the initial evil upon me is himself "justified" in doing so.
If he is ~

as he might be for a variety of reasons, as I shall show

—

then returning evil for this (justifiable) evil may be itself unjust or
immoral.

If the evil initially inflicted upon me is not justified, how-

ever, then I cannot see how it can be wrong for me to resist it. We
sometimes have to resist evil with means that would otherwise be evil
but which are justified in the circumstances.

I shall deal in a moment

with the question of whether this is actually returning evil for evil.
Now it may seem paradoxical to suppose that anyone could ever be
justified in inflicting injustice or evil upon another.
so, for two reasons.

But this is not

First, by "evil" here Socrates does not mean "that

which it is wrong to inflict," which would generate the paradox but,
rather, "that which is an evil or is hurtful" which avoids the paradox.
Secondly, and more importantly, we shall see below that it is arguable
that under certain circumstances it is justifiable to treat people unfairly •— to do them an injustice.

This certainly i£ paradoxical, but

there are compelling arguments that we shall examine below in favor of
accepting the unjust results of fair procedures.

Indeed, I shall even-

tually show that this is precisely Socrates* point in the Crito.
To return to the main thread, it is crucial to distinguish the
primary and secondary senses of repaying evil for evil for the following
reason.

If my account of this distinction is roughly correct, then the

fact that an action can be appropriately described as "returning evil for
evil'* does not directly insure that the action is unjust or immoral, as
Socrates sometimes suggests.

In particular, if we are dealing with a case

of returning evil for evil in the secondary sense, then it is essential
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to determine whether the evil initially inflicted is justified or not.
The issue in the Crito is whether or not Socrates will be acting
justly or rightly in trying to escape.

It will not do for Socrates to

point out that he would be "hurting" the state in some sense by escaping
and then to claim, on the basis of presupposition (b) above, that it
would be unjust for him to try to escape. Let us suppose, for now, that
the "consequential" argument (see below) is sound and that Socrates
would be injuring the state by trying to escape. Would escape be immoral
then, because of premise (b)?

It would be so only if Socrates would be

repaying evil for evil in the primary sense.

But this is not the case.

At most he is returning evil for evil in the secondary sense.

But in

that case he is acting unjustly only if the state is justified in injuring him in the first place, and the burden of proof is on the state
to demonstrate this, since Socrates is ex hypothesi innocent and has
been unjustly convicted.
Socrates is simply confused, therefore, if he is arguing that, in
light of presupposition (b) and the consequential argument, he has shown
that he would be acting unjustly by trying to escape.

The confusion

arises out of the ambiguity of the notion of "repaying evil with evil.'*
In presupposition (b) this phrase is used in the primary sense; the "consequential" argument merely shows that Socrates would be repaying evil
with evil in the secondary sense.

It is up to the state to show that it

is justified in harming Socrates (by executing him despite his innocence)
and the "contractarian" argument is supposed to show this.

Thus, if the

*'contractarian" argument is sound, trying to escape would be unjust not
only on presupposition (c) above but on presupposition (b) as well.
The shift from the "consequential" to the "contractarian** argument
occurs when Socrstes considers the following reply to the claim that he
would be injuring the state by trying to escape: *'But the state has in24
jured me by judging my case unjustly."
Significantly, the laws do not
deny this. They claim, instead, that it is irrelevant, because Socrates
has agreed to abide "by whatever decisions the state should pronounce."
This reply, of course, cuts two ways.

Since it implicitly grants that
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Socrates' claim is correct, it shows, on the one hand, that we are dealing
with an apparent case or repaying evil for evil in the "secondary" sense.
If this is so, then, as I have already shown, the burden of proof is on
the state to show that the evil it is inflicting is justified and hence
that Socrates is not justified in resisting that evil.

The laws try to

discharge this burden of proof by showing that they are justified because
of Socrates' tacit agreement to abide by their final judicial judgments.
The "contractarian" argument is based on presupposition (c) above:
we have a moral obligation to carry out our just agreements.

The laws

claim, quite simply, that Socrates has agreed "not in mere words, but
in...actions" to abide "by whatever judgments the state should pronounce."'
There are many questions we might raise with respect to this contention.
I shall attempt to deal with the following:

(1) Has Socrates in fact

made some sort of implicit agreement with the state?

(2) If so, is it

the sort of agreement the laws describe and does it have the implications
they say it has?

(3) Would an "agreement" of this sort be a just and

binding one? and finally, (4) Why would anyone ever make such an agreement, even tacitly?
Let us suppose for the sake of argument, what many thinkers would
perhaps deny, that Socrates has —

at least tacitly —

implicit "agreement" with the state.
Laws describe —

an

should pronounce"?

made some sort of

Is it the sort of agreement the

agreement to '*ablde by whatever judgments the state
This seems terribly implausible, and thanks to Crito*s

intellectual limitations and his inclination to assent to just about anything his friend says, Socrates is not constrained to defend this claim
explicitly in the dialogue.

But I think we can imagine roughly how his

defense of it would proceed if we ask ourselves the following question:
why would anyone ever make such an agreement, and how could such a "blankcheck" agreement, to abide by whatever the state decrees, be a "just"
agreement?
The answer to the first question is suggested by Socrates' conception of the likely consequences of any other social arrangement.

No

answer to the second question is even suggested in the dialogue itself.
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but an answer could be garnered from an examination of Plato's idea of
justice in the Republic and elsewhere.

We shall not have to turn to

these sources, however, since the arguments of Rawls's that we shall consider below speak directly to this second question, the question of how
it can be "just" or morally right to agree to perpetrate and endure injustice or what is itself morally wrong.
But what about the first question?

Aside from the moral propriety

of such an agreement, why does Socrates believe that it would be reasonable to agree to abide by whatever judgments the state should pronounce?
Here to, Socrates' contentions are defended by Rawls, albeit obliquely
and in an importantly qualified way.

But first let us look at how

Socrates might defend his implicit claim that a reasonable man would
(and should) make an agreement like the one the laws describe.
Early in the dialogue Socrates —
Athens —

in the mouth of the Laws of

sketches the first of his three major arguments against escape.

This is what I called the "causal" or "consequential" argument above, an
argument which depends upon the (allegedly) disastrous consequences that
escaping would have.

Thus, the Laws exclaim:

Tell us, Socrates, what have you in your mind
to do? What do you mean by trying to escape,
but to destroy us, the laws and the whole
state, as far as you are able?26
The force of the exclamation is apparently supposed to be explained when
the Laws continue:
Do you think that a state can exist and not
be overthrown, in which the decisions of law
are of no force, and are disregarded and
undermined by private individuals?27
Socrates is close here to some form of extreme legalism, and for all
that has been said so far it might be extreme legalism with respect to
legislative decisions as well as extreme legalism with respect to judicial decisions. However, the following remark suggests that, explicitly
at least, Socrates is only committed to the narrower form of legalism:
"Much might be said," the Laws assert, "in defense of the law which
28
makes judicial decisions supreme."
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In order to construe the preceding remarks as a valid argument, we
must interpret Socrates as making both a normative and a very strong
empirical claim:

(1) it is wrong to do anything likely to undermine the

state, and (2) seeking to escape would be likely to undermine the state.
Obviously, both claims need to be modified to be even tenuously plausible,
but Socrates does not do so in the Crito.

Before seeing how the political

theory of John Rawls can be construed as an attempt to remedy these deficiencies, let me indicate where I think we have gotten thus far.
To make good on the preceding arguments, Socrates would have to
show, first, why it would be wrong for him to do anything likely to undermine the state (including something like saving his own life when he has
been unjustly condemned to death) and, secondly, why seeking to escape
would in fact be likely to undermine the state.

One obvious way of de-

fending the normative claim would be the "utilitarian" way:

arguing that

more social benefits are achieved with a state than without one, and hence
that undermining the state is wrong.

Socrates does not use this argument,

however, and relies instead on two other arguments:

the "contractarian"

argument (Socrates has agreed to abide by whatever decisions the state
should pronounce) and the "relational" argument (Socrates owes it to the
state to abide by its decisions and to avoid doing anything that would
hurt it because the state has "reared" him —

he stands in a "child-

parent," indeed a "slave-master," relationship to the state).
With respect to the first of these arguments we are really no further
than when we started:

supposing Socrates has made some sort of "agreement"

with the state, why should we concede that it is such an extraordinarily
rigorous one?

It is at this point that the "consequential" argument is

relevant once again.

If the consequences of disobeying the state's laws,

on the basis of individual private judgment, say, are in fact as bad as
that argument suggests, then perhaps it would be reasonable to agree to
abide absolutely by the state*s (judicial) judgments, whatever they are
(supposing all along, of course, that the state itself has remained more
or less reasonably just).
6. The situation, then, is this. Two of Socrates* major arguments for
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not escaping must be conjoined if either of them is to have any force:
the consequential argument makes an empirical claim (about the likely
consequences of disobedience to the law) that needs a normative claim
to make it relevant (a claim about not doing what is likely to undermine
the state); the contractarian argument provides us with the relevant
normative claim (we shouldn*t undermine the state because we have agreed
not to) but is in difficulty over an empirical or at least pragmatic
claim (the claim that in fact we have tacitly made such an agreement or
that we would make it, given our ends and needs, if we had the chance).
The theoretical resolution to this problem is obvious:

if the conse-

quential argument is correct in its empirical claim about the consequences of disobedience, then it seems that the contractarian argument
can supply the relevant normative premise.

For if the consequences of

ever following one*s private lights over social (or at least judicial)
decisions are as likely to lead to disaster as the consequential argument suggests, then it would perhaps be reasonable to agree to forego
individual private judgment for the greater good of a social decision
procedure.

Unfortunately, as obvious as this theoretical resolution

is, as it stands it suffers from two insurmountable weaknesses.
To begin with, the empirical claim about the likely consequences
of disobedience to the law is simply too strong.

It is extremely im-

plausible to claim, as Socrates must claim, that the slightest deviance
from social (or at least judicial) decisions, even for the best of
reasons, courts disaster.

To be sure, there is an important and not im-

plausible empirical claim in the offing here —

a claim about the dangers

of individual private judgment and its likely consequences.

But as we

shall see below in our discussion of Rawls*s defense of a similar argument, it is a carefully modified empirical claim.
This is just one of Socrates* problems, however.

For suppose he

were to grant that the consequences of disobedience are not always likely
to be disastrous and that the maintenance of a healthy commonwealth is
consistent with (indeed, perhaps dependent upon) a certain amount of conscientious, illegal dissent.

If he made this concession, Socrates would
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then no longer be able to retain the normative claim that he needs for
his argument as a whole to go through.

For the agreement to abide by

whatever (judicial) decisions the state should make was reasonable only
insofar as this agreement was necessary for the preservation of the state.
If we grant, as it seems we must, that in fact the state can survive a
certain amount of illegal dissent, then the most plausible "agreement"
would be to abide by the state's decisions up to the point necessary for
its preservation.
In short, Socrates faces a paradox:

his normative claim, that

we should do whatever is necessary to uphold a more or less just state,
is quite plausible on a certain reading.

But it does not follow that

we have an absolute or unqualified obligation to abide by the state's
(judicial) decisions, since it is not likely that absolute or unqualified
obedience is necessary for the preservation of the state.

In this case,

Socrates seems to be making too strong an empirical claim.

On the other

hand, Socrates can weaken his empirical claim but try to make his argument good by strengthening his normative claim:

we are required to abide

by the state's decisions, whatever they are, whether compliance is necessary for the state's preservation or not.
argument, too strong a normative claim.

But this is, without further

Thus, however we read him,

Socrates is making either too strong an empirical or too strong a normative claim, and he cannot qualify the one without modifying the other

—

with unhappy results for his argument.
Before turning to a treatment of these problems that is remarkable,
among other reasons, for the way in which it picks up the thread of our
discussion almost exactly where Socrates leaves off, I should like to
anticipate one criticism that might be made of my treatment of his arguments in the Crito. Very briefly, it may be said that I've taken the
letter of the text too seriously and the spirit not seriously enough.
Thus, it might be conceded that the structure of Socrates' argument in the
Crito is much the way I have described it, but that I have missed the
real point of the dialogue.
this:

That point, it could be argued, is simply

Socrates chose to play the Athenian "game," had his day in court,

was unfortunately convicted, and yet is enough of a gentleman and fair-
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minded citizen to accept the consequences.

This, while in my opinion a

rather farfetched interpretation of Socrates* arguments in the Crito,
is in fact an argument for his accepting the consequences that we shall
have to consider and that we shall consider when we evaluate Professor
Rawls*s arguments below.

Here I should simply like to point out that

however gentlemanly it might be for Socrates to play the sacrificial
lamb, it is odd to think that he has a moral duty to do so or that he
would be acting unjustly (or immorally) if he did not do so. And this
is what any argument that would vindicate Socrates* position in the Crito
must show.

As a first step toward

finding such an argument, I should

like to examine Professor John Rawls*s views about the nature and extent
of our obligation to obey the law.

CHAPTER IV
RAWLS*S ARGUMENTS FOR
OBEYING JUST AND UNJUST LAWS
1,

For analytic purposes I shall interpret Rawls as making two claims

in his later work:

(i) citizens in a reasonably just constitutional

democracy have a moral duty, other things equal, to comply with duly
enacted laws and policies (this view is often expressed by saying that
citizens in such a society have a prima facie moral duty to comply with
duly enacted laws and policies); and (11) citizens in a reasonably just
constitutional democracy sometimes (and perhaps often) have a moral
duty, on balance or all things considered, to comply with unjust laws
and policies as well as just ones (this view is often expressed by
saying that in such a society the injustice of a law or policy is not
always sufficient to override one*s prima facie duty to comply with
duly enacted legislation).

Of course, Rawls is also making a third

claim that we want to evaluate:

that under certain circumstances,

even when one is morally justified in disobeying the law in a reasonably
just democratic society, one is nonetheless morally bound to accept the
legal consequences for doing so.

But since the best argument for this

claim is an argument analogous to the argument for the first two claims,
I want to postpone the analysis and evaluation of the former until we
have gotten clear (in the present chapter) about the most plausible argument for (1) and (11).
It seems that if (1) is correct, questions of obedience and disobedience to the law —
—

at least in reasonably just democratic societies

are always moral questions.

This evidently means that in such soci-

eties the fact that a certain course of conduct is proscribed or prohibited by a valid law is always a relevant moral consideration in deciding whether one ought to pursue that course of conduct or not.
say, this fact is not always an overriding consideration —
72

Needless to

this is what
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is meant by calling the relevant duty a prima facie one or a duty "other
things equal." Nonetheless, it appears to follow from the view we*re
concerned with that illegality always counts as one reason for not doing
(or for doing, as the case may be) something that is prohibited or proscribed by law.
This may not seem terribly controversial at first blush, but it
does appear to be a rather odd claim when we consider both how it is that
something acquires the force of law in democratic societies and what an
extraordinary variety of activities (or prohibitions on activities) have
that force in such societies.

To begin with the second point, we should

have to note that smoking in most classrooms on the Ohio State campus,
for example, is illegal.

Hence, on the view in question smoking in

those classrooms is at least prima facie immoral and in the absence of
other (overriding) considerations is immoral on balance or all things
considered.
Of course, this is a trivial example, but that*s just its force.
For the view in question has it that acting illegally is always prima
facie immoral:

that we are morally bound, other things equal, to comply

with duly enacted laws and policies in societies like our own.

Perhaps

this is not intended to apply to laws like those against smoking in the
classroom; but then we need to know how to determine when law has moral
force and when it does not.

Or perhaps it*s true that the view in ques-

tion applies in cases of this sort, but it's supposed to be obvious that
other things are not equal in such cases.

But then we need to know a

great deal more about the phrase "other things equal" that appears in
the first of the two claims that interest us.
A much larger issue is raised by the fact that the law is made, in
societies like our own, with decision-procedures that are both majoritarian and representational (rather than direct).
wish to emphasize only the first feature:
rule.

For present purposes I

the principle of majority

As we shall see, Rawls*s argument is designed to show that, other

things equal, we are morally bound to abide by the (valid) legislative
decisions of a majority (or their representatives), even when we are in
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the minority and even when we think the majority is acting unwisely and/
or unjustly.

Thus, the principle of majority rule is viewed not only as

an obvious practical expedient but as a decision-procedure with considerable moral force behind it.

I am not arguing against this feature of

Rawls*s view at this point, but simply trying to be sure we imderstand
it and its implications.

Perhaps some examples would be helpful.

A majority of the citizens in this country have seen fit, through
their duly elected representatives, to prohibit the possession and use
of marijuana, not to mention its sale.

It is also illegal, in most

states, for consenting adults to engage in homosexual acts of various
kinds.

It is even illegal in most states to engage privately in a vari-

ety of heterosexual activities, such as fellatio, cunnilingus, and sodomy.

This is due of course to the moral views of the majority.

Do

those views have prima facie moral force for those of us who disagree
with them and who wish to engage in some nxjmber of the illegal activities just mentioned?

That is, is the fact that fellatio is illegal

something I ought to be taking into account in my private life, if I
wish to remain a righteous man?

That it is allegedly unnatural is a

fact that I am willing to take into account in the moral reckoning
(though I reckon it not unnatural).

But the fact that it is illegal?

How can this be relevant to my private life?

And we must remember that

this is just one of an extraordinary number of valid laws that it seems
odd to think of as relevant in my moral reckoning.

What's more, many of

them are laws that most of us either don't even know about or the details
of which we have never bothered to consider.

Is this moral irresponsi-

bility on our part or just good sense, as I should have thought?

2. I should like to determine whether Rawls can get round difficulties
of this sort, and what his argument for the two principal claims in question actually is:

the claims that in a reasonably just constitutional

democracy we have a prima facie moral duty to comply with duly enacted
laws and policies and that in such a society it sometimes happens that we
have a moral duty, on balance or all things considered, to comply with
2
unjust as well as just laws and policies.
In order to understand Rawls's

75

strategy in his attempt to prove these claims, we must first note a distinction he uses in his discussion, a distinction that I am not sure I
fully understand.

This is the distinction between what Rawls calls

"ideal" or "strict-compliance" theory and "nonideal" or "partial-compliance" theory.

Roughly, the idea seems to be that in ideal theory we

assume that everyone will always act in accordance with their moral and
legal commitments, while in nonideal theory we try to take into account
the fact that in real life everyone will not always act as they ought.
Rawls believes that it is useful to do political theory from the point
of view of ideal theory, in the first instance, and to make the appropriate adjustments for nonideal theory when we have gotten clear about
the former (the situations of strict or perfect compliance).
Rawls*s strategy is this.

First he develops an argument con-

cemiLng the moral basis of civil authority under the conditions (and
subject to the assumptions) of ideal or strict-compliance theory.

This

is an argument that in a perfectly just democratic society we woiHd be
morally bound, other things equal, to comply with duly enacted laws and
policies sans phrase.
above —

This argument does not bear on the second claim

since the problem of unjust laws and policies does not arise

in ideal theory ~

but it does suggest a rather straightforward defense

of the first claim.

Rawls then develops an argument from the point of

view of nonideal or partial-compliance theory.

This is an argument that

even in an imperfectly but nearly just democratic society we would be
morally bound to comply with duly enacted laws and policies even (up to
a point) if they were unjust.

This argument is supposed to prove both

of Rawls's main claims as I am interpreting them.

I shall begin by out-

lining and briefly evaluating the argument from ideal theory.

The reasons

for proceeding in this way will become obvious as we proceed.
The argument from ideal theory begins with a moral principle that
3
Rawls calls "the natural duty of justice". This principle is formulated
somewhat differently by Rawls in different places, and these differences
t u m out to be of some significance.

Here, however, I wish to keep things

fairly simple, so I shall say that according to Rawls the natural duty of
justice requires us to support and uphold just institutions that exist
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and apply to us and to further such institutions when they do not exist
and when we can do so at no great cost to ourselves.

For present pur-

poses I am interested only in the first part of this principle, the
claim that we have a natural duty to support just institutions that
exist and apply to us.
Given the so-called natural duty of justice, Rawls goes on to
argue that a perfectly just constitutional democracy would be a just
institution in the relevant sense.

It follows that citizens in a

perfectly just constitutional democracy would have a moral duty to support and uphold it.

But how do they become morally bound to duly

enacted laws and policies in such a society?
I think that we must interpret Rawls as making an important empirical claim at this point:

namely, that it is impossible, as a mat-

ter of fact, to maintain a perfectly just constitutional democracy without general compliance with some principle of institutional settlement
—

the principle of majority rule, for example.

If this is true, then

since we have a moral duty to uphold such societies, it seems to follow
that, for the most part, we have a moral duty to comply with its duly
enacted laws and policies.

I wish to summarize all of this as follows:

(1) We have a natural moral duty to support and
uphold just institutions that exist and apply
to us — institutions, that is, that satisfy
the two principles of justice.
(2) A just constitutional democracy is a just institution in the relevant sense — that is,
it is a social system that satisfies the two
principles of justice.
(3) Therefore, we have a moral duty to support
and uphold a just constitutional democracy
when it exists and applies to us,
(4)

Supporting and upholding a just constitutional
democracy requires general compliance with
some principle of institutional settlement for
resolving legislative conflict — the principle
of majority rule, for example.

(5) Therefore, we have a moral duty to comply with

77

the principle of majority rule in a just constitutional democracy that exists and applies to us.
(In other words, we have a moral duty to comply
with the duly enacted laws and policies of a just
constitutional democracy that exists and applies
to us.)
It is important to notice at the outset that the duty to support
just institutions —

which for all we said above might very well be an

important ethical principle in the moral philosophy of a utilitarian
like Mill or an intuitionist like Ross —

is interpreted by Rawls as a

duty to support and further arrangements that satisfy his own well4
known principles of justice.
That is, an ideally just institution
simply is, for Rawls, an institution that satisfies these two principles.
I have made this point explicit in the formal version of the argument
from ideal theory above.

Obviously, the so-called duty of justice be-

comes much more controversial as it is made more specific in this way.
After all, it might be said, who woiildn't agree that we have a duty to
support just institutions in some vague sense?

3. It would be impossible to consider here each of the many profound
problems that the argument above faces.

What I propose to do instead

is show, first, that even if we concede premises (1), (2) and (4) above,
Rawls still cannot validly infer (5), the conclusion he wants to establish.

But I think I can suggest a move that will enable Rawls to

remedy this difficulty.

More interesting, as we shall see, is the fact

that even the revised argument faces two further difficulties:

it is

so excessively abstract as to leave us wholly in the dark about the
question of the nature and extent of our obligation to obey the law in
situations of less than perfect justice; and it doesn*t even mention
the question of the moral force of unjust laws in imperfectly just
societies.

Of course, the argument from nonideal theory is intended to

meet the latter difficulties.

But first a word about the logic of the

argument above, the argument from ideal theory.
Suppose we concede the substantive moral claim embodied in premiss
(1), the stipulative claim made in premiss (2), and the empirical claim
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suggested by premiss (4). It seems that Rawls still cannot validly infer
(5), at least as it stands.

The problem, of course, is that the notion

of general compliance that (4) trades on is not adequately reflected in
(5), the conclusion, and hence the argument is not even clearly valid.
What*s more, it is not clear that this difficulty can be easily remedied.
The main idea, of course, is to get the notion of general compliance into
f.
(5), the conclusion.
But notice that we cannot do this in any simpleminded fashion. We don*t want to say, after all, that what the argument
proves is that we have a natural moral duty generally to comply with
duly enacted laws and policies in a perfectly just constitutional democracy.

Aside from the unhappy fact that this is at best rather awkward

English, it is surely less than what Rawls wants to say.

We want, at the

very least, regular (indeed, rather rigorous) compliance, and not just
*'general compliance" in some vague sense.
One obvious move is to reword (5) so that it states that in a
perfectly just constitutional democracy we have what is usually called
a prima facie moral duty (a moral duty other things equal, as Rawls puts
it) to abide by duly enacted laws and policies.
argument*s formal validity remains:

But the problem of the

how exactly do we get from the em-

pirical necessity for general compliance to the moral requirement of a
prima facie duty to obey the law?
The intuitive idea, I take it, is that even from the standpoint of
ideal theory it is necessary to bear in mind that without regular compliance our enterprise is doomed to failure.

Not that anyone will be tempted

to disobey the law for sinister reasons in ideal theory, or because of
alleged injustice in the society's laws or policies.
by the assumptions of strict-compliance theory.

This is ruled out

Still, Rawls says, even

just men acting strictly on their (collective) sense of justice, will
sometimes disagree as to what*s the best policy xinder certain circumstances.

They do not all have possession of the same set of facts, for

example, and in any case different people will assess the relevance of
various facts differently.

For this reason, apparently, they would agree

that justice will be more effectively served in the long run by com-
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mitting themselves to an institutionalized decision-procedure for resolving their policy conflicts than by leaving what is to be done up
to each individual acting by his private lights.
What we have, then, is a situation where men of good will agree
that a commitment to some principle of institutional settlement (the
principle of majority rule, for example) is requisite to keep their
society going. And since they presumably view keeping it going as
one of their most important natural duties, they will agree that it
is, in general, more important to abide by the principle of institutional settlement than to have their own way in every case, as with
the principle of private lights (roughly:

"In the final analysis,

always act by your own private lights.").
Now it may seem that with these intuitive remarks in mind we can
solve the problem of formal validity mentioned above.
it will be recalled, was this:

That problem,

on the one hand it seems quite difficult

to alter (5) so that it will follow validly from (3) and (4); on the
other hand the intuitive idea in the move to (5) seems fairly obvious.
That is, what (4) is essentially saying is that unless people abide
by the principle of institutional settlement for the most part, the
just society cannot be maintained.

Thus, what (5) should be saying is

that for the most part we are morally bound to the results of the principle of institutional settlement, whether we happen to like them or
not, due to our duty to support and uphold just institutions.

Since

we are not absolutely bound to these results, it is tempting to say
that what the argument proves is that we have a prima facie duty, or a
duty other things equal as Rawls puts it, to abide by duly enacted laws
and policies in a just constitutional democracy.

This all sounds very

nice, but Rawls is still not out of the woods, as can easily be shown.
The main difficulty is that the duty of justice is insufficient, in
itself, to generate even a prima facie moral duty to obey the law.
Suppose that it is reasonable for some member of a given society
to conclude that most of the other members will comply with the principle of majority rule and that noncompliance in his case will not
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weaken the stability of the society in question.

It seems to follow that

he will not be violating the so-called duty of justice if he fails to
comply with the principle of majority rule, for we are supposing that the
society will be maintained whether he complies with it or not. What
binds him to the principle of majority rule, then, if not the natural
duty of justice?
I think that Rawls needs to introduce the principle of fairness,
or the natural duty of fair play as he has also called it, in order to
Q

meet this difficulty.

Any one citizen can fail to comply without en-

dangering the society as a whole.
the society is in danger.

But if enough citizens do so, then

What is true of one citizen, however, is

true for any other citizen, as long as his fellows are complying.

But

now we face a situation which is familiar enough in cooperative ventures.
The benefits of the venture —

indeed, its very viability —

only as long as most of the members comply most of the time.

are ensured
There is

room for a certain amount of "free riding" as it is sometimes called.
But how are we to determine who gets to ride free, since obviously
everyone cannot?

The principle of fairness suggests that no one is to

ride free simply because he can get away with doing so.

This would be

unfair to the other members of the venture, who could just as well claim
a right to ride free if it appeared that their doing so would not endanger
the system as a whole.

But this means that free-riding is forbidden not

so much by the duty of justice, strictly speaking, but by the principle
of fairness.

Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice does not bring this

out clearly enough.

We cannot generate even a prima facie moral duty to

comply with duly enacted laws and policies without introducing the principle of fairness as well as the natural duty of justice, which was our
starting-point.
If this is true, then we must insert another premiss into the preceding argument in order to generate the conclusion Rawls wants.

I shall

assume that the relevant moral principle is captured by premiss (5') in
the argument immediately below —
theory —

call it the revised argument from ideal

and that with it Rawls can make good on his claim that citizens
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in a perfectly just constitutional democracy would have a prima facie
moral duty to comply with all duly enacted laws and policies. The final
argument from the point of view of ideal theory, then, is this:
(1') We have a natural moral duty to support and
uphold just institutions that exist and apply
to us — Institutions, that is, that satisfy
the two principles of justice.
(2*) A just constitutional democracy is a just institution in the relevant sense — that is, it
is a social system that satisfies the two principles of justice.
(3*) Therefore, we have a moral duty to support and
uphold a just constitutional democracy when it
exists and applies to us.
(4*) Supporting and upholding a just constitutional
democracy requires general compliance with
some principle of institutional settlement —
the principle of majority rule, for example.
(5*) If a social scheme requires general compliance
with some principle of institutional settlement in order to be maintained, and if citizens
are morally bound to uphold that scheme, then
every citizen is morally bound to comply with
duly enacted laws and policies, other things
being equal.
(6*) Therefore, every citizen in a just constitutional democracy has a moral duty, other things
equal, to abide by duly enacted laws and policies.
(Alternatively: every citizen in a just constitutional democracy has a prima facie moral duty
to abide by duly enacted laws and policies.)
Let us suppose that this argument is sound. How does it bear on
the problem of the nature and extent of legitimate civil authority under
less than perfect conditions? That is, under conditions other than
those of ideal or strict-compliance theory?

4. What Rawls calls the argument from "nonideal** or '*partial-compliance" theory is supposed to help us here. Rawls does not sketch this
argument even roughly, but I take it that when worked out the argument
from nonideal theory is supposed to do two somewhat different things:
(i) prove that even in an imperfectly just society we have a prima facie
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moral duty to comply with duly enacted laws and policies; and (ii) prove
that this prima facie duty is heavily weighted, so that sometimes we are
morally bound (all things considered) to comply with what we think, and
think correctly, is an unjust law or policy.

Rawls is inclined to say

(or to imply, at any rate) that (1) goes without saying, in light of the
9
argument from ideal theory, and that it*s really (ii) that needs proving.
But this is a mistake, for reasons that are worth explaining.
Rawls writes that "there is quite clearly no difficulty in explaining why we are to comply with just laws enacted under a just constitution".

But this is an ambiguous remark, as I shall show, and it is

possible that Rawls is making things easier on himself than he is entitled
to, by exploiting that ambiguity.

If he is merely saying that in a per-

fectly just society there would obviously be no difficulty in explaining
why we are morally bound to comply with just laws enacted under a just
constitution, then perhaps he*s right and right for reasons of the sort
. suggested by the argument from ideal theory.

However, it sometimes seems

that Rawls means to say more than this when he says that there *s no difficulty in explaining why we are morally bound to comply vn.th just laws
and policies enacted under a just constitution.

For his remarks some-

times suggest the idea that in nonideal theory, when we are dealing with
imperfectly just institutions, we can separate just laws and policies
from unjust ones, give a quick proof of why we are morally bound to the
former (by alluding to the argument from ideal theory), and then formulate a somewhat lengthier account of how we come to be bound to (some of)
the latter as well.

But this won't do, for a number of reasons.

To begin with, all that the argument from ideal theory proves, if
it proves anything, is that citizens in a perfectly just society would
have a moral duty (other things equal) to obey just laws and policies
enacted under a just constitution.

When we t u m to imperfectly just so-

cieties, like our own, it will not do for Rawls to single out the just
laws and policies, refer us back to the argument from ideal theory, and
contend that that argument explains why we are morally bound to at least
the just laws and policies in the imperfectly just society.

He cannot do

this because all the earlier argument established was that we would be
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morally bound to just laws and policies in a perfectly just society.

It

is by no means obvious that this same account holds for just laws and
policies in an imperfectly just society.

It may be that in imperfectly

just societies we have no moral duty to obey the law at all.
But Rawls's claim that there's no problem in explaining how we become morally bound to just laws and policies, even in imperfectly just
societies, is misleading for another reason as well.

For it suggests

that in a given society we can distinguish just and unjust laws, for example, and then show how we are obviously bound to the former and at
least arguably bound (up to a point) even to the latter.

But as we shall

see, the thrust of Rawls's main argument for complying with at least some
unjust laws and policies is that we cannot determine, with respect to a
large and important number of cases, whether or not a given law or policy is "really" unjust.

That is, this is a distinction that it is dan-

gerous and, in any case, often impossible to make with respect to a
given law or policy, according to Rawls.

But then Rawls himself is

hardly in a position to rely on this distinction in order to pass off
his claim about obeying just laws and policies as though it were a
truism or followed in some obvious way from his remarks about ideal or
perfectly just societies.
In short, the argument from nonideal or partial-compliance theory
has got to be an argument about laws and policies (in a reasonably just
society) generally; it cannot be a two-part argument, where one part
proves that we are morally bound to just laws and policies in such a
society and the other proves that we are even bound (up to a point) to
unjust laws and policies.

I believe that an argument of the appropriate

sort can be found in Rawls's book, but in large part it is an argument
that I have put together from remarks he makes in different places.

As

I see it, the central argument in nonideal theory is parallel, up to a
point, to the argument from ideal theory.

But it becomes quite another

argument at a certain point, as I shall show.
If the argument from ideal theory is sound, then in a perfectly
just constitutional democracy we would be morally bound to comply with
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duly enacted laws and policies in such a society —
which will, by assumption, always be just.

laws and policies

The difficulty that the

argument from nonideal theory has to meet is simply this:

it is ex-

tremely unlikely that we shall ever find ourselves in a perfectly just
society, so what's the relevance of the so-called natural duty of justice?

At least two moves are open to Rawls at this point.
On the one hand, he might simply remind us that there's more to

the natural duty of justice than has thus far been acknowledged.

In

addition to supporting just institutions that exist and apply to us,
we are morally bound to foster the development of such institutions
when they do not exist, at least if we can do so at no great cost to
ourselves.

Hence, we might expect Rawls to argue that we are morally

bound to support imperfectly just societies when doing so is necessary
for the development of perfectly just societies. And if supporting im:perfectly just societies requires obeying duly enacted laws and policies
in such societies, then Rawls might argue that we are morally bound
(other things equal) to comply with duly enacted laws and policies even
in imperfectly just societies and even when it's certain, for all practical purposes, that not all of those laws and policies will be just.
Rawls does not follow the strategy suggested by the preceding remarks, however, and he does not explain why.

Perhaps he feels that it's

manifestly implausible to claim that supporting imperfectly just societies is required for fostering perfectly just societies.

Or perhaps

he recognizes that, since the duty of justice requires us to foster the
development of perfectly just societies only if we can do so at no great
cost to ourselves, it is not likely that we are committed to doing this
by complying with the laws and policies of an imperfectly just society.
After all, this is likely to involve considerable "cost" to ourselves,
both in terms of personal inconvenience and in terms of finding ourselves
forced to obey laws and policies that we consider palpably unjust.

It is

important to remember that Rawls could have advanced some argument like
that suggested above, however, since the argument that he does advance is
not entirely unrelated to it and certainly makes more sense when we think
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of Rawls*s somewhat abstract but nonetheless very serious commitment to
the development of perfectly just societies —

societies, that is, that

realize the principles of justice perfectly.
The argument that Rawls in fact uses to make good on his central
claims in nonideal theory is related to the argument from ideal theory
in an obvious way.

Since it*s unreasonable to expect to find perfectly

just institutions in the real world, it is plausible to suppose that we
nonetheless have a natural moral duty to support institutions that come
reasonably close to meeting the standards set by the two principles of
justice.

Thus, the argument from nonideal theory involves a significant

(but not very surprising) amendment to the natural duty of justice as we
have been thinking of it so far; we might put this principle as follows:
We have a natural moral duty to support and uphold
reasonably just institutions that exist and apply
to us —- institutions, that is, that come reasonably close to satisfying the two principles of justice.
With this principle as a starting-point, it is easy enough to see how
the argument from nonideal theory is to proceed.

Rawls need only claim

that a reasonably just constitutional democracy would be a reasonably
just institution in the relevant sense, and it follows that we would be
morally bound to uphold a reasonably just constitutional democracy that
existed and applied to us.

Given an empirical claim analogous to that

made in premiss (4*) of the argument from ideal theory, as well as some
principle of fair play like that embodied in premiss (5*) of the earlier
argument, it appears that we can deduce at least one of the claims Rawls
wishes to make:

namely, that even in imperfectly just democratic so-

cieties there is a moral presumption in favor of complying with duly
enacted laws and policies.

I wish to summarize this argument formally

as follows:
(1") We have a natural moral duty to support and
uphold reasonably just institutions that
exist and apply to us — institutions, that
is, that come reasonably close to satisfying the two principles of justice.
(2") A reasonably just constitutional democracy is
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a reasonably just institution in the relevant
sense — that is, it is a social system that
comes reasonably close to satisfying the two
principles of justice.
(3") Therefore, we have a moral duty to support and
uphold a reasonably just constitutional democracy
when it exists and applies to us.
(4") Supporting and upholding a reasonably just
constitutional democracy requires general compliance with some principle of institutional
settlement for resolving legislative conflict
— the principle of majority rule, for example.
(5") If a social scheme requires general compliance
with some principle of institutional settlement
in order to be maintained, and if citizens are
morally bound to uphold that scheme, then every
citizen is morally bound to abide by duly enacted
laws and policies, other things being equal.
(6") Therefore, every citizen in a reasonably just
constitutional democracy has a moral duty, other
things being equal, to abide by duly enacted
laws and policies. (Alternatively: every citizen
in a reasonably just constitutional democracy
has a prima facie moral duty to abide by duly
enacted laws and policies.)
5. Now this argument faces difficulties of at least four kinds. To begin
with, it faces all the difficulties that the argument from ideal theory
faced. Thus, it would need to be shown that we do indeed have a natural
moral duty to uphold reasonably just institutions and that such institutions are those that come reasonably close to satisfying Rawls*s principles of justice.

Similarly, it would have to be shown that it is in fact

impossible to maintain a reasonably just constitutional democracy without
relying on some principle of institutional settlement such as the principle of majority rule.

But I shall not pursue these problems here.

There is a somewhat different problem connected with premiss (1")
in the argument from nonideal theory, however.

This is the problem of

articulating just what it means to say that we have a moral duty to support reasonably just institutions as well as perfectly just ones.

Even

if we suppose that we know what it would be like for a society to satisfy
the two principles of justice perfectly, it*s not entirely clear what
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someone would have in mind in speaking of a society that came "reasonably
close" to doing so.
Rawls*s idea, I take it, is roughly this.

A social arrangement

comes reasonably close to satisfying the two principles of justice if
it comes as close to realizing those principles as it is reasonable to
expect under the circumstances.

Thus, if a given society tends to max-

imize political freedom and equality of opportunity, and tends to distribute social and economic inequalities in a way calculated to improve
the lot of those least fortunate in that society, then, even if it does
not do so perfectly, we have a natural duty to uphold that society and
to do what is required of us to keep it going.

Rawls is assuming as

well, of course, that the society in question is coming fairly close to
maximizing these things, at least as close as any alternative and,
again, as close as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances.
In other words, while it may well be conceivable that the society in
question could be doing better, it would be unreasonable to expect it
to do so under the circumstances (the circumstances of normal political
life, that is).

At the very least, this must mean that that particular

society is likelier than any available alternative social arrangement
to realize the principles of justice, even imperfectly.

On this inter-

pretation, it seems to me, premiss (1") is not entirely implausible.
But of course there*s a third difficulty connected with the argument from nonideal theory, a difficulty which is independent of the one
just mentioned.

For how can we say, in an actual case, when a given

society is as just as it's reasonable to expect, under the circumstances?
That is, even if we suppose that Rawls's principles of justice are our
standards for assessing the relative justice of a social arrangement,
and even if we agree that a society would be "reasonably just" if it came
reasonably close to satisfying these principles, it turns out to be very
difficult (if not impossible) to get any sort of agreement, in practice,
on the question of whether or not a given society is indeed coming as
close to satisfying the principles of justice as it is reasonable to expect.

Is our own society, for example, a reasonably just one in Rawls's
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sense, so that all U.S. citizens are morally bound to comply with its
duly enacted laws and policies?

It's not just that it's difficult to

get general agreement on the correct answer to this question.

The social

and political difficulties of the past decade suggest that it may be impossible.
Thus, even if Rawls has proven that there would be a moral presumption in favor of obedience to the law in a reasonably just constitutional democracy as he conceives it, this is not a very helpful result.
It will probably always be a matter of serious controversy as to whether
or not a given society is as just as it is reasonable to expect, even if
we accept Rawls's theory of justice.

Hence, it will apparently always

be a matter of genuine controversy as to whether or not we are in general
morally bound to abide by duly enacted laws and policies in a given
society, even if we accept Rawls's "theory of right" or of the moral
basis of civil authority.
But the largest difficulty with the argixment thus far —
one I wish to follow up in the remainder of this chapter —

and the

is this:

in its present form the argument does not speak to the problem of unjust laws and policies and of the extent to which, theoretically at
least, citizens in a reasonably just constitutional democracy would be
morally bound to submit to them.
the conclusion Rawls wants:

Thus, we need another premiss to get

that in a reasonably just constitutional

democracy we have a prima facie moral duty to abide by unjust as well as
just results of the principle of majority rule.
6. Rawls recognizes that in a reasonably just constitutional democracy
it will sometimes happen that we will be confronted with a duly enacted
law or policy that we think, and think correctly, is unjust.

The problem

in such cases is that we seem to be faced with a conflict of duties:

on

the one hand we are morally bound to comply with duly enacted laws and
policies in such a society (at least if the argument above is sound); on
the other hand, it is plausible to say that we have a natural duty (and
in any case a right) to resist injustice. What do we do, then, in cases
of duly enacted laws and policies that we believe, correctly let us
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suppose, to be unjust?
The simple answer is to say that since the duty to comply with duly
enacted legislation in a reasonably just society is only a prima facie
duty or a duty "other things equal", we are never morally bound to comply
with an unjust law.

That is, we might say that the injustice of a given

law or policy always overrides our moral duty (other things equal) to
comply with duly enacted laws and policies, and hence that we are never
morally bound to comply with unjust laws and policies, even in a more or
less just constitutional democracy.
answer is essentially correct.

My own view is that this simple

Rawls rejects this answer, however, and

in this respect his views are characteristic of most recent liberal (not
to mention conservative) political theorists. What reason is there for
supposing that such thinkers are correct, and that we are sometimes
morally bound to go along with unjust laws and policies in more or less
just democratic societies?
It is tempting to think that Rawls can get the result he wants
simply by altering premiss (5") above in an obvious way (see (5*) below).
On this view, which was Rawls's view in a early paper and is still
favored by many political theorists, we are morally bound to unjust laws
and policies for the same reason that we're morally bound to the results
of the principle of majority rule generally.

Others have done their

part, hence we must do our part when it comes our turn, even if this
means complying with unjust laws.

In other words, we are morally bound

to duly enacted but unjust laws and policies because we are morally
bound to duly enacted laws and policies generally, other things being
equal, and hence we must obey putatively unjust laws and policies just as
we must obey inconvenient ones, say, when it comes our t u m .
wise would be to act unfairly.

To do other-

Hence fairness (that is, justice) requires

us to do what would otherwise be unjust or unfair.
We can capture the thrust of the preceding remarks simply by altering
(5") so that it reads as follows:
(5*) If a social scheme requires general compliance
with some principle of institutional settlement in order to be maintained, and if citizens
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are morally bound to uphold that scheme, then
every citizen is morally bound to abide by
duly enacted laws and policies, other things
being equal, even, up to a point, if they are
unjust.
We might then infer (6*) or something like it:
(6*) Therefore, every citizen in a reasonably just
constitutional democracy has a moral duty, other
things being equal, to abide by duly enacted
laws and policies, even, up to a point, when
they are unjust. (Or: every citizen in a reasonably just constitutional democracy has a prima
facie moral duty to abide by duly enacted laws
and policies, even when they are unjust.)
The trouble with construing the argument for obeying unjust laws
in this way is not merely, nor even primarily, that it is ad hoc.
Rather, the problem is that the argument from (5*) proceeds as though
the injustice involved in "doing one's part" in certain cases —
where the law or policy is unjust —

cases

is not a relevant difference with

respect to the general notion of doing-one's-part, other things equal.
That is, at first blush it seems that the fact that a law or policy is
unjust implies that other things are not equal, and hence that the
principle that I ought to do my part, other things equal, simply does
not apply.
But this tack is mistaken for even more profound reasons.

For

when properly understood, it changes the very direction of Rawls's
argument for the moral basis of civil authority.

This is because premiss

(5"), and the principle of fair play generally, plays only a subordinate
role in the argument for complying with duly enacted laws and policies in
a reasonably just constitutional democracy.

The basic thrust of both the

argument from ideal and the argument from nonideal theory is that we're
morally bound to comply with duly enacted laws and policies because without general compliance the system cannot be maintained.
the system is one of our most serious moral duties.

And maintaining

The idea in the

earlier arguments was not "Others have done their part, therefore you
must do your part when it comes your turn", but "People must obey for the
most part, and you're no exception unless you can show why."
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In other words, the principle of fairness does not account for why,
in general, we are morally bound to obey the law in a more or less just
democratic society.

Rather, the natural duty of justice accounts for

our duty to comply with duly enacted laws and policies, via the notion
of the principle of majority rule and doing what is required of us to
uphold just institutions.

The principle of fairness was Introduced only

as a means of handling the problem of "free riders" and to make the move
from (4') to (6*) valid.

To think of the principle of fairness as lying

at the heart of the matter, as the argument for (5*) does, is to make
Rawls a social-contract or "consent" theorist in a very real sense. Although this would be a correct description of the early Rawls, it is
12
certainly not true of the later Rawls, as I have remarked above.
7. It will be convenient, for analytic purposes, to note that the view
we've been considering is subject to still another important criticism.
Rawls remarks early in his book that "an injustice is tolerable only
13
when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice."
But this
implies that an injustice would not be morally tolerable, much less required of us, merely because it happened to be our t u m to obey the law
and the law in question happened to be unjust.

Quite the contrary.

One

would be justified in doing one's turn, if doing so involved one in perpetrating injustice, only if doing one's t u m , and thus perpetrating the
injustice, were required to prevent an even greater injustice.
could that (latter) injustice be?

But what

The answer to this question brings us

to the heart of Rawls's real argument for obeying unjust laws.

Very

roughly, it is an argument which depends upon the empirical claim that
abiding by (some) unjust laws and policies is necessary if we are to uphold a reasonably just constitutional democracy, rather than on the formal
claim that one must do one's part, in such a society, when it comes one's
tum.
At first blush the premiss Rawls needs is an empirical one of the
following sort:

an otherwise just society simply cannot be maintained

unless we agree to abide by some unjust laws and policies.

In other words,

the principle of majority rule will work, as a procedural device for
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resolving legislative conflict, only if we abide for the most part by both
its just and, up to a point, its unjust results.

For the sake of simplic-

ity, I shall interpret Rawls as adding the following premiss to his argument above (see section 4) in order to generate the appropriate conclusion:
(7") Maintaining a reasonably just constitutional
democracy requires general compliance not
only with duly enacted laws and policies that
happen to be just, but with duly enacted laws
and policies generally -— even, up to a point,
when they are unjust.
If Rawls can prove this claim, then he can infer (8"), the conclusion he
wants:
(8") Therefore, every citizen in a reasonably just
constitutional democracy has a moral duty,
other things equal, to abide by duly enacted
laws and policies even when they are unjust.
(Or: every citizen in such a society has a
prima facie moral duty to abide by duly
enacted laws and policies, even when they are
unjust.
Can Rawls prove premiss (7")?
Notice, to begin with, that the empirical claim embodied in (7")
is surely not that a reasonably just society cannot be maintained unless
its occasional unjust laws and policies are regularly complied with as
such.

Any society which could not survive if every one of its unjust

laws and policies were violated —
were violated —

but none of whose just laws and policies

would hardly be a clear (or even a plausible) instance of

a just or reasonably just society.

I take it that the thrust of Rawls's

argument for complying with unjust laws is not that we are committed to
unjust results as such, then, but that we are committed to acting in
accordance with the principle of majority rule generally, even when its
results are unjust.
But why?

Why, when the results are palpably unjust, must we abide

by the principle of majority rule?
this:

I believe that Rawls's thought is

if we could actually know when this were the case (i.e., identify

unjust laws publicly and agree collectively that they were unjust), then
perhaps we would never be required to go along with them.

But we have no

Moral Oracle, as it were, of the sort that could conclusively resolve the
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relevant questions, and hence the principle we would be acting on would
be a principle of private judgment of some sort:

for example, "Judge

for yourself when a law is unjust and hence not to be obeyed."

Why is

Rawls opposed to such a principle?
Suppose we interpret Rawls as claiming that a reasonably just
society simply cannot be maintained without rigorous compliance with
some principle of institutional settlement, even when its results are
unjust. Without such compliance, that is, a society would simply collapse.
This is not unlike the argument advanced by Socrates in the Crito.

It is

a bad argument, however, and hence it is probably mistaken to interpret
Rawls as making quite the same claim.

But it is worth noting just what

Rawls's claim would be on this interpretation, and why it would be mistaken.
Socrates argued in the Crito that a society simply cannot endure
in which decisions of law have no force and are undermined by private
individuals.
reasoning.

There are at least two serious mistakes in this line of

To begin with, it's false to say that decisions of law have

no force for an individual as long as he reserves the right to disregard
them when he thinks they're unjust.

Such decisions will certainly have

force for him, morally speaking, when he believes they're just, even if
they're terribly inconvenient or obviously not in his own interest.
What's more, even putatively unjust laws, laws which in the final analysis he is perhaps unlikely to obey, might have more "force" for him than
other sorts of institutionalized injustice.

That is, the fact that

apparent injustice is embodied in a law will give this person pause (make
him think things out a little more carefully before acting by his private
lights) in a way that the ordinary injustices of everyday life do not.
He may feel no qualms about resisting injustices of the latter sort; but
he may well think very carefully before concluding that a duly enacted
law is unjust and hence to be resisted.

In this sense even laws that a

person is likely to disobey, in the final analysis, have a certain force
for him qua laws.
But it is even more important to notice that Socrates' claim in the
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Crito is simply too general.

It may well be true that if every citizen

in a given society always acts by his private lights, rather than by
some just principle of institutional settlement, that society cannot
long endure.

This is not the kind of case that's relevant, however.

We're concerned with a situation where citizens quite willingly acknowledge the right of the majority to legislate, and have their way, with
respect to the countless practical issues that must be settled if a just
and efficient society is to be maintained.

The question is simply whether

they must also surrender their right to assess questions of justice and
injustice by their own lights, at least up to a point, if their society
is to survive.
Socrates makes it too easy for himself in the Crito, in other words.
We need not deny that complete lawlessness is likely to undermine the
state in order to defend the claim that allowing a certain amount of individual discretion with respect to putatively unjust laws is consistent
. with keeping society going.
Of course, Rawls's critic must not be allowed to make it too easy
on himself either.

It may well be true, as a straightforward matter of

empirical fact, that even if we allow private judgment to prevail only
in cases of putative legislative injustice, we will end up with more
private dissent from social policy than society can safely tolerate.
This is an important empirical question which has not been adequately
studied, so far as I know.

We all have our own intuitions about such

matters, but these are practically worthless. What we need is to encourage social scientists to do some hard research on the question of
the likely effects of allowing (and even encouraging) private judgment
on any issue that seems to one, upon reflection, to raise serious questions
of legislative injustice.
It can be argued, however, that to cast the discussion in this way
is to miss an obvious point. Whether or not the state can in some sense
continue to exist side by side with a great deal of individual judgment
over and against institutionalized social decision-procedures, it is surely
obvious that a society in which private judgment regularly overrides public
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policy, even if this is only on questions of justice and Injustice, will
be less efficient than a society in which people abide fairly rigorously
by some principle of institutional settlement.
For present purposes I wish to concede this claim.

The kind of

society Rawls's critic is apparently advocating (see below) would presumably be less efficient in some straightforward sense than the alternative Rawls favors.
fairly obvious claim.

But suppose we interpret Rawls as making this
That is, suppose we interpret him as claiming

not that society cannot survive unless there is general compliance with
some principle of institutional settlement, even on questions of justice
and injustice, but merely that society will obviously be less efficient
unless some principle of institutional settlement is generally agreed to
have more moral force than one's own private moral judgments.
Rawls's empirical claim would then be far more plausible, but surely
it is one which he would not wish to defend, at least in its present form.
For Rawls is committed, above all, to defending justice against utility,
to put it roughly.

Suppose our society will be more efficient if people

more or less regularly squash their scruples with respect to moral matters
in favor of institutionalized decision-procedures.

Isn't the ineffi-

ciency of the one system outweighed by the fact that in the alternative
system we give wider scope to a person's balanced judgments of the right
and the just?
The answer to this last question is obvious, I think, when we remember Rawls's maxim that an injustice is tolerable only when it is required to prevent an even greater injustice.

On this view it is not the

bare inefficiency of the principle of private judgment that requires us
to favor the principle of majority rule. Rather, it is the possibility
that following the principle of private judgment (with respect to putative
injustice) will lead to greater injustice, in the long run, than following
the principle of majority rule, even when its results are xinjust. But
this leads to a new interpretation of Rawls's thought in premiss (7").

8. According to the new interpretation Rawls is claiming that somehow
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society will be less effectively just (in the long run) if we refuse to
comply with unjust laws and policies than if we agree to do so, within
limits.

Aside from its other merits, this is the only interpretation

of Rawls's empirical claim which is at all plausible, on the one hand,
and is consistent with his dictum that an injustice is tolerable only
when it is required to prevent an even greater injustice, on the other.
We now need to ask what sense can be made of this new claim and what can
be said in its behalf.
Obviously, the intuitive idea is that regular, nonselective comrpliance with duly enacted laws and policies is necessary to prevent some
greater injustice than the injustice involved in complying with occasional unjust laws and policies.

That is, on the new interpretation we

are to comply with duly enacted laws and policies —
when they are unjust —

even, within limits,

because doing so is necessary to prevent an even

greater injustice than the Injustice the law will sometimes sanction.
But what injustice, exactly, is the latter injustice (the injustice of
unjust laws and policies as well as the injustice of complying with them)
supposed to help us avoid?
I think Rawls has at least two different sorts of things in mind
here.

On the one hand, certain of his remarks suggest that he believes

that we simply cannot manage a democratic regime unless we renounce the
principle of private lights for the most part and agree to abide by the
principle of majority rule.l^ Rawls is also thinking along lines such
as this, I believe, when he remarks that our commitment to the principle
of majority rule is necessary to gain the advantages of an effective
legislative procedure.1^

These sorts of considerations suggest that we

would do best to interpret Rawls as arguing in (7") that it's impossible
to manage a democratic regime (and secure the benefits that accrue to it)
without general compliance with the principle of majority rule, even,
within limits, when its results are unjust.
But it would be a mistake to take this interpretation too simplemindedly.

In particular, it would be mistaken to think of the injustice

we avoid by giving up the principle of private judgment as some fairly
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specific instance of massive injustice that we ward off by regular compliance with the principle of majority rule. (This was Socrates' mistake
in the Crito, when he argued that if he refused to go along with the unjust results of a just decision-procedure he would be contributing to
the very dissolution of an otherwise just regime.)
that Rawls's idea is roughly the following.

Rather, I take it

Society will work more ef-

fectively in securing the basic liberties for every citizen —

and in

seeing to it that inequalities are to the advantage of all (especially
the least advantaged) —

only if the principle of majority rule is

fairly rigorously complied with, even when its results are unjust in
certain cases.

That is, general compliance will tend to realize these

ends more effectively than, say, selective compliance —

compliance

that is fairly regular but that stops whenever complying would mean
going along with what one believes to be an unjust law or policy.
But of course now we must ask a ninnber of rather basic questions.
.To begin xd.th, what evidence is there that this new empirical claim is
true?

And how, even in a general way, would one go about collecting

evidence concerning such a claim, one way or the other?
Obviously, we cannot deal with these questions in any detail here,
and in fact we really don't need to.

Our main interest is in the argu-

ment for paying the penalty that can be constructed by analogy to
Rawls's argument above. Hence we could just as well concede everything
Rawls has said so far, since we have what we need:

the bare bones of

an argument for restricted legalism with respect to legislative decisions.
We could simply get on with it, then, and ask where this reasoning leads
when it comes to the judicial system and paying the penalty for justified
civil disobedience.
But I cannot forbear from concluding this chapter with some tentative remarks about Rawls's argument for complying with unjust laws.

My

main complaint is that Rawls never tells us what sorts of laws he has
in mind in this connection.

Moreover, when we try to imagine concrete

cases of laws that would apparently be within the bounds of what Rawls
calls "tolerable injustice", it seems clear that in many such cases we
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would in fact not be morally bound to go along with legislation of this
sort.
9. Suppose we ask when people ought to comply with laws that they believe to be unjust, on Rawls's view, and why they should do so. We are
in the curious position of knowing roughly why Rawls would have people
comply with what they believe to be unjust laws but of not knowing when
—

that is, of not knowing exactly what sorts of cases Rawls has in mind

as instances of "tolerable injustice", as he puts it.
Of course, we know from Rawls*s theory of justified civil disobedience roughly when a given law or policy is beyond the bounds of
tolerable injustice, and hence the following idea suggests itself.
Suppose we sketch the sorts of cases that qualify as clear cases of
intolerable injustice for Rawls, and then try to determine what might
be considered tolerable injustice by working backwards, by imagining
cases that don*t qualify.
a serious caveat:

I shall attempt to do this below, but first

it is not at all clear that Rawls means to say that

when neither civil disobedience nor conscientious refusal is justified
in a reasonably just constitutional democracy, then noncompliance is
out of the question.

These are not the only forms of justifiable dissent

on Rawls*s view, perhaps even in a reasonably just democratic society.
Still, one wants to know how Rawls feels about the moral force of certain
putatively unjust laws that do not meet the requirements of either the
theory of justified civil disobedience or conscientious refusal.
I shall contend that if Rawls maintains that we are morally bound
to obey the law in such cases, then he is simply mistaken.

Alternatively,

if he would agree that noncompliance is justified in the sorts of cases
that I shall describe, then I contend that his claim that sometimes we
are morally boirnd to comply with unjust laws is uninteresting.
The general theory of noncompliance that Rawls develops in his book
has two parts:

the theory of civil disobedience and the theory of con-

scientious refusal.

These theories are supposed to tell us roughly when

noncompliance (with duly enacted laws and policies) would be morally
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justified, even in a reasonably just constitutional democracy.

In other

words, they indicate roughly when the duty (or at any rate the right) to
resist injustice overrides the duty to comply with duly enacted laws and
policies, just and unjust alike.
Briefly, the theory of civil disobedience sets three conditions
16
for justified civil disobedience as Rawls conceives it.
(1) We must
be dealing with alleged injustices that are "serious infringements of
the first principle of justice" and/or "blatant violations of the second
part of the second principle of justice".

(Rawls explicitly excludes an

appeal to the first part of the second principle of justice, the socalled "difference principle".

I discuss this point below.)

(2) Normal

appeals must have been made through the standard modes of legal redress.
(3) The dissenters must be careful to see to it that serious disorder is
not likely to follow in view of the fact that other groups, similarly
situated, have an equal right to protest.
Conscientious refusal is justified in two sorts of cases:

(1) cases

that violate a nation*s jus ad bellum (that is, cases of unjust wars);
and (2) cases that violate a nation*s jus in bello (that is, cases of un17
just warfare in an otherwise just war).
The latter, according to
Rawls, are cases where a man could say that "all things considered, his
natural duty not to be made the agent of grave injustice and evil to
18
another outweighs his duty to obey."
It is obvious that Rawls believes that managing a reasonably just
democratic society, and securing the advantages of such a society, requires compliance with a certain amount of unjust legislation.
after all, is his central claim in section 53 of his book.
of cases does Rawls have in mind here?

This,

But what sorts

If we judge injustice in terms of

the principles of justice, then Rawls has already conceded that we are not
morally bound to go along with "serious" violations of the first principle
of justice or "blatant" violations of the second.

What sorts of unjust

laws are we left with, then, as instances of legislation that is within
the bounds of tolerable injustice?
It seems that there are at least three sorts of cases:

(1) any law
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that seems to violate the first part of the second principle of justice
(assuming, of course, that the society as a whole is reasonably just
and hence comes reasonably close to satisfying the difference principle);
(2) any law that seems to violate the second part of the second principle
of justice but is not a "blatant" violation of that principle; and (3) any
law that seems to violate the first principle of justice, but which is not
a sufficiently "serious" violation of that principle to justify noncomrpliance.
There is a great deal of legislation in our own society, I think,
that violates only the first part of the second principle of justice,
and which we are morally bound to go along with, according to Rawls,
despite the fact that some of the most compelling reasons for disobedience
to the law in our society have to do with this principle.

I think a good

case could be made against Rawls in cases of this sort, but I shall not
try to do so here.

Rather, I wish to concentrate on putative violations

.of the first principle of justice, according to which every citizen is
entitled to maximum equal liberty consistent with a like liberty for all,
and the second part of the second principle, which guarantees fair
equality of opportunity.

These are the most important sorts of cases,

I believe, because it is precisely when the law seems to infringe upon
my basic liberties that it seems to me to lose whatever moral force it
may ordinarily have.

10. The sorts of cases I have in mind here are cases in which the law
seems to interfere with a person*s right to live as he or she sees fit,
as long as in doing so he or she is not interfering with the rights or
well-being of others.

Thus, the majority of citizens in most states have

seen fit, through their duly elected representatives, to prohibit the
sale, possession and use of marijuana.

It is also illegal, in most states,

for consenting adults to engage in certain homosexual activities in private.

It is even illegal, in many jurisdictions, to engage privately in

certain heterosexual activities, such as sodomy, fellatio and cunnilingus.
It is illegal in many states to procure a prostitute, and illegal for
prostitutes to solicit customers. And so on for the whole list of so-
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called "patemalistic" legislation and legislation that creates what are
sometimes called "crimes without victims .
What is Rawls*s position with respect to cases of this sort?

Is

it morally wrong to smoke marijuana, procure a prostitute, perform
cunnilingus, etc., when (and because) these activities are illegal?
If these things are not wrong on Rawls*s theory, then what is the point
of his claim about obeying unjust laws?

If they are, how can his theory

be correct?
I should like to begin by sketching very roughly my own position
with respect to laws of this sort. When I believe that a law intrudes
(unnecessarily) upon one or more of my basic liberties, I disregard it,
and I am willing to allow others to do likewise (not merely with respect
to the laws I^ find objectionable, of course, but with respect to laws
that they feel intrude unnecessarily upon one or more of their basic
liberties).
Consider the laws against possession and use of marijuana, for example, and any other illegal drugs usage of which has no demonstrable
ill-effects on society.

I disregard these laws and I do so because I

feel they violate my right to privacy as well as my right to live my
life as I see fit, as long as doing so is not harmful to others.

Is

there any sense in which my doing so endangers the stability of American
society?
Obviously, what's worrying Rawls here is not so much the possible
ill-effects of my own illegal activities, but what he considers the
likely ill-effects of everyone's doing as I do.

But of course he's not

worried about the ill-effects of everyone*s smoking marijuana, or even
of everyone's breaking the law in similarly harmless cases. Rather,
what he*s vzorried about, I take it, are the likely effects of everyone's
acting on a general maxim like my own:

when one believes that a law in-

trudes unnecessarily upon one or more of his basic liberties, one may
disregard it.
Suppose we distinguish two classes of laws that people might believe
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fall under this principle and hence which they would be likely to disregard if they accepted it.
class described above:

The first class of cases will be the general

laws which seem to interfere with a person*s

right to live as he or she sees fit, as long as in doing so he or she is
not interfering with the rights or well-being of others.
mentioned a number of examples of laws of this.sort.

I have already

It would be pre-

posterous, I believe, to contend that generalized disobedience with
respect to laws of this sort would have bad effects on society*s stability.
The proof of this is that in fact most people who feel that these laws
interfere with one or more of their basic liberties actually do ignore
them, with results that are salutary if anything.

Hence, if Rawls is

suggesting that it is morally wrong to take the law into one*s own hands
in cases of this sort, on the grounds that (i) society would be better
off if we complied, or (ii) that society would be worse off if everyone
acted as we do, he*s just mistaken.

I think the first assumption is

obviously false and that the second too is, upon reflection, clearly mistaken.

After all, most people do act as I do when similarly agitated by

alleged injustice of the relevant sort.
But now consider cases of another sort:

cases in which the law

intrudes upon what a person believes to be a basic liberty, but where
society (i.e., the majority of the voters or their representatives and/or
the appropriate appellate courts) believes that the exercise of such a
"right" would be detrimental to the rights or well-being of others.

Here

we would find laws against abortion, for example, laws against certain
forms of racial discrimination, laws restricting sale and possession of
certain firearms, and so forth.
The point of mentioning the second class of cases is that in many
instances it*s plausible to claim that no matter how sincere a person
is in his belief that forced racial integration, for example, is unjust,
society is justified in seeing to it that he is not allowed to act on
his beliefs in ways that would be detrimental to the rights and well-being
of his fellow citizens. Hence, we do not want to say that the sincere
bigot is justified in breaking the laws against racial segregation, simply
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because his bigotry is sincere and because he sincerely believes that
it*s unjust, for example, to bus his children from one school district
to another.

But on what principle can we allow "clear-headed" liberals

to disregard the laws against smoking marijuana and against unnatural
sexual congress, while depriving the muddle-headed bigot of the right to
disregard laws that he feels just as strongly opposed to —

on grounds

of their obvious injustice?
The suggestion here, of course, is that we face a problem of
generalization:

if we concede the moral propriety of private judgment

in cases of the first sort, then we must make a similar concession in
cases of the latter sort. And if we did this, the results would be
disastrous.

Or, more modestly, Rawls can simply claim that justice will

be better served, in the long run, by disallowing private judgment in
these cases than by allowing it.
My main complaint against Rawls here is that he makes no serious
attempt to prove that this is so.

I also suspect, what I cannot prove

here, that Rawls is mistaken and that justice is in fact not better served
by the kind of rigorous compliance with the principle of majority rule
that he favors.

It seems to me that we have to balance the beneficial

effects of individual autonomy in cases of the first sort above against
the possible ill-effects of private judgment in cases of the second sort.
And of course, in order to do this, we would have to have some idea of
the likelihood that people would use the principle of noncompliance
which I favor just as often in cases of the second sort as in cases of
the first sort.

In other words, we would have to determine whether

people would abuse or misuse my principle of private judgment as often
as Rawls seems to think.
With respect to the question of weighing the pros and cons of extending the principle of private judgment in the fashion I favor, it is
important to remember that Rawls himself believes that an injustice is
tolerable (here:

the injustice of preventing me from smoking marijuana

or performing sodomy in the privacy of my own home, for example) only
when it is necessary to prevent an even greater injustice.

Hence Rawls

104

must believe that suppressing private judgment is to a large degree necessary in order to prevent some grave injustice in society.

Since Rawls*s

criteria for social justice are the principles of justice, he must be
claiming that a society which operated on some principle of "selective"
compliance would tend to realize these principles less effectively than a
society in which general compliance was the rule. My own view, on the
other hand, is that the dangers of extending the principle of private
judgment do not outweigh the dangers of majoritarian tyranny involved in
Rawls*s view and the subsequent loss of liberty that would accompany it.
How does one settle a disagreement of this sort?
For one thing, we have allowed our discussion to become excessively
abstract.

Suppose we try to imagine what it would be like for one so-

ciety to operate on a principle of "selective" compliance and for another
society to operate on some more rigorous principle of general compliance.
What*s worrying Rawls here?

At least two sorts of things, I think:

(1) People would no longer feel morally bound to
results of the principle of majority rule
that they considered unjust.1^
(11) People would be acting contrary to the principle
of majority rule sufficiently often to make the
society unstable — and less effectively just
than it might otherwise be.
I think that (1) is correct.
that people are not —

Indeed, the point of my argument is

and need not feel —

morally bound to results of
20
the principle of majority rule that they consider unjust.
The second
point assumes, I think, that people's conduct — in complying or not
complying with what they think are unjust laws —

is based on their moral

commitment to the principle of majority rule. For remember:

Rawls and I

differ not on the question of whether unjust laws are laws or not, and
hence have whatever force laws have in constraining people's behavior,
but on the question

of whether such laws have moral force as well as what-

ever other force laws have in a society like our own (e.g., the power
simply to intimidate people).

Hence I think that Rawls and I are arguing

about an empirical question of the following sort:

to what extent, under

systems like our own, are people actually willing to comply with what
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they believe are unjust laws simply because they are valid laws and because people generally recognize that they are morally bound to comply
with valid laws, other things equal?
Personally, if I think a given law is unjust, then the only reason
that moves me to obey it is the possibility of getting caught if I do
not.

But suppose Rawls is right.

And suppose that people in a society

like our own were suddenly to take their private judgments of the relative justice of duly enacted legislation more seriously than they do
now and suppose that people subsequently began to disregard duly enacted
legislation when they considered it unjust in the ways sketched above.
What would be the likely consequences of this sort of situation?
There would, by hypothesis, be considerably more "conscientious"
disobedience to the law than there is at present.

People who were

opposed to "busing" legislation, for example, would feel no moral compulsion to comply with it. But what's so troubling about this?

Rawls's

thought must be that in the long run this sort of conduct would lead to
a situation of instability, as he sometimes puts it, or to a situation
where people's basic political liberties and equality of opportunity
were less effectively served than in a situation where they could count
on each other to comply fairly rigorously with duly enacted legislation
21
even when it was unjust.
Unfortunately, not only does Rawls not present a shred of evidence
in defense of these claims, but upon reflection they seem plainly false.
As things are, it is clear that people disregard legislation of the sort
in question when they can get away with it, and often even when they
cannot.

If people were to adopt my view, unless we changed our judicial

system, they would still be accountable for disobeying the law, however
pure their motives.

The difference, however, is that while we would

say that such people had acted illegally, we would not (with Rawls) say
22
that they had acted wrongly or immorally.
Are we likely to face massive and debilitating disobedience on
this hypothesis?

Notice that we would be morally bound to Rawls's ver-

sion of non-selective compliance only if we would face such problems.
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But, then, to prove his moral claim Rawls needs to prove this empirical
claim, something he hasn't done.

What's more, it's hard to say how such

a claim could be tested much less proven.

In the next two chapters I

hope to show that the most plausible defense of this empirical claim
involves the additional claim that our courts could not possibly function
if they were forced to hear pleas based on moral motivation of the sort
we have been discussing (i.e., pleas based on the claim that a given law
was unjust and that this justified noncompliance). I shall do my best
to weaken the intuitive plausibility of this new claim and to outline a
legal system that would accommodate conscientious disobedience to the
law.

CHAPTER V
THE ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY
1.

Rawls's argument that under certain circumstances we have a moral

duty to comply with both just and unjust laws is both interesting and
important in its own right.

It defends explicitly and at some length

a claim that is quite common in the recent literature on civil disobedience but that is seldom argued:

the claim that there is a moral pre-

sumption in favor of obedience to the law, at least in reasonably just
democratic societies, and that this presumption weighs heavily even
when we are faced with an admittedly unjust law.
But this argument is of interest for other reasons as well.

It

is only in light of the contemporary strain of restricted or qualified
"legalism" that this argument exemplifies, for example, that the intensive efforts of the past decade to show that civil disobedience is
2
sometimes morally justified can be fully understood and appreciated.
What's more, two central contentions of Rawls's general theory of
political obligation emerge in the analysis of this argument, contentions which seem to me to epitomize recent liberal thinking on this
topic:

(1) the claim that the obligation to obey the law is a moral

obligation, one that extends as far as an obligation to obey unjust
laws, under certain circumstances, and (2) the claim that at some point,
even in a reasonably just democratic society, this obligation can break
down and disobedience to the law can be morally justified.
As I have already indicated, Rawls's work seems to me to embody a
further claim that has also been quite prominent in recent liberal politics and political theory:

the claim that "paying the penalty" is an

essential characteristic of justified civil disobedience.

In this

chapter I want to analyze the latter claim in relation to the first two.
That is, I want to show first why it is tempting, given the tenets of
liberal legalism, to make a willingness to suffer the consequences part
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of the justification of civil disobedience in a constitutional democracy
and, secondly, why the attempt to do so does not succeed.
In an important sense I shall merely be exploiting the argiiment of
the preceding chapter and not considering it in its own right.
shall assume that that argument can be made good.
investigate is the possibility that Rawls might be

For I

What I shoiild like to
able to provide a

defense of the willingness requirement that is analogous to (or in some
sense related to) his defense of the claim that sometimes we are morally
bound to obey unjust laws, at least in a reasonably just constitutional
democracy.
Suppose, then, that Rawls's argument for restricted legalism with
respect to legislative decisions can be made good; that is, suppose,
among other things, that it is true that sometimes we have a moral duty
to obey unjust laws.

What follows —

claim or by parity of reasoning —
claim:

either directly from this latter

with respect to Rawls's subsequent

that even when this duty to obey unjust laws is overriden, we

should nonetheless willingly accept the consequences of disobedience
3
in the kinds of cases we're concerned with?
In other words, if we
assume that a certain law is beyond the limits of "tolerable injustice",
as Rawls puts it, and thus that civil disobedience is justified by
Rawls's lights, and yet assume that the law itself and the society as a
whole are not so iinjust as to justify anything more than civil disobedience, why must we be willing to accept the consequences of dis4
obeying the law or laws in question?
In particular, how can the argument for restricted legalism with respect to legislative decisions be
used to defend extreme legalism with respect to judicial decisions in
a reasonably just constitutional democracy?
I must emphasize that the arguments for the willingness requirement that I am about to examine do not occur explicitly anywhere in
Rawls's writings.

It is not merely the principle of generosity, however,

that induces me to introduce them on Rawls's behalf, although this is
reason enough.

As we saw in the preceding chapter, Rawls uses the same

method for establishing the particular claims of his theories of political
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obligation and civil disobedience that he uses for validating his general
theory of justice (and his two "principles of justice" in particular).
Hence it seems appropriate to ask whether this same method —
called "the method of hypothetical agreement" —

what can be

can convince us that we

should willingly accept the legal consequences of our illegal actions,
even when the latter are admittedly justified.

2. Now it might .be thought that Rawls does not actually have to argue
for the willingness requirement independently of arguing for the claim
that sometimes we have a moral duty to obey iinjust laws:

that he does

not even need "the argument by analogy" that I shall outline below.

For

it might be contended that the willingness requirement is actually a
logical consequence of the claim that in a reasonably just society we
sometimes have a moral duty to obey unjust laws.

This is what I shall

call "the argument by implication", and I shall consider it briefly
before getting into the argument by analogy, since if the former (stronger)
argument is sound we don't need the latter (weaker) argument.
The thrust of the argument by implication is roughly this.

We have

granted Rawls that we may indeed have a moral duty to obey unjust laws
under certain circumstances.

It would hardly make sense, however, at

the stage of the hypothetical "constitutional convention",for example,
to agree to obey certain unjust laws without also agreeing both to accept
the consequences of disobedience when we don't obey such laws and to
apply them when someone else doesn*t obey.
familiar one:

The basic idea here is a

given what we know about people, coercive laws without

sanctions are about as good as no laws at all.

So in recognizing that

society will need laws, and in agreeing to obey them (even, up to a
point, when they are unjust), we must also recognize the need to agree
in advance to accept and apply the sanctions that make such laws effective (supposing, of course, that they do).
This is an important argument, even though it does not validate
the willingness requirement.

For one thing, it forces us to recognize

the seriousness of just what we*re getting into when we make the orig-
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inal "agreement" (at the constitutional convention) to abide by at least
some unjust laws:

we must be willing not only to receive the whip*s blows,

as it were, should we break our agreement to obey such laws, but also to
administer these blows when others fail to obey.

But, by the nature of

the case, this will be disobedience to laws which we admit are unjust but
which are presumably not sufficiently unjust to warrant justified civil
disobedience.

To the conscientious man it might be even more repugnant

to concede that society can be justified in punishing others for refusing to comply with unjust legislation than to agree that he himself
will accept such punishment willingly.
Now it may be that Rawls can convince us that if we*re going to
agree that it*s right to obey at least some unjust laws, then we must
also grant that it's right to punish conscientious men for disobeying
these laws —

as long as the laws in question do not exceed certain

limits of injustice, of course.

It*s difficult to say whether this is

simply an unfortunate consequence of the necessity of agreeing to obey
some unjust laws, or whether it*s a rather compelling reason for not
making such an agreement in the first place (we are agreeing, after all,
to punish the "innocent", or at least the "righteous", in certain circumstances) . This is quite a serious dilemma, in my opinion, since it
raises a difficulty which would take us back to the argximent in Chapter
IV and perhaps induce us to reconsider our concessive attitude towards
that argument. We do not need to resolve this dilemma here, however,
for the argument by implication does not validate the willingness requirement with respect to justified civil disobedience, which is our
primary concern in the present chapter.
The most that this argument proves, even if it*s basically sound,
is that we have an obligation and/or a duty to accept (and apply) the
consequences of disobeying even an unjust law in those cases where the
injustice of the law was not sufficient to override our prima facie duty
to obey such laws in the first place.

But, of course, we're not concerned

with cases of this sort here (although if they do imply that we ought to
punish in cases of this sort, they raise serious problems for even these
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cases, as I have just tried to show),

We*re concerned at present with

those cases where we would all agree that the tolerable limits of injustice have been exceeded and hence civil disobedience is appropriate
and morally justifiable.

That is, we*re concerned with those cases

where our duty to act justly overrides our duty to obey the law,

What*s

the argument for the claim that even in these cases we ought to accept
the legal consequences of disobedience?

It cannot be that we have agreed

to obey such laws, and hence accept the consequences, for we haven * t,
even according to Rawls, agreed to obey them,

3, It is at this point that what I shall call "the argument by analogy"
is relevant.

Can we make a case for saying that while we agree to obey

unjust laws, even in a reasonably just constitutional democracy, only up
to a certain point, we agree to accept the legal consequences of disobeying unjust laws even in cases where this point has been passed and
we no longer have a moral duty to obey them?

If there is an argument

for doing so, it will be a subtle one, even if it is analogous to the
argument for agreeing to obey some unjust laws.

For it will have to

meet a compelling argument against punishing justified civil disobedience,
what I shall call the argument that justification entails nonpunishment.
Roughly, the latter argument is this:
(1)

When disobedience to a particular law (or
laws) is justified, the prima facie duty
to obey that law (those laws) is overriden,

(2)

When the prima facie duty to obey a particular
law (or laws) is overriden, the disobedient
should not be punished for violating the law
(or laws) in question,

(3)

Therefore when disobedience to a particular
law (or laws) is justified, the disobedient
should not be punished for violating that
law (those laws),

This argument is of special interest for two reasons.

First, it is

a general, theoretical argument against punishing justified civil disobedience.

Thus far, we have only been considering arguments in favor of

the willingness requirement and attempting to show that they are unsound.
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But this procedure leaves open the possibility that there are still other
arguments, not considered here, that will vindicate the willingness requirement.

But if the argument that justification entails nonpunishment

is sound, then we have a compelling reason for thinking that n£ argument
that defends the willingness requirement, as a matter of moral and political principle, is sound.

In other words, the argument above suggests

that the willingness requirement is mistaken for general theoretical
reasons and not simply because the particular arguments for it considered
earlier are unconvincing.
But of course, we must ask just how convincing the argument that
justification entails nonpunishment is. This brings us to the second
point of interest regarding this argument.

I think it can be shown

that it derives whatever plausibility it has from Rawls's own theories
of political obligation and civil disobedience.

This becomes evident

when we ask what reason there is for believing that premisses (1) and (2)
above are true.
I can make my point here most simply by explicating (1) and (2) in
a certain way, thus showing not only that they are quite plausible, upon
reflection, but also that their plausibility is derived from some of
Rawls*s ideas in A Theory of Justice,

Thus, suppose we ask what "justi-

fied" means in premiss (1), This premiss is certainly not obviously
true on just any interpretation of "justified", for suppose that by
"justified disobedience to the law" someone meant disobedience that is
justified by one*s own lights or justified on one*s own private moral
principles.

Surely it would be at best controversial to claim that the

prima facie duty to obey the law breaks down whenever it conflicts with
one*s private moral assessment of what one ought to do.

However, if we

explicate the notion of justified disobedience to the law as Rawls does
in A Theory of Justice, and expand (1) accordingly, we find that this
premiss is almost trivially true. Very roughly, the following is the
sort of explication I have in mind:
(1*) When disobedience to a particular law (or
laws) is justified by a clear and serious
violation of the principles of justice, then

the prima facie duty to obey that law (those
laws) is overriden because of the right to
resist serious injustice (i.e,, because of
the intimate relationship, in Rawls's theory,
between the principles of justice and the
prima facie duty to obey the law).
Premiss (1*) is really no more than a summary statement of Rawls s
theory of the justification of civil disobedience.
very roughly, is this.

The idea, again

Rawls develops both his theory of when we are

morally bound to obey the law, as well as his theory of when we are
morally justified in disobeying it, within the framework of his general
theory of justice and his two principles of justice in particular.

It

is not surprising, then, that when we can say that a man is justified
in disobeying the law, we can say also that his prima facie duty to
obey the law has been overriden.

Indeed, this is almost trivially true

on Rawls*s theory, since justified disobedience is defined in terms of
a breakdown of the conditions that create a prima facie duty to obey.
Hence, Rawls is not only stuck with (1*), it would seem to be axiomatic
on his theory of political obligation.
This second premiss is curious.

What about (2)?
On the one hand, it seems to me

to have a profound intuitive appeal, especially when we explicate it
in light of (1*), our explication of the first premiss.

This we can do

as follows:
(2*) When the prima facie duty to obey a particular
law (or laws) is overriden because of the
right to resist serious injustice, the disobedient should not be punished for violating
the law (or laws) in question because a man
is liable to such punishment only when he
actually had a duty to obey the law or laws
in question.
If (2*) can be made good, then we can infer (3*), which is simply a
fuller version of (3), the original conclusion above:
(3*) When disobedience to a particular law (or
laws) is justified by a clear and serious
violation of the principles of justice,
the disobedient should not be punished
for violating the law (or laws) in question.
The last part of (2*) is the crucial claim here; the key idea is
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simply this: no duty, no punishment.

That is, when the moral duty to

obey the law breaks down, the moral right to punish disobedience (and the
duty to accept it) breaks down as well.

This seems quite plausible on

its face, although there are a number of difficulties which could be
raised about the intuitive idea behind this formulation.

I shall not go

into all these difficulties here, however, because Rawls is committed to
denying (2*) and because a very interesting argument can be constructed
from his work for denying it; that is, for saying that justified disobedience to the law can be justifiably punished, even if we might not
always choose to do so.
The argument I have in mind, which I shall eventually formalize
and which I call the argument by analogy, runs roughly as follows:
rationally self-interested men, at the stage of the hypothetical constitutional convention, would agree to accept the consequences of disobeying even those laws they are morally justified in disobeying (in
light of the principles of justice) as long as the constitution and the
society as a whole are still reasonably just; and such an agreement
would be both reasonable and just.

The last point is essential, for

Rawls must show not only that such men would presumably make such an
agreement but also that in doing so they would create moral ties that
are binding at subsequent stages. Why would rationally self-interested
men make such an agreement and why would they be acting rightly (as
well as reasonably) in doing so?
To begin with, we must remember that when the question of whether
or not to adopt some sort of willingness requirement arises, a number
of "agreements" have already been made.

The parties in question have

already agreed, among other things, to comply with imjust legislation
up to a certain point.

They have also agreed, however, that at some

point the obligation imposed by this agreement breaks down and civil disobedience can be justified, even though the constitution and the society
as a whole are still reasonably just.

In short, the parties have agreed

to a general theory of political obligation and a particular theory of
civil disobedience.

But they have agreed, on a deeper level and at an

earlier stage (in the "initial position"), to even more.

They have agreed
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that injustice is morally tolerable if (and only if) it is required to
avoid even greater injustice (what I call "the principle of choice with
respect to unjust alternatives"), and they have acknowledged a natural
duty to support and foster reasonably just institutions ("the natural
duty of justice", as Rawls puts it).
All of these previous "agreements", and the duties and obligations
they impose, will be relevant to the question we now want to consider:
would such men, and should they, morally speaking, make an absolute willingness to suffer the (legal) consequences part of their theory of justified civil disobedience?

Starting from the point of view of men at

the stage so far described, in other words, what can be said for and
against agreeing to make the willingness requirement part of the theory
of justified civil disobedience?

Before constructing a formal analogue

to the argument of the preceding chapter (see section 6 below), I should
like to try to speak to these questions somewhat informally.

4. One obvious reason against making such an agreement, a reason embodied in the argument that justification entails nonpunishment, is that
we are discussing cases where, ex hypothesi, the limits of tolerable
o

justice have been exceeded (though not exceedingly so).
In the absence
of any other considerations, this seems like a good reason for not
9
punishing (or willingly accepting punishment) in such cases.
Why, despite this fact, would we agree to punish and be punished in such cases,
and why would such an agreement be morally justified?

An obvious answer

suggests itself: ideally we wouldn't, and shouldn't (see the argument
that justification entails nonpunishment), but we are unfortunately not
dealing with an "ideal" situation.

We are dealing with real men in a

real society, and the problem of distinguishing cases of civil disobedience that are justified (in our theory) from those that are not is
insurmountable (or so it might be argued).
from "impracticability":

Let us call this the argument

it would simply be impracticable to try to

identify (in a court of law, say) exactly those cases of civil disobedience that are justified, even on the universally accepted (Rawlsian)
theory of civil disobedience, and to separate them from those that are
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not.

I shall speak to this difficulty shortly.

But there is even more

to the argument for the willingness requirement than this, and we should
be clear about it from the start.
Let us grant for the moment that it would be very difficult, if
not impracticable or even impossible, to distinguish (at the judicial
level) cases of justified and unjustified civil disobedience. Nonetheless, this difficulty, if that's all it is, might be one that reasonable
men would be willing to put up with for the sake of the greater justice
of not punishing their fellowmen for disobeying intolerably unjust laws.
But there is an obvious rejoinder that could be made to this point.

For

the claim behind the willingness requirement is not simply that we would
encounter enormous (if not insurmountable) practical difficulties in
trying to sort out, judicially, "justified" from "unjustified" acts of
civil disobedience, but that if we allow ourselves (or our courts,
rather) to undertake such a task, we will eventually, and perhaps very
quickly, undermine the very stability of our otherwise "just" social
system.

And this of course is quite important, since we have already

acknowledged that we have a natural duty to support and foster just institutions.

What's more, we have agreed that since a certain amount of

injustice is inevitable no matter what institutions we choose, we are
justified in choosing (indeed, we are morally bound to choose) that
arrangement which will produce the greatest balance of justice over injustice in the long run.

That is, even an arrangement which involves

us in a certain amount of injustice is morally tolerable, if it is required to prevent an even greater amount of injustice.

I must say a bit

more about these matters before going on.
It may appear to be obvious that it is better to have a viable and
fairly stable society at the expense of systematically punishing justified
civil disobedience than to have a "clean conscience" with respect to never
punishing such disobedience at the expense of eventually undermining the
social fabric of such a society.

But aside from the difficulties involved

in proving the claim that allowing justified civil disobedients to go free
would involve us in an arrangement which would lead to substantial social
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instability, difficulties which we shall consider in detail in the next
chapter, Rawls is faced with an even greater difficulty here.

For he

has claimed repeatedly that one of the principal merits of his general
theory of political obligation is that considerations of justice are
absolute with respect to considerations of utility.

Suppose we grant

that a society without a willingness requirement would be less efficient
and perhaps even less stable, in the long run, than a society with such
a requirement.

How can Rawls argue from this fact, if such it is, to

the claim that we ought to choose the former sort of society over the
latter without conceding that the efficiency and stability of the latter
are sufficient reasons for legitimizing the prima facie injustice of
punishing justified disobedience to the law?

Doesn't Rawls have to qualify

his claim that justice is "absolute" with respect to utility in order to
get us to agree that we would, and should, punish each other for justified disobedience to the law?
I think there is no question that if Rawls*s sole argument for
the willingness requirement were that society would be less efficient
without it, then his own convictions about the priority of justice over
efficiency would force him to choose the more just but less efficient
society over the less just but more efficient one.

But surely it is

incorrect to interpret Rawls as arguing for the willingness requirement
simply on the basis of "efficiency" in some simple-minded utilitarian
sense.

His argument must certainly be that a society without a willing-

ness requirement is less just than a society with one, and not simply
less efficient.

If he could prove this, then on his own principle that

injustice is permissible when it is required to offset even greater injustice, we would be morally justified in choosing a society with a
willingness requirement over one without such a requirement.

Can Rawls

prove this?

5. Everything depends here on how likely it is that the absence of a
willingness requirement (or a similar constraint on illegal but morally
justified actions) would lead, in an otherwise reasonably just society,
to instability of the sort that would shift the balance of justice in an
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undesirable direction.

That is, the argument for the willingness re-

quirement, as we shall see more perspicuously in a moment (section 6 ) ,
depends on the claim that a greater balance of justice over injustice
is achieved, in the long run, by a society that insists on a willingness to pay the penalty for otherwise justified civil disobedience than
10
by a society that does not.
If this claim is correct, then presumably our duty to support and
foster just institutions would override our duty not to inflict suffering on someone for doing what was admittedly the right thing to do.
The analogy to the situation in Chapter IV should be apparent:

it would

ordinarily be wrong to treat a certain group of people unfairly (as unjust laws sometimes require us to do), but the natural duty of justice
can create an "actual" or "on balance" duty to do just this, as we saw
in Chapter IV, if the stability of a just social scheme and the greater
balance of justice require it.

Similarly, although it is normally wrong

to inflict suffering on someone (by way of judicial punishment and fines,
as much as in any other way) for doing what we agree he ought to have
done (even if this involves disobedience to the law), nonetheless, the
natural duty of justice can justify such a practice if the stability of
a just social scheme and the greater balance of justice require it.
In both cases we are faced with a strightforward but very complicated empirical question, which in the case at hand (whether or not
to require a willingness to pay the penalty for justified acts of civil
disobedience) takes the following form:

what would be the empirical

effects of the various competing arrangements?

And just as in the argu-

ment for the duty to comply with unjust laws, as far as anything Rawls
actually says is concerned, we are left to resolve this question on a
very impressionistic, intuitive level.

Rawls*s intuitions seem to be

that without a willingness requirement we would pretty quickly come to
such acrimonious disagreements over particular cases (and perhaps over
certain sorts of cases) that the social fabric in our generally just society would deteriorate and that the balance of justice would shift in
an undesirable way.
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This is a large claim, and it will be difficult to appraise it without a great deal of empirical information.

Rawls acknowledges, with re-

spect to a related problem, that "men of great honesty with full confidence in one another might make such a system work" —

that is, might

make a system without a willingness requirement work; but he goes on to
say that, nonetheless, "as things are, such a scheme would presumably be
unstable even in a state of near justice,"

But it is not enough to

say (or even show) that such a scheme would be "unstable".

The insta-

bility must, by Rawls*s own lights, be of the kind that affects not only
the efficiency of the social system but the long-run balance of justice
in that society as well.

Of course, these factors are likely to corre-

late highly in a given instance. We can summarize this by saying that,
for Rawls, the optimal social arrangement is that which, among the possibilities available to us, is most effectively just.

I shall sometimes

use this last notion to gloss the intricate relationship between justice
and efficiency in Rawls*s conception of the just state.

In short, Rawls*s

claim must be that a society with a willingness requirement is more effectively just, in the long run, than a society without one.
It goes without saying, I think, that the burden of proof is on
Rawls to make this last claim good.

In the previous chapter I conceded

the analogous empirical claim that Rawls needed for his argument that
sometimes we have a moral duty to comply with unjust laws,

I wish to be

more critical towards the analogue of that claim which Rawls needs for
his argument that even when we are justified in disobeying an unjust law,
we ought to pay the penalty for doing so.

This new claim —

that an un-

willingness to pay the penalty in such cases would be disruptive of the
greater balance of justice —

is subject to criticism on at least two

major counts.
To begin with, Rawls nowhere seriously considers the tenability of
actually trying to implement a legal defense for acts of civil disobedience
that the dissenter believes to be morally justified, so that there would be
a public, nonviolent, institutionalized way of expressing (and defending)
an unwillingness to pay the penalty for such conduct.

No doubt such far-
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reaching judicial reform would raise serious practical problems, problems
we shall consider in the next chapter. And perhaps it is unfair to demand an account of these matters from Rawls, since it is not clear how
strong his commitment to the willingness requirement is in the final
12
analysis.
Nonetheless, to the extent that he is committed to it (see
my discussion in Chapter II, section 2), the burden of proof is on Rawls
to show that these practical problems are so great as to threaten social
instability of just that kind which overthrows the optimal balance of
justice in a democratic society.

And in any case, arguments of this kind

(arguments that justified civil disobedience can be justifiably punished)
are common enough to merit our attention, even if Rawls himself would
concede that they are not terribly persuasive.
There is a second preliminary point that Rawls*s critic might make
with respect to his apparently strong stand on paying the penalty for
justified civil disobedience.

This point arises out of a curious fea-

ture of Rawls*s position on the issues of obeying unjust laws up to a
point, on the one hand, and accepting the consequences of disobedience
even when the injustice of the law is beyond that point, on the other.
Rawls*s position on the duty to obey unjust laws is not absolute or unqualified; that is, he adopts (and defends) what I call "restricted"
rather than "extreme" legalism with respect to legislative decisions.
And yet his position with respect to judicial decisions —

like Socrates*
13
position in the Crito — is more or less absolute or unqualified.
That
is, he adopts a position of "extreme" or "unrestricted" legalism rather
than "restricted" legalism with respect to judicial decisions, at least
in reasonably just constitutional democracies which are at a point where
no more than civil disobedience is justified on my "circumstances continuum" of Chapter II.
This is a curious anomaly, especially in a thinker as careful as
Rawls.

Either Rawls thinks that compliance with judicial decisions needs

even more stringent safeguards (in a reasonably just democratic society)
than compliance with legislative decisions, or he has not followed the
logic of his own restricted legalism to its ultimate conclusion.

I should
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like to show now that the reasons for safeguarding judicial procedures
in a more or less just democratic society are indeed compelling ones; I
should also like to show, however, that we can safely protect such procedures without resorting to legal extremism of the sort embodied in
the willingness requirement.

To do this I shall have to construct a

formal argument for the willingness requirement that is exactly analogous to the argument for the duty to comply with unjust laws.
this final argument will do the job for Rawls, as I shall show.

Not even
But it

is worth constructing, and not simply because only by doing so can I
make good on my claims against the willingness requirement.

It turns

out that in considering the formal analogue to the argument sketched
in the last chapter, some extremely important points with respect to
my own conception of the place of punishment in the theory of civil disobedience come out.

6. At the end of Chapter II I considered, very briefly and sketchily,
an

argument of Professor Charles Fried*s for something very much like

the willingness requirement.

This argument was based on what Fried calls

*'the principle of institutional settlement".

It turns out that this

principle, or some variant of it, is crucial to the formal version of the
argument by analogy that can be developed from some of Rawls*s work.
Fried*s principle of institutional settlement can be interpreted
14
as the judicial analogue of the principle of majority rule.
Thus, on
this reading, in agreeing to the principle of institutional settlement,
we are agreeing to abide by the forms and consequences of trial by jury,
for example, just as in agreeing to the principle of majority rule we
are agreeing to abide by the majority's decisions (only up to a point,
significantly) on legislative matters.
I believe that interpreting the argument for the willingness requirement in terms of this analogy brings out what is at the heart of the commitment to various versions of the willingness requirement in the recent
literature on the justification of civil disobedience.
obvious only in the sequel.

But this will be

The principle of institutional settlement.
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qua analogue of the principle of majority rule, must first be worked into
a formal argument for the willingness requirement. This can be done in
the following way:
(1) A society is reasonably just if its basic
structure more or less satisfies the principles of justice.
(2) If a society is reasonably just, then we
have a natural duty to support and comply
with its institutions if it exists and
applies to us.
(3) Therefore, we have a natural duty to support
and comply with the institutions of a reasonably just society when we find ourselves in
such a society.
(4) Supporting the institutions of a reasonably
just society involves supporting and complying
with one of its most fundamental and essential
institutions — a just constitution.
(5) Therefore, when we find ourselves in a
reasonably just society, we have a duty to
support and comply with its constitution
(as long as both the society and the constitution are just — or as just as can
reasonably be expected).
(6) Supporting and complying with a just constitution in a reasonably just society requires
supporting and complying with the principle
of institutional settlement with respect to
judicial matters — i.e., the judicial system
as we know it (more or less).
(7) Therefore, we have a duty to support and comply
with the principle of institutional settlement
with respect to judicial matters in a reasonably just society.
(8) Supporting and complying with the principle
of institutional settlement with respect to
judicial matters requires accepting (and
applying) the standard legal penalties for
disobedience to the law even when that disobedience was morally justified, justified
either because the law itself was beyond
the limits of tolerable injustice or for
some related reason articulated by the theory
of justified civil disobedience.
(9) Therefore, in a reasonably just society with
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a just constitution we have a duty to accept
(and apply) the standard legal penalties for
disobedience to the law, even when that disobedience was morally justified.
The crucial premisses here are (6) and (8), of course, since the
other premisses are more or less identical with premisses of the argument in the preceding chapter, premisses which we have agreed to grant
for the sake of argument.

Premiss (6) sets us up for, and premiss (8)

ensures, the willingness requirement as we have been conceiving it.
What*s the argument for (6)?

Roughly, and by analogy to the argument

of the preceding chapter, we may suppose that just as we would agree
to the principle of majority rule as a procedural device for resolving
conflicts about legislative matters, so we would agree to the principle
of institutional settlement with respect to judicial matters for resolving similar disputes on the judicial level.

That is, the prin-

ciple of institutional settlement is to be thought of as the most efficient way of handling disputes about how a given law is to be interpreted and applied, once it has been passed, just as the principle
of majority rule is apparently the most efficient way of handling
disputes about what the law is going to be in the first place.
Of course, there*s much more to be said for these principles

—

the principle of majority rule and the principle of institutional settlement with respect to judicial matters —

than that they are the most

efficient ways of handling these difficulties.

Indeed, more important,

for thinkers like Rawls, than their bare efficiency is the fact that
they are presumably the most effectively just ways of handling the difficulties in question.

It is significant that from the point of view

of justice it seems that, if anything, more could be said in favor of
the principle of institutional settlement with respect to judicial
matters than can be said for the principle of majority rule with respect
to legislative matters.

And in any case, it seems at least as reasonable

to agree in advance (at the stage of the hypothetical "constitutional convention", say) to abide by the principle of institutional settlement when
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judicial disputes arise as it is to agree in advance to abide by the principle of majority rule when legislative disputes arise.
Now premiss (6) can either be read as making a fairly noncontroversial claim about the reasonableness of adopting a certain kind of institutionalized procedure, in which case the burden of subsequent argument
is thrown on (8), or it can be read as making a fairly strong claim, in
which case we shall want to ask some serious questions about (6) as well
as (8). I wish to avoid the latter difficulty by reading (6) in such a
way that it is relatively noncontroversial.
see how much weight premiss (8) can bear.

In other words, I want to

This should not be taken as

implying that (6) is altogether empty of substantive content.
contrary.

On the

In committing ourselves to the principle of institutional

settlement with respect to judicial matters, we are presumably committing ourselves to a great deal.

Let us suppose that in a very general

way this amounts to a commitment to something like our own American
judicial system.

I say "in a very general way" because we want to leave

open the possibility that we have not committed ourselves to exactly
these procedures.

This is the point of saying that (6) is not intended

to carry much of the burden of argument.

It merely stipulates that we

have agreed to trial by jury, for example, and some of the other general
features of our own judicial system.

What we should like to know is how

such a commitment bears on the theory of justified civil disobedience.
In particular, we should like to know if a commitment to the principle
of institutional settlement necessarily commits us to willingly paying
the penalty for disobedience that is admittedly justified from the moral
point of view, as (8) contends.

What is the argument for (8)?

We must not expect to find any explicit arguments for (8) in Rawls*s
work, or anyone else*s for that matter, since (8) is an artifice of my
own.

However, as I shall show, when we try to imagine how the defense of

(8) would proceed, we quickly see what the ultimate rationale behind the
willingness requirement really is. Very roughly, (8), and the willingness requirement it entails, rests on the claim that we simply cannot
settle moral and political questions in courts of law.

Thus, the argu-
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ment for (8) rests on both normative and empirical claims. The relevant
normative claims are embodied in the so-called "natural duty of justice"
(the duty to foster and support just institutions) and the "principle of
choice", as I call it, with respect to unjust alternatives: when faced
with a necessary choice among alternatives each of which involves a certain amount of injustice, choose that which will bring about the least
injustice.

The crucial empirical claim, of course, is that a system

where civil disobedience is regulated by a willingness requirement of
some sort is more likely to produce a greater balance of justice over
injustice in the long run than a system where this is not the case.
Now we have encountered these normative claims before (see Chapter
IV) and once again I wish to concede them for the sake of argument.

My

principal question is about the empirical claim that (8) needs to make
in order for these normative premisses to yield the appropriate conclusion (that even when justified in his civil disobedience, a dissenter
should pay the legal penalty willingly).

But before asking how plausi-

ble the empirical claim is, we ought to get clear on just what it amounts
to.
Premiss (8) above can be made good, as we have seen, only if it is
true that a social system that requires a willingness to pay the penalty
for justified civil disobedience produces a greater balance of justice,
in the long run, than a system that does not.

This in turn depends upon

the claim that, among the alternative institutions available for consideration at the hypothetical ''constitutional convention", the system with
the willingness requirement is morally preferable to one without it because of the greater balance of justice adhering to the former alternative.
Now we have a rough idea of what the first alternative is:

it is

a system much like that defended and practised in the past ten years by
most theorists and practitioners of civil disobedience, a system where
one breaks the law publicly and nonviolently and then willingly pays the
penalty.

What is the second alternative, however, over which the former

is supposed to win in the "balance-of-justice" calculation?

Remember
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that we have already conceded that in the sorts of situations we are concerned with, an unwillingness to pay the penalty cannot be exhibited by
violent or secretive means. That is, we have agreed to abide by the requirements of publicity and nonviolence in the definition/justification
of civil disobedience.

So the alternative to the system with a willing-

ness requirement, that is, a system where an individual can be justified
in his disobedience without exhibiting a willingness to pay the penalty,
must be a system where this unwillingness is expressed through neither
violent nor clandestine acts.
I submit that the alternative we*re describing is a society whose
judicial system includes explicit legal defenses for civil disobedience
based on the claim that the disobedience was morally right or even
morally necessary.

For reasons I shall explain in Chapter VI, I shall

refer to such defenses summarily (and perhaps somewhat inaccurately) as
defenses of "moral necessity".

The idea, very roughly, is that such a

system would allow the accused in a court of law to concede that he
broke the law in question but to go on to defend himself for doing so by
explaining why he feels he was morally justified in doing so —

for ex-

ample, because his disobedience would be justified on Rawls*s theory of
civil disobedience.
It is this sort of judicial system, I think, where pleas of "moral
necessity" are allowed to be entered in defense of a charge of criminal
activity like civil disobedience, that we must take to be the principal
alternative arrangement to the system Rawls chooses —

the system em:-

bodying the willingness requirement and prohibiting defenses of this sort
in the courtroom.

Hence, the crucial empirical claim on which premiss

(8) above rests comes down to this:

a system that prohibits (for the

most part, if not entirely) legal defenses aimed at showing that the disobedient was morally justified in an admittedly illegal action tends to
produce a greater balance of justice over injustice (in the long run) than
the alternative system in which such defenses, of justification due to
'*moral necessity", say, are allowed.
bility we must now examine.

And it is this claim whose plausi-

In order to do so, we shall have to get clear
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on what the alternative arrangement I favor would involve, what can be
said for and against such an arrangement, and whether the considerations against it outweigh those in its favor.
resolving the last question of course is this:

Our ultimate criterion in
which arrangement is

more effectively just or produces the greater balance of justice over
injustice in the long run?

CHAPTER VI
JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION:
SOME TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS
1.

Nearly a decade ago Professor Richard Wasserstrom wrote that it is

*'more than a little surprising..,that the task of examining the possible
procedures by which a legal system either could or should decide cases
has on the whole been neglected by legal philosophers."

In this chapter

I should like to suggest and assess one substantive procedural change
that might be made in our own legal system, a change which would allow a
legal defense for conscientious disobedience to the law.

This defense,

which I shall describe in detail in section 4 below, is to be thought of
as specifying an alternative arrangement to the one Rawls seems to favor
and which is in fact the arrangement favored by most recent theorists
and practitioners of civil disobedience.
Rawls and other proponents of the willingness requirement need to
defend some version of premiss (8) in the argximent of the preceding
chapter.

I intend to show that (8) rests on a dubious empirical pre-

supposition —

on the assumption that a legal system with a willingness

requirement tends to produce a greater balance of justice over injustice
than a system without such a requirement —

and I shall do this by show-

ing that (8) rests on the mistaken idea that it is not feasible to allow
moral considerations to be entered as part of a legal defense for disobedience to the law.
The basic thrust behind my own proposal is this.

If an individual

feels that by complying with a certain law he will be either the agent
2
or the victim of serious injustice, then (i) it is possible that he
would be morally justified in refusing to comply with that law, and (ii)
there is no good reason for refusing to give him a chance to defend his
noncompliance in a court of law and to be released from the ordinary
sanctions for noncompliance if he can convince a jury that his moral
128
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beliefs are sincere and reasonable ones.
It is obvious that no one who believes that disobedience to the law
can never be justified, at least in a reasonably just constitutional democracy, will be receptive to my view.

But the thinkers we have been

concerned with in the preceding chapters do believe that disobedience
to the law can be morally justified, even in more or less just democratic
societies.

And yet these same thinkers believe that even when disobe-

dience to the law is justified, the disobedient must be ready to accept
the legal consequences of his illegal dissent. My guess is that, ultimately, they hold the latter view because they hold some version of
premiss (8) in the argument by analogy.

This means that they oppose my

view, if they do, because they disagree with the second part of it, (ii)
above.
What sorts of reasons are there for denying a conscientious disobedient an opportunity to state his case in court?

That is, what can

be said against the notion of allowing someone to claim in court not
that he did not disobey the law, but that he did and was morally justified in doing so?

In trying to come to grips with the issues that

surround this question, I shall limit my discussion to a rather narrow
range of cases of conscientious disobedience.

This limitation will ob-

viously set limits on what I can expect to prove, but this is inevitable
in a study of this sort.
In order to illustrate the kinds of cases I shall be concerned with,
I want to return to Rawls*s work on justified disobedience to the law.
Rawls describes two forms of disobedience in his general theory of noncompliance:

civil disobedience and conscientious refusal.

Although he

is willing to acknowledge that disobedience of either sort can be justified —

indeed, he tries to outline the conditions under which this would

be so —

he also believes that the civil disobedient ought to accept the

legal consequences of his illegal behavior.

Rawls does not take a stand

with respect to paying the penalty in cases of conscientious refusal.
But if I am correct in speculating that he accepts some form of premiss
(8) in the argument by analogy, then he would be implicitly committed to
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saying that the dissenter ought to be willing to pay the penalty in both
sorts of cases, unless express legal provision has been made for noncompliance, as in the case of conscientious objectors under the Selective
Service System.
In any case, there are plenty of people who do hold that even when
conscientious refusal is morally justified, this feature of the act is
4
irrelevant from the law*s point of view.
This general view is in fact
enshrined in our own legal system. If a young man opposed the war in
Vietnam on the grounds that it was an unjust war or a war that was blatantly violating the principles of just warfare, and if on these grounds
he refused induction into the armed forces, he was not allowed to defend
this conduct in terms of his moral convictions about the war.

Similarly,

if women, or men over thirty, who could not oppose the war by refusing
induction, expressed their opposition indirectly by violating some other
law, their moral reasons for doing so were not the sort of considerations
that would be permitted as evidence on their behalf in a court of law.
These, and cases like them, are the kinds of cases I shall be concerned
with below.
If we believe that at times civil disobedience and conscientious
refusal can be morally justified in cases like these, cases of allegedly
intolerable injustice, then why do we refuse to allow the considerations
that motivate such noncomliance to be used in defense of it in our law
courts?

Suppose that we were to allow some sort of legal defense for

conscientious disobedience to the law.

In this case it would no longer

be axiomatic that when one disobeyed the law on conscientious grounds one
would have to be ready to pay the penalty without reservation.

Of course,

neither would it be axiomatic that one would never have to pay the penalty
for conscientious noncompliance.

Rather, whether or not one finally paid

the legal penalty would depend on whether one could convince a jury of his
peers that the grounds of his noncompliance were good grounds.

But what

would count as "good groxmds" in cases of this sort?
In answering this question I plan to make things easy for myself, at
least in one respect.

Rawls has given us a fairly comprehensive account
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of what constitutes good grounds for civil disobedience and conscientious
refusal, and I propose to accept his account.

That is, I shall say that

civil disobedience is morally justified when the dissenter faced a serious
violation of the first principle of justice or a blatant violation of the
second part of the second, when he has tried the normal channels of legal
redress without success, and when there is no reason to believe that
others, similarly situated, will express their equal right to dissent,
with harmful consequences for society as a whole.

I shall say that con-

scientious refusal is justified, following Rawls, when a nation violates
its jus ad bellum (wages an unjust war) or its jus in bello (conducts
unjust warfare in an arguably just war).
with is simply this:

The question we are then faced

if people can be morally justified in disobeying

the law on grounds like these, why cannot the same grounds be used in a
law court as part of a standard legal defense for conscientious noncompliance?

2. The recent literature has not been entirely without advocates for
some form of accommodation for conscientious disobedience to the law.
I can set my own proposal in a clearer perspective by discussing a few
of these proposals first.

For it seems to me that one of them is clearly

too weak to meet our needs, while the other is arguably too strong (or
at least too sweeping).
o

In an article entitled *'0n Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience",
Ronald Dworkin suggests an interesting way of accommodating some forms of
conscientious disobedience to the law.

He argues that federal prosecu-

tors should use the discretion they have for not prosecuting in cases of
the sort mentioned above —

cases of conscientious resistance to the

draft laws, for example, because of the war in Vietnam.

Dworkin points

out that although society "cannot endure" if it tolerates all disobedience to the law, it obviously does not follow "that it will collapse
9
if it tolerates some."
He then catalogues some of the many cases in
which prosecutors can (and often do) decide not to press charges in
criminal cases, and argues that there are "some good reasons for not
prosecuting those who disobey the draft laws out of conscience:

One is the obvious reason that they act out of
better motives than those who break the law out
of greed or a desire to subvert the government.
Another is the practical reason that our society
suffers a loss if it punishes a group that
includes...some of its most thoughtful and
loyal citizens. Jailing such men solidifies
their alienation from society, and alienates ,Q
many like them who are deterred by the threat.
The last few sentences suggest that Dworkin would appeal to both
utility and to some principle of "fittingness" or equity as reasons
for not prosecuting such disobedience.

These are reasons to which I

shall also appeal in support of my own proposal for accommodating conscientious disobedience to the law.

But Dworkin*s suggestion, and

others like it, while in the spirit of the suggestions I shall make below, are nonetheless far more limited proposals than my own.

To begin

with, Dworkin is speaking directly only to conscientious disobedience
inspired by the war in Vietnam; he is speaking only indirectly, if at
all, to the issue of how we might handle conscientious disobedience
generally.
More important, however, is a limitation arising from the fact
that Dworkin is suggesting discretion at the prosecutorial level.

This

raises two quite different problems, from the point of view of the pres12
ent study.
On the one hand, looking at the problem from a purely
practical point of view, it seems to me that it is unreasonable to expect federal prosecutors to take Dworkin*s admonitions to heart and to
refrain from prosecuting in the relevant cases.

These are men whose

careers depend, in part, on successfully prosecuting a certain number of
cases, as well as certain kinds of cases.

What*s more, these men are

representing in the courts the very governmental forces the resistors
oppose.
Perhaps Dworkin has reasons for being optimistic in this regard,
however.

For example, perhaps when he made his proposal he believed

that the prosecutors themselves recognized that more was to be gained
by avoiding courtroom confrontations on the moral issues surrounding
13
the war than by promoting them.
But there is another more serious
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difficulty connected with proposals like Dworkin*s.

For even if it is

not unreasonable to expect federal prosecutors to act on his advice,
an assimiption that is controversial at best, it seems both dangerous and
unnecessary to leave the discretion to decide on the fate of such dissenters solely in the hands of a class of men less likely than most to
14
be sjnnpathetic to the dissenter*s claims.
To be sure, it might often
be best, for all parties concerned, to avoid a direct confrontation with
respect to the moral issues at stake simply by not making an issue of
them.

But to leave the matter there overlooks the possibility that some

dissenters may actually want to bring their cases to court as well as
the probability that others will be forced to do so, whether they want
to or not, by prosecutors who do not decide against prosecution.

Both

groups, I shall argue, ought to be able to avail themselves of a legal
defense that allows them to defend their illegal conduct on moral
grounds.
Thus far I have been raising more or less practical problems that
Dworkin*s proposal must face, especially the problem of just how likely
it is that federal prosecutors will in fact exercise the discretion
that Dworkin is exhorting them to use.

Before showing that suggestions

like Dworkin*s face even more serious theoretical problems —
of moral and political principle —

problems

it might be worthwhile to connect

Dworkin*s remarks with a more general trend in legal thought to which
they are related.

This is the view that while moral issues are irre-

levant to the court in determining the legal guilt or innocence of an
accused draft resister, say, such issues are certainly not irrelevant at
the level of sentencing.

A conscientious judge, in other words, will

take the moral integrity of the defendant into account when sentencing
him, even though he cannot (and should not) do so when trying him for
the crime.

Unfortunately, this move is open to the same objections as

Dworkin*s view.
There is, to begin with, the problem of determining just how likely
it is that a federal judge will be moved to leniency in the sorts of cases
we are discussing.

What*s more, it should be apparent that whether pros-

ecutor or judge is thought of as exercising the discretion we are discussing, it seems very odd to leave decisions of this magnitude to individuals who are not especially likely to represent the moral consciousness of the community at large and who are in fact more likely
than not to represent a segment of the community with very special (and
very conservative) views about the propriety of any disobedience to the
law, whether conscientious or not.

As we shall see below, there is

good reason to believe that one of the most important characteristics
of the notion of a trial by a jury of one*s peers is the fact that a
carefully selected sample of a man*s peers is more likely to be in touch
with and representative of contemporary moral thinking than law enforcement agents like judges and prosecutors.

If this is true, it would be

salutary to allow a jury to hear and deliberate upon the relevance of a
man's moral beliefs to the question of his liability to conviction and
punishment for an otherwise illegal act.
We are now dealing with a more general view than Dworkin* s view
that the moral principles of war resisters, say, might appropriately
be taken into account at the prosecutorial level. We are considering
the view that such considerations can be taken into account both at
this level and at subsequent levels when fines and punishment are being
considered, supposing that prosecution has been carried through and
carried through successfully.

In other words, we are considering the

not uncommon view that Dworkin* s proposal can be supplemented by the
proposal that we can (and should) respect the conscientiousness of
principled disobedience to the law by urging the judge, for example, to
mitigate the sentence for conduct of this sort, or even by urging the
prosecution to ask for a mitigated sentence once a conviction has been
achieved.

I shall not belabor the practical difficulties that viewing

the matter in this way seems to me to face, although I think they are
formidable (see my remarks above).
But suppose I am mistaken or suppose I have exaggerated the extent
to which difficulties like those suggested above are exigent. Nonetheless, it seems to me that a proposal such as Dworkin*s faces serious
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theoretical problems as well —

problems of moral and political princi-

ple, that is. And, more importantly, it seems that these same difficulties are attached to the more general view just sketched, the view
wherein we would respect the conscientiousness of principled disobedience
to the law by mitigating or even suspending sentence after conviction on
standard legal grounds.
The claim of these dissenters is not simply that they are conscientious in their resistance, but that they are conscientious and correct.
That is, at least in the cases we*re concerned with (where the disobedience is justified ex hypothesi), the dissenters correctly believe that
they have acted on moral principles that override their prima facie duty
to obey the law and hence that the government is acting in ways that
forfeit, at least to a certain extent and with respect to certain laws,
its right to expect compliance.
Now when the court mitigates a sentence for criminal conduct, and
even when the prosecution decides not to press charges in the first
place, or to ask for a mitigated sentence once conviction has been
achieved, it seems to me that the dissenter*s moral stance is not receiving the sort of response it deserves (and implicitly demands) or,
at best, is receiving such a response in an inappropriately oblique manner. When we mitigate a sentence, for example, we are in effect saying
that while there has been an unjustified criminal act, we are willing to
refrain from punishment, or to mitigate it to a certain extent, for various reasons.

But is this what we want (and ought) to say to war re-

sisters (and civil disobedients generally) whom we believe are justified
in their disobedience to the law?

I should think not. We ought to con-

gratulate such dissenters for their courageous actions; and if we believe
they really were justified in what they did, I should think we would want
to say they are not deserving of punishment at all.
3. At this point we are approaching the basic question of why the moral
considerations that motivate a conscientious disobedient*s conduct should
be deemed appropriate at certain points in the judicial process but not at
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others.

In particular, why should such considerations be irrelevant to a

determination of guilt or innocence in the trial itself?

Professor Jon

Van Dyke has addressed this question directly in a recent article on "The
.. 18
Jury as a Political Institution .
Van Dyke opens his article by pointing out that at the start of the
trial of the "Chicago Eight" for allegedly conspiring to produce violence
at the 1968 Democratic Convention, Federal District Judge Julius J. Hoffman "told the jurors that they must always follow his instructions on
19
matters of law".
According to Van Dyke, defense lawyer Leonard Weinglas objected, saying:
The defense will contend that the jury is a
representative of the moral conscience of
the community. If there is a conflict between the judge*s instructions and that conscience, it should obey the latter.20
Van Dyke comments dryly:
trial proceeded."

"Judge Hoffman overruled the objection and the

The rest of Van Dyke*s paper can be seen, I think, as

an attempt to show that Hoffman*s ruling was incorrect. He writes:
Although the American jury is still praised as
a bastion of democracy, standing between oppressive governments and the people, most of today*s
American judges in fact do everything they can
to emasculate the jury until the only role left
for them is to review the facts and then rubberstamp the application of the law for the government. 21
Van Dyke observes that, according to a study made by Professors
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel (THE AMERICAN JURY), "the most important
reason jurors rarely use their theoretical power [to acquit a guilty defendant, for example, because he acted conscientiously] is that they are
22
constantly told that they have none."
A typical example, according to
Van Dyke, occurred in the case of Dr. Benjamin Spock, when the jury returned a verdict of guilty for conspiracy to violate the draft laws.

Van

Dyke points out, as is well-known from subsequent press stories, that one
juror said after the trial that he was "uneasy" about convicting the defendants, and yet, according to Van Dyke, felt that "he had no choice but
to follow the judge's instruction."

"The paradox," this juror went on.
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"was that I agreed wholeheartedly with these defendants but...I felt that
23
technically they did break the law."
It is apropos this remark that
Van Dyke states his central thesis:
I contend that justice would be better served
if jurors were told they have the power to
act mercifully toward the defendant should
they decide that applying the law to this act
would lead to an unjust result.24
He traces the history of judicial opinion against this stand from the
early nineteenth century to 1895, when the Supreme Court of the United
States considered the question in the case of Sparf & Hansen v. The
United States:
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court
spends forty-two pages reviewing the earlier
decisions and comes to the conclusion that
because we cannot tolerate allowing jurors
to increase the penalties or make law on
their own, we cannot tolerate allowing them
to reduce the penalties or nullify laws....
Even though no one in the case before the
Court argued that the jury should be allowed
to create its own crimes or to render stiffer
punishment than the law allows, the Court was
haunted by that specter. Because the Supreme
Court could not distinguish between lowering
and raising the punishment it deprived the
jurors of the power to do either.25
Now Van Dyke makes so much of this distinction between lowering the
punishment (or acting mercifully) and raising the punishment (or acting
harshly) because he believes that in light of it the Supreme Court*s
position will be obviously untenable. He returns to the trial of the
"Chicago Eight" and writes:
Leonard Weinglas was arguing to Judge Hoffman
only that the jurors have the power to temper
the law with mercy. He was not saying that
the jurors had the power to interpret the law
for any purpose beyond the confines of the
courtroom. He was certainly not arguing that
the jury should be empowered to hand down a
harsher punishment than permitted under current
law. 26
Similarly, he distinguishes between jurors making law and nullifying it.
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because he favors the latter and not the former, and because he believes
that the position against so-called "jury nullification" is based on a
fear of the former and simply fails to make an obvious distinction.

Thus,

he writes:
Proponents of jury nullification are not arguing
that the jury be given free rein to create new
laws or define *people*s crimes' in a fashion
reminiscent of Nazi Germany. The argument today
is only that the jury has the right to mitigate
existing laws and that this is a basic safeguard
against an oppressive or even merely overly
aggressive government.
Our judicial system already recognizes to some
extent a jury acting vengefully and one acting
mercifully. Appellate judges can reduce a sentence or refuse to uphold a conviction if they
feel a jury has imposed too harsh a judgment on
the accused, but they are prevented from reviewing a judgment of acquittal no matter how irrational it seems.27
The position that Van Dyke himself supports, however, is both too
vague and too wide-ranging.

He argues that jurors should not be in-

structed that it is their duty to follow the letter of the law as the
judge interprets it, but that they should be encouraged "to give respectful attention to the laws", on the one hand, and then instructed that
nonetheless "they have the final authority to decide whether or not to
28
apply a given law to the acts of the defendant on trial before them."
What we need to know, however, is on exactly what kinds of grounds
a jury ought to base this sort of decision.

Van Dyke believes that

"jurors should be told that they represent their communities" and told
as well that it is appropriate for them "to bring into their delibera29
tions the feelings of the community and their own feelings as well."
It seems to me that talk of "representing one* s community" and bringing
one*s own (as well as one*s community*s) "feelings" into one*s deliberations in a criminal trial is simply too vague and too broad a charge to
give a jury.

It is too vague because one would like the jury to be

fairly clear about what counts as a morally defensible (if not altogether
correct) position as opposed to an indefensible (or downright incorrect)
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moral position.

Van Dyke*s suggestion is too broad, on the other hand,

insofar as it seems that moral considerations are at least prima facie
relevant in any sort of criminal case on his view.

I shall argue, to

the contrary, that only very specific moral beliefs should be arguable
in court and only in a carefully circumscribed range of cases (see
section 4 below).
It is only fair to Van Dyke to note that at one point he comes
somewhat closer to articulating the kind of moral standards he has in
mind (though he still leaves open the range of cases in which they might
be applied).

He argues that the jury should be told that, despite their

respect for the law, nothing prohibits them from acquitting the defendant
"if they feel that the law as applied to the factual situation before
30
them would produce an inequitable or unjust result."
This is still
rather vague talk, but it raises the issue of justice and injustice that
lies at the heart of recent concern about how the law can go wrong and
how illegal dissent can be morally justified (and sometimes even morally
obligatory).

In the next section I shall try to delineate with consid-

erably more precision what the relevant considerations of justice and
equity are, the scope of their relevance in an ideal judicial system,
and precisely how the arrangement I favor might be worked into a legal
system like our own.

4. My own proposal differs substantially from Dworkin's, as well as
the more general line on mitigation-after-conviction.

I wish to argue

that certain moral considerations should be allowed as part of an explicit
legal defense that would enable a jury to acquit a defendant on the
grounds that he was morally justified in what he did (or that he was in
fact morally bound to act as he did) and hence that he cannot be held
legally culpable for not refraining from an otherwise illegal act.
proposal also differs from Van Dyke's in a number of important ways.

This
To

begin with, I shall attempt to make the mechanics of the defense fairly
specific.

What's more, my suggestion is not that juries be given a gen-

eral power to nullify law when they see fit, but that the defendant be
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given the specific right to enter a plea of "moral justification".

This

plea will be based on a very explicit conception of what it is for disobedience to the law to be morally justified:

roughly, the conception

advanced by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, minus the willingness requirement.

On this view the jury would be empowered to acquit if the defend-

ant makes good on his claim that he was morally justified in disobeying
the law.

Obviously, any reasonable arrangement for allowing pleas of

moral justification will have to be very specific not only with respect
to what will count as a convincing moral defense but also with respect
to how such a defense would actually be implemented in the criminal and
civil law.

I turn to these matters now.

In section 3 of the preceding chapter I tried to show that the
argument that justification entails punishment gains a great deal of
its plausibility from Rawls's arguments in A Theory of Justice.

Premiss

(1) in that argument, at any rate, according to which disobedience to
the law is justified only when the prima facie duty to obey the law is
overriden, is simply a gloss on Rawls's theory of the justification of
civil disobedience, as well as his theory of justified conscientious
refusal.

According to both theories, there is a point when the limits

of tolerable injustice have been exceeded and when the right to resist
injustice overrides the duty to obey the law.

Rawls delineates the con-

ditions that indicate when this point has been reached rather precisely.
To be sure, Rawls does not give us a simple and easily applicable set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the justification of disobedience
to the law.

But his theories do indicate rather nicely the sorts of cases

that would qualify as more or less clear cases of justified illegal dissent and the sorts of cases that would certainly not qualify.

Henceforth

I shall assume for the sake of argument that the standards for when
illegal dissent is morally justified are roughly the standards outlined
by Rawls in his book.
Rawls's theory leaves a great deal of room for controversy, but
from our present perspective it is important to note that it also provides
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grounds for a considerable amount of substantive agreement on an impressive range of cases.

This is because, like his theory of justice gener-

ally, Rawls's theory of noncompliance is designed to suggest the sorts
of standards which rationally self-interested parties would be likely
to agree to employ for resolving competing claims —

in this case, claims

about whether a given law or policy had exceeded the limits of tolerable
injustice and, hence, whether disobedience would be justified, all things
considered.
In light of all this, it is possible to sketch roughly what a defense like the one I advocate would involve.

Essentially, in allowing

a legal defense of "moral justification" we woiild be allowing an appeal
to Rawls's principles of justice or to what Marshall Cohen has called
31
"the principles of political morality".
More specifically, we would
be establishing an arrangement where the question of whether or not an
agent was justified in his disobedience to the law is to be settled by
asking whether that disobedience would be justified on Rawls's theory of
civil disobedience or on his theory of conscientious refusal.

Thus, a

jury would be faced with the problem of determining whether a disobedient' s act was justified by a serious violation of Rawls's first principle of justice (the principle of maximal equal liberty) or the second
32
part of the second principle (the principle of open offices).
Alternatively, in certain cases the jury would be faced with deciding whether
illegal dissent was justified on the grounds that a nation was violating
what Rawls calls its jus ad bellum (waging an unjust war) or its jus in
bello (by engaging in unjust warfare).

A great deal of illegal dissent

in the civil-rights movement in the 1960s was based on principles of the
first sort.

And most of the illegal dissent in the recent anti-war

movement was based on principles of the second sort.
Now there are at least three questions that a jury would have to
decide in assessing a plea made on the basis of principles like those
of Rawls:

(i) is the dissenter's claim that he believed he was justified

in what he did a genuinely sincere claim?

(ii) is the dissenter*s belief

that he was justified in what he did reasonable as well as genuinely
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sincere?

(iii) is this belief correct, in addition to being both reason-

able and sincere?

Ideally, a defendant would be able to convince a jury

that the answer to all three questions was affirmative.

However, I think

that it will often be impossible to reach agreement on the third question,
while the answer to the first two will clearly be yes. Hence I think that
proving that one was correct in his conscientious disobedience would be
too strong a requirement for acquittal.

On the other hand, sincerity in

itself seems too weak to qualify as a sufficient condition in and of it33
self.
Hence, establishing that one was sincere in his moral dissent
will be a necessary condition for acquittal on my proposal, and establishing that one*s sincere dissent was reasonable and/or correct will be a
sufficient condition for acquittal.
What does it mean to say that a person*s belief with respect to the
moral propriety of disobeying the law was a correct and/or a reasonable
belief?

Suppose, as above, that we accept Rawls*s account of when civil

disobedience and conscientious refusal are morally justified.

We can

then say that a sincere belief that one was morally justified in his noncompliance is a correct belief just in case one*s belief that the appropriate conditions for noncompliance were fulfilled is correct.

Similarly,

we can say that a sincere belief that one was morally justified in noncompliance is a reasonable belief just in case one*s belief that the appropriate conditions for noncompliance were fulfilled is a reasonable belief.
What will count as correct and/or reasonable beliefs about these matters
will itself be a matter of controversy, which we shall discuss in a moment.
But first a word about my procedure here and the structure of the defense
I am proposing.
I am assuming without argument that we can describe at least three
kinds of dissent:

(i) correct moral dissent (i.e., dissent that is actually

justified by correct moral principles); (ii) reasonable moral dissent (i.e.,
dissent that it is reasonable to undertake, whether it is actually justified or not); and (iii) genuine moral dissent (i.e., dissent that is conscientious or sincere, even if it is neither reasonable nor correct).

Ob-

viously, more than one of these descriptions can apply to the same act at
the same time.
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I am also assuming, for the sake of argument rather than "without
argument, that the standards for when illegal dissent is in fact morally
justified are roughly the standards outlined by Rawls in Chapter VI of
A Theory of Justice.

I happen to believe that Rawls*s view is essen-

tially correct, but I cannot defend this view here.

The point is that

I shall assume that we have these rather rough standards at our disposal.
The problem is how we are to apply them, and in particular whether we
should allow them to be applied by judges and/or juries in courts of
law.
Now since I assume that in every case we shall be concerned with
the defendant will have to establish his sincerity or conscientiousness
beyond the shadow of a doubt (this is what is meant by saying that sincerity is a necessary condition of a successful legal defense), we are
left with four possible kinds of cases, depending on whether the defendant *s sincere belief is judged to be correct or incorrect, reasonable or unreasonable.

This can be illustrated, with the different cases

identified for reference by capital letters, as follows:
Status of a. sincere belief that illegal
dissent was morally justified

Correct
Incorrect

Reasonable

Unreasonable

A
B

C
D

The cases that are of most interest to us are A and B, of course:

cases

where the defendant*s belief was (1) a reasonable and correct belief,
and (li) a reasonable but incorrect belief, respectively.

In cases of

an unreasonable, incorrect belief, I shall argue that the defense (for
acquittal on groxinds of morally justified conscientious noncompliance)
fails.

I am not certain what an unreasonable but correct belief that one

was morally justified in disobeying the law would be like (case C), but
doubtless we could work out this sort of case if we needed to.
My view is that defenses to the effect that one*s illegal dissent
falls in either category A or category B ought to be allowed in criminal
trials concerned with conscientious disobedience to the law (what Rawls
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would call civil disobedience or conscientious refusal), and that if one
can make good on the defense (i.e., convince the judge or jury, as the
case may be), then one ought to be acquitted outright (in cases of type
A) or excused for the offense (in cases of type B).

The controversy,

of course, is over whether it is reasonable even to allow defenses of
this sort.

5. I want to begin assessing the pros and cons of the system I favor
by illustrating it with an example of each of the relevant sorts of
cases.

The clearest case for acquittal on moral grounds (category A)

will be where the jury concludes that the defendant acted on sincere
34
moral convictions that were both reasonable and correct.
Here I should
like to say that the individual was fully justified in what he did. An
example would be the case of a soldier in Vietnam who refused to obey an
order to shoot down what looked like, and turned out to be, a group of
peasants.
The clearest case of a failed moral defense (if we exclude for now
cases where the defendant cannot even establish his sincerity) would be
a case where the jury concludes that the defendant acted on moral convictions (however sincere) that were unreasonable and incorrect (category D).

Suppose, for example, that a U.S. citizen had illegally passed

important documents to the Axis powers during World War II on the
grounds that the Allies were waging a war that threatened to end an era
of human progress and peace.
Perhaps the most interesting class of cases are those where the
jury cannot agree that the defendant*s moral judgment was correct, but
where they believe that nonetheless it was reasonable, or at least not unreasonable, under the circumstances (category B).

Consider, for example,

the case of a young man who refuses to be drafted into the armed forces
of any major power like the United States, and to do any form of alternative service, on the grounds that to do so in the context of contemporary
international politics is to participate in a militaristic system that is
35
inevitably going to cause more harm than good in the world.
In cases
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like this, where the jury concedes that the view is reasonable even if
not clearly correct, we should want them to be empowered to recommend
a mitigated or suspended sentence.
I should like to show first that there are no profound difficulties
of principle involved in my proposal and, moreover, that far from supporting premiss (8) in the argument of the preceding chapter, or anything like
it, Rawls*s general theory of politics and society actually supports an
arrangement like the one I have suggested.

I shall show that if we take

seriously the idea of maximizing justice in our social and political institutions, and the idea that an injustice is morally tolerable only if
it is required to prevent an even greater injustice, then we shall be
inclined to allow defenses like those I have described rather than to
prohibit them.

In section 7

I shall try to show that the practical dif-

ficulties involved in the implementation of a proposal like my own are
not severe enough to override its theoretical and moral superiority to
systems like our present one, which does not allow moral considerations
to be presented as a defense for disobedience to the law, at least to
any appreciable extent.
The principal merit of the system I propose is that it would enable
dissenters who were morally justified in their disobedience to the law
to state their case and, hopefully, thereby escape the ordinary legal consequences.

Of course, such a system might allow too many (or the wrong)

people to escape the consequences, and this is a difficulty we shall have
to consider.

The important point here, however, is that there is a strong

prima facie case against punishing justified civil disobedience (see section 3 in Chapter V ) , and any argument for premiss (8) above and the willingness requirement must show why it can be right to punish in such cases
despite this argument.

The earlier argument against punishment in cases

of this sort was actually based on principles that Rawls himself has articulated —

the principle that an injustice is justified only if it is

necessary to prevent an even greater injustice, for example.

But there

is another line of thought that is relevant here as well.
6.

Professor Herbert Packer has argued for a view related to mine by
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distinguishing the aims of punishment and the aims of what he calls
rule of law".^^

the

Suppose we accept the claim that the goal of punishment

is the prevention of crime.

If we distinguish the aims of punishment

(within a legal system) from the ends of the legal system itself (or as
a whole), then we can argue that the prevention of crime cannot be pursued
without qualification, because there are certain other values that "tran38
scend the goal of crime prevention" as Packer puts it.
What are these
values? According to Packer, in a free society law must ultimately be
judged "on the basis of its success in promoting htmian autonomy and the
39
capacity for human growth and development."
Not only does "punishment
of the morally innocent", as Packer calls it, fail to reinforce one*s
commitment to the rule of law generally, but a single-minded pursuit of
the goal of crime prevention —
sketched above —

excluding moral defenses of the sort

"will slight and in the end defeat". Packer argues,

"the ultimate goal of law in a free society, which is to liberate rather
40
than to restrain."
Packer*s view rests on an emphatic distinction between the aims of
punishment and the aims of the rule of law generally, and on the possibility that the two can conflict. Although Packer has a rather special
conception of the function of law, it is not an idiosyncratic one.

In

many ways it is reminiscent of the view adumbrated by H.L.A. Hart in the
controversy over the proposal to eliminate the "mental elements" of mens
rea and personal responsibility in the law.

Hart points out that in the

criminal law of nearly all modem states responsibility for certain
crimes is excluded or "diminished" by what he refers to as "excusing conditions".

On a more general level, this is the doctrine that a "subjec41
tive element or mens rea is required for criminal responsibility.
This is related to my own argument in an important way.
Hart is concerned in his article not simply with arguing for the

preservation of the concepts of mens rea and personal responsibility but,
first, with inquiring into and showing precisely why these concepts are
worth preserving —

that is, with analyzing and refuting the so-called

*'retributive" and "utilitarian" rationalia that have been advanced by
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various thinkers in support of the preservation of these concepts

• and

secondly, with determining just where their ultimate rationale really
lies and of just what sort it really is.

Thus, he asks why we value a

system of social control that takes mental elements into account and what
would be lost if we gave this system up. After a careful analysis of the
"retributive" and "utilitarian" attempts to answer these questions. Hart
outlines his own answer, which he finally summarizes in the following
way:
On this view excusing conditions are accepted as
something that may conflict with the social utility
of the law*s threats; they are regarded as of moral
importance because they provide for all individuals
alike the satisfactions of a choosing system [a
system in which the individual is free to choose
to obey or disobey the law and in which he is not
accountable for disobedience which he did not freely
choose]. Recognition of excusing conditions is
therefore seen as a matter of protection of the individual against the claims of society for the highest measure of protection from crime that can be obtained from a system of threats. In this way the
criminal law respects the claims of the individual
as such, or at least as a choosing being, and distributes its coercive sanctions in a way that reflects this respect for the individual. This surely
is very central in the notion of justice and is one,
though no doubt only one, among the many strands of
principle that I think lie at the root of the preference for legal institutions conditioning liability
by reference to excusing conditions.^2
It is clear even in this relatively early essay that Hart sees the
rationale for the excusing conditions embodied in the doctrine of mens
rea and the concept of personal responsibility not in the "retributive"
and "utilitarian" justifications strewn throughout the legal and philosophical literature but in something far deeper and much more profound:
in the notion of man as a free and "choosing" creature and in the respect
for the individual and his freedom to choose that these concepts (of mens
rea and personal responsibility) reflect and reinforce.
There is, I think, an important analogy between Hart*s arguments
for the preservation of the concepts of mens rea and personal responsi-
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bility and my own proposal to introduce a legal defense for criminal behavior that is alleged to be morally justified.

This analogy is relevant

to the critique of premiss (8) in Chapter V as well.

Just as Hart claims

that there are certain profound "moral gains" that would be lost if we
eliminated the principle of mens rea from the criminal law (such as respect for the individual and his freedom to choose, among other things),
so there is much to be gained —

that is, society would be "enriched

in certain profound and important ways —

by the introduction of a legal

defense for principled or conscientious disobedience to the law.
To begin with, the very same values of respect for the individual
and his freedom to choose would be protected.

Moreover, we surely want

to encourage an individualistic, reflective response to the law in societies like our own, for the alternative is a society that will consist
more and more of "moral automatons" who look always for a law or some
other socially imposed duty to guide their behavior and who never guide
it for themselves and by their own lights.

Surely higher and higher

levels of moral consciousness enhance the quality of civilization in a
given society in obvious ways.

Just as a legal system that would permit

widespread use of laws of strict liability and eliminate the notions of
mens rea and personal responsibility would lose the profound values of
respect for the individual, for example, and the others that Hart finds
at the bottom of these concepts and of our distaste for such laws, so
too, if we simply foreclose the possibility of defenses based on the fundamental principles of political morality, we stand to lose something on
which we ordinarily place a great deal of value:

respect for individual

choice and moral freedom.
A less florid attack on premiss (8) and a defense of the alternative
arrangement it precludes could be sketched by trying to answer the following question quite concretely:

how are we "enriching" society by allowing

moral defenses for criminal conduct?
in at least two ways.

We are doing so, it might be answered,

On one level we are showing a proper respect for

moral freedom and autonomy, something that is important and valuable in its
own right.

But suppose it is contended that we would have to pay too high
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a social price for doing this.

To this it might well be replied that

encouraging a sincere, considered ethical approach to social conduct,
even when it may involve crime, is at least arguably in the interests of
society itself in the long run.

Who can say, for example, what the ef-

fect on the national awareness would have been if draft resisters had
been allowed to give their reasons, and show evidence for their beliefs,
in trials of conscientious crimes related to the awful war in Vietnam?
A defense involving a plea of "moral justification" would, in short, be
a two-edged sword, protecting the individual, or at any rate, giving him
a chance to state his case, and informing the public in the very process,
bringing to their attention not only moral convictions but also factual
evidence that they otherwise would probably never see.
I would now like to make one last and entirely different general
remark with respect to the critique of (8) and in connection with my own
proposal for a legal defense of "moral justification".

It is a point

suggested by Professor Hart in another of his essays in quite another
43
context.
Hart argues, quite convincingly I think, that despite the
fact that our general aim in punishing law-breakers is a utilitarian or
*'foreward-looking" one, and not a retributive or "backward-looking" one,
when we come to actually applying punishment to an individual offender
we do not rely on strictly utilitarian considerations.

We qualify our

initial utilitarian aims, as it were, because justice or fairness seems
to demand that whatever the utility of punishing wives and children of
law-breakers, for example, in order to ensure greater "deterrence value",
considerations of utility shall not prevail at this point and we shall
punish only offenders for offenses, thus adopting, in a sense, a quasiretributive or at least non-utilitarian point of view at this juncture.
Now I think Hart*s general point applies to the institution of law
itself.

Although the general aim of a legal system and its sanctions

may be a utilitarian one in some sense (very roughly:

the prevention of

crime and the preservation of "law and order" in society), certain other
moral principles may also make it necessary to qualify that general aim
at certain points just as in the case of the institution of punishment.
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It may well be that certain forms of strict or extreme *'legalism", in
other words, while quite acceptable from the strictly utilitarian point
of view, may have to be limited or qualified because of other (nonutilitarian) moral principles.
Thus, while there may be more over-all social utility (in some
classical sense) in a legal system that allows no departure from the injunctions of the "the law" and the legal obligations it imposes, it can
be argued that principles like justice or fairness require us to qualify
this system by recognizing and actually introducing a legal defense for
principled or conscientious disobedience to the law.

And if we fail to

observe this limitation or qualification, we may very well be unable to
give a morally tolerable account of our institution of law, as Hart puts
it.
It seems to me that these remarks are especially apposite in the
context of an essentially non-utilitarian theory of political obligation
such as that of Rawls.

Indeed, Rawls could argue for precluding the

qualifications suggested by the preceding remarks, qualifications that
undermine premiss (8) in the argument by analogy, only by showing that
the willingness requirement results not in a greater balance of "utility"
(in the classical sense) but in a greater balance of justice (in his own
sense).

That is, he would have to show that despite its theoretical

merit, a system that allows moral defenses in the courtroom is less effectively just, in the long run, than one that does not.

This means that

he would have to show that, as a matter of empirical fact, an arrangement
that precludes moral defenses is productive of more justice, in the long
run, than one that does not; or, at any rate, that among the arrangements
available to us, the one that precludes such defenses is likelier to preserve the maximal balance of justice over injustice than an arrangement
which allows such defenses.
Rawls does not defend this claim in A Theory of Justice, although I
think he needs to support some such contention to sustain his claim that
punishing justified civil disobedience can be morally right, or is at least
morally tolerable. He is committed, after all, to the principle that an
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injustice is morally tolerable only if it is required to avoid an even
greater injustice.

It is not difficult to imagine the sorts of consid-

erations that could be adduced to support the claim in question, and I
wish to speak to them in the following (and final) section.

7. What exactly is supposed to outweigh the apparent injustice of
punishing justified civil disobedience?

And what makes denying con-

scientious disobedients a chance to state their case the preferable
thing to do, from the point of view of justice?

It will be helpful

here to remember the analogous argument for requiring compliance with
some unjust laws.

The argument for the crucial empirical premiss

there (see section 8, Chapter IV) was that, up to a point, we had to
require obedience even to unjust laws for the sake of the greater balance of justice in the long run.

A certain number of unjust laws is

inevitable, and it is better (up to a point) to have more or less uniform obedience than to have selective obedience and disobedience.

Let-

ting this argument stand for now, what is the analogous argument for
premiss (8) in the argument by analogy?

Presumably, the claim would be

that we have to require a willingness to accept the consequences (and
we have to apply them) for the sake of the greater balance of justice.
That is, it is inevitable that there will be people who we will agree
were justified in disobeying the law, but lt*s better —

in the long

run and from the point of view of maximizing justice —

to disregard

pleas based on the moral propriety of disobedience than to entertain
them.

Why should anyone think that this is so?
To begin with, the alternative system (of hearing pleas of moral

justification, etc.) would take too much time.

This is the weakest

defense of premiss (8), when we remember that we want to maximize justice as well as efficiency, and in any case I shall show below that
this difficulty can be obviated in fairly straightforward ways.

There

are obviously more impressive things to be said on behalf of (8). Thus,
it might be alleged that it would be practically impossible to distinguish
those who were justified in their disobedience from those who were not.
Unfortunately, this defense is not open to Rawls, since presumably the
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point of the principles of justice and the general theory of political
obligation and civil disobedience that he develops around them is to
give us criteria for making exactly these sorts of decisions (criteria,
that is, for distinguishing those who are justified in their disobedience
from those who are not).
But perhaps Rawls can use a related point to make good on (8).
Suppose we do in fact have criteria for meeting the preceding objection.
After all, we have Rawls*s general theory of justice for institutions
and his inchoate but very suggestive "theory of right" for individuals
as well as his very detailed theory of the justification of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal.

Nonetheless, even if we have these

criteria, how can we trust one another to apply them properly in particular cases?

They are, after all, merely approximations to the truth on

these matters, as Rawls himself repeatedly emphasizes, and only rough
approximations at that.

They were developed, moreover, with more of a

theoretical than a practical intent.
This is not the difficulty, which we have not yet considered, that
arises out of the claim that people*s conceptions of right and wrong are
too divergent for the alternative to (8) to be practicable. We can suppose for the sake of argument that at bottom people do in fact have a
common sense of justice.

The problem we are considering here is the

problem of using that sense of justice, and the particular principles
Rawls thinks underlie it, to decide in particular cases who is justified
and who is not in his disobedience to the law.

We might call this the

problem of separating the sheep from the goats, morally speaking.

The

general problem is clear enough, at least intuitively, but how can it be
worked out to provide a compelling defense of premiss (8) in the argument
by analogy?
Consider the alternative:

allowing a defense such as '*moral justi-

fication" and basing it, say, on Rawls*s general theory of justice and
his particular theory of justified noncompliance.

Imagine the long,

drawn-out disputes we would encounter, in such a system, in the court
room and in the jury room.
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Notice first that there already are long, drawn-out disputes in the
jury room.

Would we really be making things any worse —

of view of the jury —
issues?

from the point

by allowing them to consider moral and political

It may be that we would even simplify things for the jury in

certain cases.

I shall have a great deal more to say about this in a

moment; here let me simply say that it is not altogether improbable that
a jury*s task would be made easier if they were allowed to dismiss a
case against a man on the grounds that even if he*d done what he was
alleged to have done he was justified in doing it.
It may be argued that the arrangement I favor will be abused and
that society cannot take the risk of having unscrupulous and morally
perverse persons let off, even at the risk of punishing the righteous
and the morally innocent.

But this is an odd reversal of a principle

that one would have thought was basic to our jurisprudence in this area:
better that a thousand guilty men go free than that one innocent man be
wrongly punished.

Perhaps we want to qualify this platitude.

Or perhaps

it was meant to apply only to men "innocent of crime" and not men who are
admittedly guilty of a (nonviolent) criminal act whom we merely consider
to be morally innocent.

The latter cannot be the proper move for the

advocate of (8), since the moral propriety of punishing such people
(*'moral innocents") is exactly what is at stake here; surely their moral
innocence is^ relevant, even if it is not conclusive. Perhaps it is relevant, then, to just how much punishment of the morally innocent we are
willing to endure in order to safeguard society against conscientious
(and convincing) persons with bad moral principles.
This point seems to rely upon postulating an almost overwhelming
44
moral obtuseness in the general public.
It overlooks, moreover, what
I have been at great pains to emphasize and shall return to again below:
a system that wants to take into account the possibility that a criminal
was morally justified in his criminal conduct does not have to begin by
letting off all criminals who claim that they acted conscientiously.

In-

deed, to do so would be madness, and the idea that we have to do so, if
we reject premiss (8), rests on the mistaken idea that we either exonerate
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conscientious disobedience wholesale or not at all.

In fact, the reason-

able thing to do would be to give conscientious law-breakers a chance to
state their case and then give a thoughtful jury of their peers a chance
to evaluate that case.
There may be some danger here, even serious danger, but it is not
the danger that an affected jury of satanists, say, would exonerate
Charles Manson on grounds that he acted in good conscience.

In fact, it

is odd that difficulties of this sort shoxild be thought to attach to
alternatives to (8) and not to systems just like our present one as well.
A jury is in fact, if not in theory, free to find a Charles Manson innocent, if it should happen that a jury is selected all of whose members
choose to ignore the defendant*s de facto guilt and return a verdict of
*'not guilty" without even explaining why.
It does seem to follow from my proposal, however, that if a jury
composed entirely of racists chose to exonerate an individual who selectively (and illegally) discriminated against Blacks active in the civil
rights movement, then it can rightfully do so.

There are a number of

replies to this difficulty, none of which is conclusive but which will
suggest the direction a fully adequate reply would take.
To begin with, any jury that would do this under my system would
doubtless do it anyway under our present system.

In fact, this sort of

thing seems to have happened with a disturbing regularity in the South.
What is more important, however, is that we must weigh evils of this sort
against the good that would be done in other cases, cases where a dissenter who was morally justified in his disobedience makes a convincing
case for his act of disobedience and is not forced to suffer the consequences.

Despite the fact that many disobedients who are justified in

their actions seem to be quite willing to pay the penalty for doing so,
a certain amount of good would be done if they didn*t have to, and this
good must be weighed against the ill effects of the arrangement I favor.
Another problem with my proposal is the problem of "differential
enforcement" which seems to lead to related problems of inequity and uncertainty.

Even if we suppose the best about each other (that we share
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a common sense of justice, for example, however much our individual views
differ in detail), there will be plenty of cases where individual A, say,
will be let off by jury Y, while individual B^, guilty of the same crime
and sincerely using the same moral defense, will not be let off by jury
Zf for example.
I am not impressed by the alleged "inequity" of this feature of my
system, but I am troubled by what I shall call the problem of "uncertain45
ty**«
With respect to the case just described and the unequal treatment A and B^ have received, I should think that it is better that at least
one of the justified disobedients gets off (assuming, of course, that he
was justified) rather than neither.

It would be best, of course, if judi-

cial decisions were uniform in this respect, and all justified civil disobedience was treated in the same way.

But surely the good of the one man

getting off outweighs the "inequity" of the other*s not getting off, when
the alternative is to let neither man off.
I am more concerned, however, about a related but independent problem.

It may be that if there were an institutionalized defense for con-

scientious civil disobedience, people would begin to count on acquittal
when they disobeyed the law with the firm conviction that they were justified in doing so.

I am not raising here the problem that unscrupulous

individuals would tend to abuse this defense (I consider that problem
below) but the problem that a man who had relied on the social conscience
might be disappointed by the actual outcome of his trial.

I'm not sure

just how much of a problem this is for my proposal, even though it represents an obvious problem for people contemplating conscientious disobedience.

There is no problem, in the system I favor, that an individual

who is Innocent of even breaking the law might be convicted because a jury
didn't like his particular moral and political convictions, since the defense I am proposing could be used only to acquit and not to convict. Under the arrangement I favor, as in our present system, anyone who felt
that he had been unjustly convicted, because he wasn't even guilty of committing the crime, questions of possible justification aside, could simply
appeal his conviction to a higher court.

There is evidence at present
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that judges or juries sometimes allow their appraisal of the moral character of the defendant to distort their judgment about the facts of the
46
case.
It does not seem to be that this difficulty would be any more
widespread in the kind of system I favor.
Finally, it might be objected that if, as I contend, the American
jury in effect already has (and sometimes exercises) the power I want to
give it, then it is otiose to do so.
difficulties.

This objection faces at least four

First, this de facto power is one that we ought to certify

as a de jure power and not one that we should let slip in occasionally by
the judicial "back door".

Second, it's not the case that juries uniformly

take moral considerations into accoimt as the objection implies, and
thirdly, they would be much more likely to do so (and to do so carefully)
if they were instructed by the judge that they had a right to do so.
Fourthly, and most importantly, by officially certifying "moral justification", for example, as an acceptable legal defense, we would bring the
discussion of the moral issues into the courtroom, thus informing the
jury of aspects of the case they would otherwise never hear about or,
what's worse perhaps, which they would be instructed to disregard if
they did hear about them.
In connection with this last point, there is still an apparent
problem of time.

Speaking practically. Ignoring the deeper issues, and

bearing in mind the enormous load the courts are already under, is it
reasonable to suggest that we complicate and lengthen an already complicated and lengthy process?

One obvious reply is that the time factor,

even if considerable, does not weigh very heavily against the reasonableness of allowing such a defense, unless it in fact affects the over-all
justice of the judicial process.

It is irrelevant that the arrangement

I favor might be more time consuming than its major rival, unless this
feature would tend to make my arrangement productive of less justice,
in the long run, than the alternative arrangement favored by most recent
thinkers.

But perhaps that is just the point; the arrangement I favor

would not simply be inefficient, because of the time factor, but would
be less effectively just as well (defendants might have to wait even
longer than at present, for example, simply to state their case).

This
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is a serious difficulty.

It cannot be conclusively met without specify-

ing exactly how the defense I favor would function in practice and calculating roughly how much time it would add to judicial proceedings, and
I cannot make these specifications and calculations here.
ever, like to make an obvious point.

I would, how-

It is not at all clear that the

sort of defense I have in mind would significantly alter the amount of
time spent in the court room, which is where the problem of time is
paramount.

The defendant would state his (moral) case, the prosecution

could reply, and perhaps the defendant would have a final word.

The real

complication would presumably occur in the jury room, and hence wouldn't
add to the court-room time to any considerable extent. What about time
spent in jury room deliberations?
It is important to separate the question of how much more complicated the jury's task would be, under the arrangement I favor, from the
question of how much more time consuming it would be.

There is no ques-

tion that in one sense the jury's task would be more complicated under
the arrangement I favor; they would be judges, in some cases, not merely
of the facts surrounding a particular case of allegedly criminal conduct
but of the moral propriety of that conduct as well.

And it will often

be difficult for them to make a responsible decision in this regard without a great deal of discussion.

At some point, however, and I am in-

clined to think after not too long, it will be fairly clear whether the
jury is sufficiently impressed by the defendant's case to acquit him on
moral grounds.
state his case.

If they are not, then at least he has had a chance to
If they are, then surely the extra time spent in sorting

out cases of justified from unjustified disobedience can be viewed as an
intelligent investment in the interests of effecting a greater balance of
justice over injustice in a given society.
Two serious practical difficulties remain, difficulties that I have
already mentioned and that any arrangement like the one I favor must face.
One is the possibility that there is no common core of conviction with
respect to the fundamental principles of political morality and hence that
it is unreasonable to expect juries to settle cases based on an appeal to
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such principles.

The easy answer is to say that this is not a problem

from the present perspective, since Rawls, at least, assumes that there
is, in a society like our own at any rate, a common sense of justice of
the kind necessary to meet this objection.
I should like to be able to show, however, not only that Rawls believes this, and hence that he at least ought to accept the arrangement
I favor, but also that he is correct in his belief and hence that all
reasonable men ought to accept it.

I cannot show this here, but I wish

to stress —- what is perhaps obvious —
not a normative claim.

that this is an empirical and

What we need to know, in order to assess the

objection at hand, is the extent to which people in a society like our
own share certain convictions about the fundamental principles of political morality.

Perhaps I am overly optimistic in my own beliefs on this

score, but I should like to think that more often than not, when people
seem to disagree about these basic principles, it is because they disagree about certain matters of fact —

about the facts of a particular

case or the likely consequences of disobedience —

than because they

disagree about the principles involved.
A final practical difficulty arises out of the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals would abuse a defense like that of "moral necessity", with the result that the balance of justice would suffer
rather than being enhanced.

Objections of this sort have been con-

sidered at several points above, and to a large extent the discussion
there is apposite in reply to this particular difficulty.

Thus, we

must balance the inevitable "utilitarian losses" to which the arrangement I favor would be liable, against the straightforward moral gains it
would produce.

Similarly, we must ask how high a price we are willing

to pay to prevent losses of this sort, and in particular, whether we are
willing to pay the price of continuing to disallow in practice a legal
defense for conduct that we are willing to agree can be justified in
theory.
This, of course, raises again the largest question I have been speaking to throughout the present study:

Is it reasonable for the very theo-
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rists who have successfully shown that civil disobedience can be morally
justified (and hence that some cases of justified civil disobedience can
be successfully identified) to insist that the disobedients must accept
the consequences of their illegal conduct?

I have attempted to show

that the best argument for saying that such a position ±s^ reasonable is
based not on the theoretical merits of the willingness requirement but
on the practical difficulties of allowing a legal defense for conscientious disobedience to the law.

And I have tried to show that the claim

that these difficulties outweigh the apparent injustice of punishing
justified disobedience to the law is itself based on empirical presumptions that are dubious at best and that certainly have not been proven.

NOTES —

CHAPTER I

For a sample of the literature from a decade ago, when philosophical interest in the justification of civil disobedience was on the rise,
see the articles by Hugo Bedau, Stuart M. Brown, Jr., and Richard Wasserstrom in the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 58 (1961). See also many of the
essays in Sidney Hook (ed.), LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (New York University
Press: New York, 1964), especially the essays by Rawls, Konvitz and Brandt,
which are discussed below. Since the early 1960's there has been a profusion of articles propounding the view I am alluding to. For the best
recent statement see John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience" in Hugo Bedau (ed.), CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Pegasus paperback: New York; 1969) and sections 55-59 of Rawls's book, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1971). See also
Marshall Cohen, "Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy," THE
MASSACHUSETTS REVIEW, Vol. X, No. 2 (Spring, 1969), and "Liberalism and
Disobedience," PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1971).
Carl Cohen has recently tried to tie some of the early literature together
in his book, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW (Columbia paperback: New York, 1971), but much of the book is intellectually
sloppy and careless; it is worthwhile as a popular gloss of a view defended more carefully elsewhere.
2
See the work of Rawls, for example, mentioned in footnote 1, as
well as that of both Marshall Cohen and Carl Cohen. Despite differences
in approach, and even differences on some substantive points of detail,
these authors tend to agree that civil disobedience is justified only
when it is necessary to protest a serious breach of justice in society
and only when normal legal remedies have been of no avail. It must also,
by definition for most recent authors, be a public and nonviolent act,
among other things.
3
The dissenters include Abe Fortas in CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE (Signet: New York, 1968) and George Kennan in "Rebels without a Program," reprinted in DEMOCRACY AND THE STUDENT LEFT (Bantam paperback: New York, 1968). Fortas's views are well known; Kennan expresses
"a serious doubt", in his essay (originally printed in the NEW YORK TIMES
SUNDAY MAGAZINE, January 21, 1968), "whether civil disobedience has any
place in a democratic society" (p. 15).
4
Howard Zinn is an outstanding exception to this generalization —
see his DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY (Vintage paperback: New York, 1968) ,
pp. 27-31
but Zinn fails to sustain his position with sound arguments.
Kai Nielsen has apparently attacked this feature of the received view
recently — see footnote 12, p. 289, in M. Cohen "Liberalism and Disobedience", o£. cit. — but I have not been able to get hold of his paper.
Professor Cohen's remarks suggest that Nielsen's arguments are defective.
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See, for example, Carl Cohen, o£. cit., pp. 94-101. See also ^^
Richard Wasserstrom's well-known essay, "The Obligation to Obey the Law ,
UCLA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 10, No. 4 (May, 1963) at p. 785 and passim.
Hugo Bedau, "On Civil Disobedience", o£. cit., p. 653. For a more
recent statement of Bedau's views see "Civil Disobedience and Personal
Responsibility for Injustice", THE MONIST, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Oct. 1970).
Bedau, "On Civil Disobedience", 0£. cit., p. 659.
o

Ibid., p. 659, footnote 9.
9
See Bedau's remarks at p. 661 of his early article and at p. 519
of the later article. See also the definition of Rawls and M. Cohen in
the essays mentioned in footnote 1 above.
See the definition in the early article mentioned above. In the
later article I think Bedau pretty clearly makes the willingness requirement an explicit part of his definition or "characterization" of civil
disobedience; see p. 519 of that article.
I am not suggesting that Bedau in fact tries to do this; I merely
wish to emphasize that it would be a mistake for anyone to try to defend
the willingness requirement in the way described.
12
Marshall Cohen, "Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy,"
op. cit., p. 213.
•"•^Ibid., p. 214.
•*-^Ibid., pp. 214-215.
The position I shall be concerned with rebutting, then, is that
which makes acceptance of the legal consequences a necessary part of the
moral justification of the illegal act and not merely a part of its definition or its reasonableness from a tactical point of view. It will not
always be easy to keep these components separate, and, indeed, it may not
always be necessary or reasonable to try to do so with absolute rigor.
But to the extent that I can do so, I shall try to isolate each thinker's
reasons for making a willingness to pay the penalty a moral requirement
in the justification of civil disobedience as opposed to a merely tactical
or definitional one.
Stuart M. Brown, Jr., 0£. cit., p. 676.
•^^Ibid., p. 678.
18
Ibid., pp. 678-679.
19
See Marshall Cohen, e.g., "Liberalism and Disobedience," op. cit.,
p. 298.
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In Chapter II I consider the claim that there is some sort of conceptual (or other) connection between the requirement that civil disobedience be nonviolent and the willingness requirement. Brown does not attempt to connect these notions, however, so I do not consider the appropriate arguments here.
21
Brown, op. cit., p. 679.
22
I return to this point, and consider it at much greater length,
in Chapter II, where I consider a related claim of John Rawls's, and in
Chapter III, where I consider a claim recently advanced by Richard Wasserstrom and also by Marshall Cohen. Here I simply want to meet Brown's
explicit arguments. There I shall be somewhat more generous, trying to
see if anything more can be said for this claim, even if Brown doesn't
say it.
23
Brown, op. cit., pp. 679-680.
24
Ibid., p. 678.
25
In this regard, see his remark quoted earlier: "a public protest in which the participants injure others, destroy property, and resist arrest is no less an act of civil disobedience; it is merely an unjustified one."
26
Milton Konvitz, "Civil Disobedience and the Duty of Fair Play",
in Sidney Hook (ed.), LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, 0£. cit., p. 26.
27
Ibid., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 28.
29
I return to Rawls's paper in Chapter IV below.
30 r.r r.-,

Konvitz, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
31
Ibid., p. 27.
32
Marshall Cohen, **Liberalism and Disobedience,'* op. cit., p. 286.
33
Carl Cohen, o£. cit., pp. 76-91.
34
Cohen favors a broad but not very clear form of consequentialism
(perhaps what Moore calls "agapistic utilitarianism") with respect to the
justification of civil disobedience: civil disobedience is justified
when it produces more good than evil for society (where the evil of disobeying the law is part of our calculation). Cohen recognizes that it
will be difficult, in practice, to determine when this is likely to be the
case, but he apparently believes it can be the case from time to time. As
I shall show in Chapter III, Cohen, like most recent theorists, is quite

conservative with respect to the basic issues here: the potential disobedient bears an enormous burden of proof in justifying his conduct;
nonetheless, such conduct can be justified, according to Cohen.
35
I am grateful to Barbara Onutz for help on this and other points
connected with Cohen's views on the willingness requirement.
36
I am indebted to Larry Peterson for helping me to get clear on
this point.
37
Cohen writes as though a retributively-minded judge could consistently acknowledge that the disobedient was morally right in what he
did while insisting that he was especially liable to punishment since
his violation of the law was defiant and deliberate (see pp. 80-81,
especially). Professor Marshall Cohen has countered, in another context,
that "it is a particularly barbarous fallacy to suppose that the government owes the disobedient his just portion of punishment" ("Liberalism
and Disobedience", o£. cit., p. 288). As I try to show in Chapters V
and VI below, I think the view that civil disobedience, even when it is
justified, justly merits punishment, is intimately connected with the
view that we cannot allow conscientious disobedients to state their
moral case in the courtroom.
38
It is important to avoid ambiguity here. My claim is not merely
that the disobedient has acted rightly in that he has acted conscientiously and with confidence that he is right in what he*s done. I am
assuming, as Cohen does, that there will be cases where the disobedient
believes, and believes correctly, that he has acted rightly in disobeying the law. The question is whether it makes sense to exact retribution in cases of this sort. Unfortunately, this does not take into account cases where the dissenter acts in good faith but is wrong in his
beliefs about the moral propriety of his disobedience. Whether retribution would be justifiable in cases of this sort is a question I cannot
answer here. It is also a question I need not answer, however, in order
to refute Cohen*s simpler point.

NOTES —

CHAPTER II

"Hlarshall Cohen, "Liberalism and Disobedience", PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1972), p. 285.
2
Ibid., p. 286.
3
Ibid,; see the text at pp, 287-288.
Ibid., p. 293.
^Ibid., pp. 293-294.
^Ibid., p. 297.
See the text at p. 294, for example.
8
Page-references in parentheses are to Rawls*s book, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1971).
9
See the text at p. 363, for example.
10
See the text at p. 365 in this connection.
11
Rawls does not use this particular locution, which is something of
a barbarism, but it captures the thrust of his thought and will enable me
to make my subsequent points rather simply.
12
In fact, once one gets down to correlating points on the reaction
spectrum with specific points on the circumstances continuum, and explaining exactly why one correlation is more appropriate than another,
the enterprise is not nearly so simple. This is why theories of civil disobedience, much less theories of "direct action" or even of revolution, can
be so controversial. How bad must things be on the circumstances continuum
to justify a given form of dissent on the reaction spectrum? Rawls himself
is explicitly concerned, in his book, with only two forms of dissent: civil
disobedience and "conscientious refusal".
13
This does not necessarily mean that circumstances have to change
materially; circumstances may remain the same, but after a certain length
of time, we*ve moved on the circumstances continuum and circumstances have
changed in that sense.
14
Of course, B will not resist the consequences by means of violence
or secrecy, since this would obviously violate the requirements of nonviolence and publicity. I return to this point below.
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Rawls*s explicit treatment of the willingness requirement in his
book is based on the claim that to be justified civil disobedience must
not only be public and nonviolent but that it must also be disobedience
"within the limits of fidelity to law". In asking, below, what is the
connection between these requirements for justified civil disobedience
and the requirement that the disobedient be willing to accept the full
legal consequences of his act, I shall be dealing with what I call Rawls s
"explicit" argument for the willingness requirement (it is the argument
that occurs explicitly in this context in his book). In Chapter V I shall
show that in fact there is quite a different argument (for the willingness
requirement) implicit in Rawls's book and some of his earlier writings. I
shall call this "Implicit" argument for the willingness requirement "the
argument by analogy", since it proceeds by analogy to Rawls's argument
for the duty to comply with (some) unjust laws (section 53), which I consider in Chapter IV.
1 fi

As I have already shown, Rawls says explicitly that such alternatives can be justified but indicates that his concern is with situations
where such extreme forms of dissent would not be justified but where
civil disobedience would.
17
See especially pp. 366-367. Civil disobedience is in fact "at the
boundary of fidelity to law", according to Rawls; that is, it is the last
step short of measures which repudiate fidelity to law.
18
A society is "reasonably just", on Rawls*s view, when it is as
just as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances. Given Rawls*s
general theory of justice, this means that a society is reasonably just
when it comes as close to satisfying the two principles of justice as it
is reasonable to expect under the circumstances of normal political life.
I return to this point and discuss it in considerable detail in Chapter
IV below.
19
I*m sure that Rawls would consider the situation that American
blacks found themselves in during the 1960s an example of the sort of
situation described in the text. There were certain laws that blacks
were obviously justified in protesting, even illegally. But I doubt that
Rawls would say that American society was so unjust in that period as to
forfeit any claim whatsoever to legitimate moral authority.
20
Notice that it is not always easy to say just where a given society
stands on the so-called "circumstances continuum" at a given point in
time. In our own country, for example, so-called "radicals" often differ
from less extreme political activists in exactly this respect: the former
believe, while the latter do not, that American society is more or less
totally unjust. Hence they are willing to resort to violence and revolutionary tactics to achieve their ends. And they believe that the state of
American society justifies their doing so.
21
See section 38 of his book, "The Rule of Law'*, where Rawls explains
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this notion. This is an important concept in Rawls's conception of a
well-ordered society, and I try to work it out in some detail in Chapter
IV below.
22
I am indebted to Michael Bratman for clarification on this point.
23
I shall have a great deal more to say about these matters in Chapter
IV. For the present I wish to accept the claim that we have this "natural
duty" to support and foster just institutions.
24
See his essay, "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play" in Sidney Hook (ed.), LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (New York University Press: New York,
1964).
25
In Chapter V, however, I return to this point and consider the
possibility that there is another, more profound analogy here and, hence,
a far more impressive argument for the willingness requirement.
26
See Charles Fried, "Moral Causation", HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Vol. 77
(1963-1964).
^^Ibid., pp. 1268-1269.
Ibid., p. 1269.
29
^Ibid.
Ibid.

NOTES —

CHAPTER III

It is this tradition that I had in mind above (see Chapter I,
Sect. 2) when I remarked that if someone wishes to argue that society
is right in punishing me, and that I have an obligation to accept that
punishment willingly, when I have rightly refused to obey an unjust law,
it would seem that the proponent of this view ought to bear the burden
of proof. In particular, we should like to know why it is right to
punish right conduct, even if the latter is illegal conduct. This burden of proof, however, is seldom discharged in recent theorizing about
civil disobedience; Rawls*s theory, as we shall see, is an exception.
2
See Bedau*s review of Carl Cohen*s book (op. cit.) in THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 69, No. 7 (April 6, 1972) at pp. 184-186.
*'Cohen*s book," writes Bedau, "like the orthodox theory of civil disobedience it expounds and like the paradigm practice of civil disobedience we owe to Gandhi and King, never calls this tradition into
question." (Bedau is alluding here to what he has just called "the
Liberal-Conservative tradition of Respect for Lawful Secular Authority".) "Yet just see how everything totters," he continues, "if
only we voice our doubts: why must the individual contemplating disobedience begin with any burden of justification whatsoever except in
a court of law (no doubt the unavowed model in terms of which the
*'philosophical problem of justification" is developed)? Why shouldn*t
the initial justificatory burden always be borne by those who would
oppose, arrest, try, convict, sentence, and punish the conscientious
disobedient?" (p. 186; Bedau*s emphasis).
Professor Joel Feinberg is mistaken, I think, when he implies
that Bedau is merely calling into question here "the discredited view"
that there is a moral presumption in favor of obedience to any law,
however instituted and enforced, whatever its provisions, and so forth
(see Feinberg*s review of Rawls*s book in the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY,
Vol. 70, No. 9 at p. 269). Certainly Bedau is questioning this (justly)
discredited version of extreme "legalism". But as the last two sentences in the quotation above make clear, Bedau is also asking why the
individual should be forced to assume any burden of (moral) proof in
his disobedience. This question cuts more deeply than Feinberg*s formulation, which is also a question Bedau is raising, to be sure. The
principal merit of Rawls*s theory of political obligation, as I shall
show, is that he provides an answer to the question of why there is
even a moral presumption in favor of obedience to the law, in more or
less "just" democratic societies at any rate.
3
John Rawls is an example. In an early article on "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play" (o£. cit.), Rawls writes that "I shall
assume, as requiring no argument, that there is, at least in a society
such as ours, a moral obligation to obey the law" (op. cit., p. 3 ) ; and
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in his recent book Rawls claims that "the injustice of a law is not, in
general, a sufficient reason for not adhering to it any more than the
legal validity of legislation...is a sufficient reason for going along
with it" (pp. 350-351).
4
See Carl Cohen, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (o£. cit.).
See the articles in the (1961) APA symposium on civil disobedience
mentioned in Chapter I as well as the articles in the (1963) NYU symposium on law and philosophy reprinted in Hook, op. cit.
6
Richard Wasserstrom, "The Obligation to Obey the Law", op. cit.,
pp. 782-783; Wasserstrom's emphasis.
7
I am extremely grateful to James Jeffers for forcing me to get
clear on this and many subsequent points connected with Wasserstrom* s
enterprise in "The Obligation to Obey the Law".
Q

See "The Obligation to Obey the Law" at p. 781. This view of
traditional democratic political theory is shared by Professor Marshall
Cohen; see the first paragraph of his "Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy", op. cit., and "Liberalism and Disobedience", 0£.
cit., at p. 283.
9
See p. 781, footnote 2, in Wasserstrom*s essay. Wasserstrom
attributes the view in question to Austin, Hume, and Locke.
•'•^A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Book III, Sects. 9 and 10.
11
Speaking of possible exceptions to the general obligation to obey
the law, Hume writes:
Our general knowledge of human nature, our
observation of the past history of mankind,
our experience of present times; all these
causes must induce us to open the door to
exceptions, and must make us conclude, that
we may resist the more violent effects of
supreme power without any crime or injustice
(Bk, III, Sect. 9).
'*'Tis certain," Hume writes later, "that in all our notions of morals we
never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make
allowances for resistance in more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression" (ibid.). Hume does not say just how "flagrant" these instances
of tyranny and oppression must be to justify disobedience and just what
sorts of disobedience would be justified under various conditions. But
see my remarks below.
12
See, for example, Richard Brandt, "Utility and the Obligation to
Obey the Law' in Hook, o£. cit.
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This point was illustrated rather nicely by two papers at the
N.Y.U. Institute on "Law and Philosophy" in 1963 (reprinted in Hook, o£.
cit.). Two prominent contemporary philosophers, Richard Brandt and John
Rawls, presented systematic analyses of the nature of our obligation to
obey the law. Interestingly, their accounts were roughly utilitarian^
and non-utilitarian, respectively. Rawls indicates explicitly that his
concern is "solely.,.with the grounds for our moral obligation to obey
the law," and his central thesis ".,,is that the obligation to obey the
law is a special case of the prima facie duty of fair play." The pertinent point for present purposes can be gleaned from two remarks Rawls
makes. At the very beginning of his paper Rawls says: "I shall assume,
as requiring no argument, that there is, at least in a society such as
ours, a moral obligation to obey the law, although it may, of course,
be overridden by other more stringent obligations." Later he writes:
"...the principles of justice are absolute with respect to the principle of utility...[i.e.] our obligation to obey the law...cannot be
overridden by an appeal to utility, though it may be overridden by
another duty of justice." Thus, the same moral principle whereby, according to Rawls, we incur an obligation or duty to obey the law can
always be imagined to make it morally justifiable to disobey the law
in certain circumstances.
Professor Brandt*s account of the nature of our obligation to
obey the law is analogous to Rawls's account in the relevant way, although the moral principles on \diich Brandt would base that obligation are quite different from Rawls's. "I shall argue that utility of
consequences is of more importance than Rawls appears to think," Brandt
writes. In fact, for Brandt utility is at the heart of our obligation
to obey the law: "...if a law has a function in maintaining the social
utility at the highest possible level, there is a prima facie obligation to obey that law." But of course this obligation is not absolute,
since "it does not follow that reflection will sustain the utility of
prima facie obligation to perform." The circle, then, is complete. The
obligation to obey the law is based, for Brandt, on considerations of
social utility; the justification for disobeying the law is based on
precisely the same principle.
14
See Wasserstrom, op. cit.» p. 780.
15
Perhaps an autobiographical remark would not be out of order
here. My original motive in undertaking the present study was to
evaluate a variety of arguments for what I call the "willingness requirement" and to show that they are simply not sound. This is still my
principal aim, but in the course of my research I have discovered that
behind the willingness requirement lies a more general — and very common — conception of the relation between citizen and state, at least in
societies that one might call "reasonably just". It is the most extreme
form of this view — that disobedience to the law is never justified in
such a society — that Wasserstrom considers in "The Obligation to Obey
the Law". This version of "legalism", however, is pretty clearly false.
As we shall see, though, modified and much more sophisticated versions
are widely received among contemporary political theorists, in our own

country at any rate. I shall eventually show that this phenomenon
"legalism", as I call it — is of much more than historical and academic
interest. It accounts, in large part, for the extreme conservatism of
liberal writing on civil disobedience, and, in particular, provides the
most plausible defense of the willingness requirement that is available
to proponents of the received view. In Chapter V I construct an argument for the willingness requirement that, as far as I know, none of its
proponents has ever actually advanced but which represents the best defense available to them for their doctrine. This argument is developed
from recent work of Rawls; hence, the discussion in this chapter and the
next is pertinent both to the question of the rationale of restricted
legalism with respect to legislative decisions as well as to the formulation of the argument for extreme legalism with respect to judicial
decisions in Chapter V.
16
Subsequent to writing this material I read Marshall Cohen's
essay "Liberalism and Disobedience", in which he too points out that
"the Socrates of the APOLOGY and CRITO is not standing trial as a civil
disobedient" (p. 289). I disagree with Cohen, however, when he suggests
that since Socrates has really not broken the law, his willingness to
accept the punishment cannot be understood as it shoiild be in cases of
civil disobedience. To be sure, the cases are different: Socrates has
presumably not broken the law; the civil disobedient has, ex hypothesi,
' done so. But I shall try to show that Socrates' arguments for accepting the consequences of a fair trial in a just society, even when one
is innocent of any illegal conduct, bear directly on the claim that
one must accept the consequences of justifiable civil disobedience.
Cohen and I may not actually disagree here since, as I have shown in
Chapter II, his conception of the role of the willingness requirement
in theories of civil disobedience is not the one I am opposed to.
What's more, Cohen agrees that "although Socrates is not on trial for
having committed a civilly disobedient act, it is true that some of
his arguments if successful, would bear on the predicament of the civil
disobedient and are therefore relevant to our theme" (p. 290).
''•^Plato, EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, and CRITO, trans. F. J. Church and
R. D. Gumming (Library of Liberal Arts: Indianapolis and New York;
1956), p. 57.
Ibid., p. 58.
19TV-/I

p. 56.
Ibid.,
20^,..
P. 57.
Ibid.,
2^TL-A

P. 65.
Ibid.,
22
"^^Ibid., PP . 58-59.
23
58.
''^Ibid., P.
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24

IMd., p. 60,
^^Ibid.
26
Ibid.
^^Ibid,
28
Ibid,

NOTES —

CHAPTER IV

1
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 0£, cit,. Chapter VI, especially section
53.
2
I shall assume, following Rawls here for the sake of argument,
that we can make sense of the distinction between so-called prima facie
duties (or "duties other things equal", as Rawls sometimes calls them)
and "actual" or "on-balance" duties ("duties all things considered",
as he calls them). I shall assume, with Rawls and a few other recent
writers, that there is an important distinction between moral obligations, properly so called, and moral duties. On the first distinction
see A THEORY OF JUSTICE at pp, 340-341, For the second point see pp.
113 ff., ibid., and the articles mentioned in footnote 29, p. 113.
^See A THEORY OF JUSTICE at pp. 115-116 and p. 335 ff.
4
Ibid., p. 335.
Thus, in a full analysis we should want to ask whether we actually
have a natural duty to support just institutions, for example, and whether
(if we do) Rawls's account of this matter is correct (see section 51 of
his book). We would also need to get clear on the status of premiss (2):
is this a stipulative claim or a substantive claim of some sort, for example? We would surely have to determine whether (4) is correct, as a
plain matter of empirical fact. These are just a few of the questions
I am passing over here.
The only alternative is to extract this notion from premiss (4).
But this would make (4) either plainly false, if the new claim were that
absolute compliance is required, or intolerably vague, if we try to
gloss this distinction entirely.
See footnote 2 above on the notion of prima facie duties.
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, sections 18 and 52; see also Rawls's
early article, "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play", o£. cit.
9
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE at p. 350.
Ibid.
11
See Rawls, "Legal Obligation...", o£. cit., and Charles Fried,
"Moral Causation", op. cit.
12
It,.
Rawls himself implicitly (but perhaps unwittingly) acknowledges
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this when he remarks in a footnote that the account of the moral basis of
civil authority in his book differs from that in his early article ("Legal
Obligation,..") in that the principle of fairness plays only "a secondary
role" in the book, where "the natural duty of justice is the main principle of political duty for citizens generally" (footnote 13, p, 353).
13
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, p. 4.
14
Ibid,, p. 355,
Ibid,
16
These conditions are not to be confused with the features of
civil disobedience which are part of its definition, according to Rawls
— e.g., the fact that it must be a public and nonviolent act. See A
THEORY OF JUSTICE at p. 364. The necessary conditions for justified
civil disobedience are sketched in section 57, pp. 371-377.
17
Ibid., section 59.
1R

Ibid., p. 380.
19
It is important to notice that they would still be legally bound
to those results and, for all we*ve said so far, to the appropriate legal
sanctions. But see Chapter VI below.
20
Unjust from the point of view of the first principle of justice,
that is, or the second part of the second.
^•""See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, section 38, "The Rule of Law". On the
alleged "instability" of the system I favor see section 53 and also
p. 367.
22
Of course the latter point might eventually make us want to
change our judicial system so that such disobedients could make their
case in court. I suggest such changes in Chapter VI below.

NOTES —

CHAPTER V

I have not emphasized the degree to which this assumption pervades
recent liberal political theory. Thus, Marshall Cohen writes: "It must
not be supposed...that the civil disobedient*s position implies that he
will never submit to the requirements of an unjust law. In fact, the
citizen in a democracy often has a moral obligation to do precisely that"
("Liberalism and Disobedience", 0£. cit., p, 288), Without explicitly
saying that the prima facie obligation to obey the law can extend as far
as an actual obligation to obey unjust laws, Joel Feinberg makes it clear
that he too shares the view that there is a moral presumption in favor of
obeying the law in reasonably just societies: ",..there is normally a
presumption against disobeying the law in a just, or near-just, society
— not an unconditional moral prohibition, but a kind of standing case
that must be overridden in a given instance by sufficient reasons" (see
his review of Rawls*s book, cited above, p. 269).
2
Professor Bedau is speaking to this same point, I think, albeit
rather obliquely, when he remarks: "Cohen has shown that it is possible
to write a brief and intelligent book on civil disobedience, provided
one leaves intact Liberal-Conservative assumptions about our *prima
facie duty to obey... [the] law.* No one else should trouble to do this
again. Some may wonder why philosophers do it at all" (see his review
of Carl Cohen*s book, mentioned above, p. 186).
o

The final remark ("in the kinds of cases we*re concerned with")
is crucial, of course. We*re presumably at a point on the "circumstances continuum" that is beyond the limits of tolerable injustice but
not so far beyond those limits as to justify anything more (on the "reaction spectrum") than civil disobedience as Rawls understands it. This
assumption is at the bottom of the discussion throughout this chapter.
Thus, when I say that Rawls insists on a willingness to accept the consequences, even when one is justified in one*s disobedience, I mean when
one is justified in civil disobedience but nothing more. Rawls himself
acknowledges that at some point (justified rebellion being the clearest
case) it would be absurd (and a moral error) to characterize disobedience
as justified and yet to insist on a willingness to pay the penalty.
4
For simplicity*s sake, I have omitted a critical distinction —
the distinction between so-called "direct" and "indirect" disobedience.
Thus, I sometimes write as though whenever breaking a particular law is
justified it is because that law is itself beyond the limits of tolerable
injustice. Strictly speaking, this is only true in cases of "direct"
disobedience. In cases of "indirect" disobedience we are indeed confronted with intolerable injustice, but that injustice does not reside in
the law that is broken. My remarks below are intended to apply to both
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sorts of cases, even when, for the sake of simplicity, I write as though
it is the law actually disobeyed that is beyond the limits of tolerable
injustice.
The following remarks are based on a point originally suggested
to me by David Schweickart.
6
Again, we are assuming that the limits of tolerable injustice have
been passed, but only just passed. That is, nothing more than civil disobedience is appropriate, else it would not even be arguable that the disobedient ought to pay the penalty, (It should also be recalled that I
intend my remarks to apply, mutatis mutandis, to cases where the offensive
law is not directly the object of disobedience,)
7
Rawls apparently believes that they should, and would, but of course
he does not explicitly say so, since the argument by analogy is my own invention. I believe that it is clearly in the spirit of the Rawlsian enterprise, however, and I believe that it affords Rawls a far more reasonable
defense for the willingness requirement than any of the explicit arguments
considered in Chapter II above.
8
See footnote 3 above for the explanation of this parenthetical remark.
9
The argument that justification entails nonpunishment is designed
to bring this out more perspicuously, of course.
As we shall see below, what this amounts to in practice is the
claim that a greater balance of justice over injustice is achieved, in
the long run, by excluding legal defenses based on appeal to moral principles — even the so-called principles of political morality — than by
allowing such defenses in the courtroom.
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 0£. cit., p. 367. Rawls is not talking explicitly about what I call the "willingness requirement" here, but there
is clearly no distortion in applying his remarks to that problem.
12
Professor Joel Feinberg has remarked to me privately that Rawls
may be willing to give up the willingness requirement without a fight.
This would be quite congenial to me, although it would make the present
study rather academic (to put it midly) in parts.
13
Rawls softens his stance at one point by saying: "Courts should
take into account the civilly disobedient nature of the protester*s act,
and the fact that it is justifiable (or may seem so) by the political
principles underlying the constitution, and on these grounds reduce and
in some cases suspend the legal sanction" (A THEORY OF JUSTICE, p. 387).
Rawls then mentions Ronald Dworkin*s well-known essay, "On Not Prosecuting
Civil Disobedience", in a footnote. I reply to Dworkin, and implicitly to
Rawls, in the next chapter.
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Of course, the phrase "the principle of institutional settlement"
niight well be thought of as a generic term for institutionalized decisionprocedures, in which case it would include the principle of majority rule.
I use the phrase much more narrowly here, to serve as the judicial analogue of the principle of majority rule.
I say "moral and political defenses", but I am actually interested
in defending only the possibility of allowing "moral" defenses, strictly
speaking. Though this is not the place to do so, I think it could be
shown that one of the principal advantages of Rawls*s theory of justice is
that he explains the relationship between so-called individual ethics and
political morality. Thus, he speaks of civil disobedience as a "political act, but, of course, it is also a moral act. Professor Marshall
Cohen has written elsewhere of "the principles of political morality".
The point is that the principles underlying political action are moral
principles, as Rawls*s theory demonstrates. To underline this point, I
shall often speak of "moral and political defenses" for disobedience to
the law, where I mean defenses that appeal to the ultimate principles of
political morality. Rawls*s principles of justice are an example of
what I have in mind here.

NOTES —

CHAPTER VI

Richard Wasserstrom, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (Stanford University
Stanford, 1961), p. 1.
2
I explain what I have in mind here in more detail in section 3
below, where I elaborate Rawls's theory of justified noncompliance (his
theory of civil disobedience as well as his theory of conscientious refusal) and use it to explicate the notion of injustice used here.
3
I have deliberately refrained from saying that his beliefs must
be "correct", since this would be too rigorous (and unreasonable) a
requirement in cases of the sort I have in mind. On the other hand, we
need a stronger requirement than sincerity alone, for obvious reasons.
Hence I argue that in order to be acquitted the defendant must convince
the jury that his moral convictions are reasonable as well as genuine
or sincere. See section 3 below for the details of my proposal.
4
See almost any recent article on disobedience to the law in both
the popular and professional journals. See in particular the articles
discussed in Chapters I and II above.
5
My interest here is partly personal. I was present when a federal
judge Instructed my unfortunate friend, David Malament, that his reasons
for refusing induction were irrelevant to his guilt or innocence before
the law. Mr. Malament was advised to speak only to the question of
whether he had in fact refused induction and the jury was instructed to
disregard other remarks. Since Mr. Malament was endeavoring to explain
why he had in fact refused induction, he was in effect pleading guilty.
Such considerations might of course be taken into account in sentencing, or they might not. I discuss this point in detail in section 2
below.
Press:

Notice that by using Rawls's theory of noncompliance to explain
what would count as "good reasons", I obviate certain serious problems
that arise for proposals like my own. In particular, I severely limit
the kinds of cases in which a moral defense could be raised in a court
of law as well as the kinds of considerations that are appropriately
raised there.
8
Ronald Dworkin, "On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience", THE NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Vol. 10, June 6, 1968. This article has recently
been reprinted in Jeffrie Murphy (ed.), CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND VIOLENCE
(Wadsworth: Belmont, Calif., 1971). Page references below are to the
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS.
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9
Ibid., p. 14.
Ibid.
The appeal to utility is implicit in the allusion to the "loss"
our society suffers if it punishes in these cases; I think Dworkin has
another principle in mind — perhaps a principle of "fittingness" or
equity — when he says that an obvious reason for not punishing in such
cases is that the resisters "act out of better motives", etc.
12
Obviously, Dworkin did not have this point of view in mind m
making his proposal, and my remarks should not be misunderstood as a
criticism of Dworkin's efforts to propose a workable and realistic solution to an urgent moral and political problem at a time when even men of
good will were polarized into bitterly opposed factions. Dworkin was
not writing about legal change or reform; as I understand it, his thesis
was that to some extent our legal system already had means for resolving
the problem of what to do when some of our most conscientious and loyal
citizens found it necessary to act in open defiance of the law.
13
But see Dworkin* s addendum to his article in Murphy, op. cit.,
where he acknowledges that far from taking his advice, the Nixon administration actually Increased the number of prosecutions for draft offenses. I saw this postscript to his article only when this manuscript
was in the typist*s hands.
14
In this connection, however, see footnote 12 above. Dworkin was
obviously concerned to make a proposal that would involve a minimum of
controversy and a maximum of justice by suggesting a way that the government could respect the resister*s views without acknowledging that they
were correct.
Certainly nothing said thus far in behalf of the willingness requirement is a very compelling reason for not giving them this chance.
The central question in the latter half of this chapter will be whether
doing so would involve us in a legal arrangement that is obviously less
effectively just than an arrangement that prohibits moral defenses for
otherwise illegal conduct.
16
I am not suggesting that Dworkin himself holds this view. It
is convenient, however, to mention it here, since it faces problems
similar to the ones his view faces and also because it is a very popular
view.
17
See, for example, the views of former Supreme Court Justice Abe
Fortas in CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, 0£. cit.
18
Jon M. Van Dyke, "The Jury As a Political Institution", THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Vol. Ill, No. 2.
19
Ibid., p. 11.
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20 ^
Ibid., p. 17,
22
Ibid., p. 18.
23
Ibid., p, 18,
Ibid,
^^Ibid,, pp. 19-20.
^^Ibid., p. 19.
27
Ibid. Van Dyke even finds an example of a system within the
United States where, as he says, "the jury is given the power of mercy
but not of vengeance." This is in Maryland, where the Constitution
reads: "In the trial of all criminal cases the jury shall be the judge
of the law as well as the facts." Under this provision. Van Dyke writes,
the jury is given the following instructions in every criminal case:
Members of the jury, this is a criminal case
and under the Constitution and the laws of
the State of Maryland in a criminal case the
jury are judges of the law as well as of the
facts in the case. So that whatever I tell
you about the law, while it is intended to
be helpful to you in reaching a just and proper
verdict in the case, it is not binding upon you
as members of the jury and you may accept the
law as you apprehend it to be the case.
Ibid., p. 26.
29
^Ibid.
Ibid.
31
See his "Liberalism and Disobedience", for example, op. cit.,
p. 298.
32
Of course, showing that a particular law or policy violated one
or the other of these two principles would not be sufficient to make
good a defense of "moral justification". For the defendant would have
to convince the jury that the breach of these principles was indeed a
serious one, that he had acted in defiance of the law only after he had
failed to win his rights through legal channels, that his illegal acts
were appropriate to the situation and not wantonly criminal, and so
forth. In short, the disobedient, or his attornies, would have to convince the jury that the act in question, while manifestly illegal, was
morally justifiable in light of theories like that of Rawls, Cohen, and
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others.

I take up this problem again below.

33
For a discussion of sincerity alone as a sufficient condition for
acquittal see Hugo Bedau, "On Civil Disobedience", THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 58, No. 21 (October 12, 1961), p. 655. Suppose a jury decides
that an instance of moral dissent was motivated out of a genuine concern
with the possible injustice of a law or policy, but that that dissent was
neither correct nor reasonable. Although we may want to allow the defendant *s sincerity to count as a mitigating factor, I do not think that
sincerity alone should be thought of as either an excusing or a justifying condition before the law. My position is a conservative one in this
respect,
34
A slightly weaker case would be one in which the jury concludes
that the defendant*s moral convictions were reasonable and at least not
clearly incorrect.
35
This sort of case is suggested by Rawls, See A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
op. cit.s pp. 381-382.
36
I shall not be able to establish this second claim (about the
practicability of the arrangement I favor) as firmly as I should like,
since ultimately it depends upon empirical data that are not yet available. However, I shall show that the burden of proof is on proponents
of alternatives to the arrangement I favor, that they have not discharged
this burden of proof, and that the likelihood is that they cannot do so,
since empirical investigation is more likely than not to vindicate the
practicality of the arrangement I have suggested.
^^Herbert Packer, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (Stanford
University Press: Stanford, 1968), p. 65.
Ibid.s p. 63.
39
Ibid.s p. 65.
Ibid., p. 66.
41
Press:

H. L. A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (Oxford University
New York, 1968), p. 31.

^^Ibid., p. 49.
43
See his "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment" in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, 0£. cit.
44
As attorney William Kunstler has pointed out, such a procedure
"would not mean that all individuals who follow their own conscience
would, or should, go free. A person who is civilly disobedient would
have to convince a jury that his moral reasons for disobeying the law
were significant — in fact, that they were more important than the value
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of obedience, in this instance. This would certainly be no easy task,
but it would provide a means of accommodation, without compromising the
law, in cases where the action clearly benefitted society and where no
one*s interests were harmed." Quoted from Hall, op. cit,, pp, 136-137.
45
I am indebted to David Looman and Margaret Wrensch for bringing
this problem to my attention and for discussing it with me. This entire
section has also benefitted from discussions I*ve had with Virginia
Tuttie,
46
A recent example is Federal District Judge Julius Hoffman*s conduct in the conspiracy trial of "The Chicago Seven", The verdict
against the defendants was overturned by a higher court on the grounds
that Hoffman prejudiced the jury against the defendants, among other
things.
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